

Supplementary Material for Changing Tides: Public Attitudes on Climate Migration*

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Contents

Literature Review	S.1
Does Climate Change Cause Migration?	S.1
Labor Market Competition and Sociotropic Concerns	S.2
Reasons for Migrating and Public Opinion	S.3
The Role of Empathy in Migration Attitudes	S.3
Labor Market Competition, Nativism, Climate Migration, and Conflict?	S.5
Climate Change Beliefs	S.6
From Climate Migration Attitudes to Climate Change Mitigation?	S.7
Pre-Registration	S.8
Experimental Sample	S.9
Experimental Design: Study 1	S.11
Main Results: Study 1	S.12
Summary Statistics: Study 1	S.14
Diagnostic Tests: Study 1	S.15
Marginal Means: Study 1	S.27
Heterogeneous Effects: Study 1	S.31
Experimental Design: Study 2	S.43
Main Results: Study 2	S.44
Summary Statistics: Study 2	S.48
Diagnostic Tests: Study 2	S.49

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Weighted Results: Study 2	S.55
Interaction Effects: Study 2	S.56
Survey Texts	S.69
Pre-Test	S.69
Survey Text: Study 1	S.72
Survey Text: Study 2	S.74
Perceptions of Voluntariness and Deservingness	S.84
References for Supplementary Materials	S.85

Literature Review

Despite dire predictions about the prospects of climate-induced displacement, and substantial academic and policy attention paid to migration¹ and climate change² generally, relatively little work examines climate-induced migration, or the theoretical and empirical relationships between migration, climate change, climate migration.³ To be sure, an interdisciplinary array of scholars have grappled with facets of the climate migration problem. Legal scholars have analyzed how climate migrants might be integrated into international legal paradigms for migration (Meadam 2012). Economists and demographers have studied the effects of climatic events on migration flows (Suhrke 1994; Beine and Parsons 2015; Hunter, Luna, and Norton 2015; Abel et al. 2019). And political scientists have examined the effects of climate change on conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; Kahl 1998; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013; Von Uexkull et al. 2016), including conflict between climate migrants and hosts (Reuveny 2007; Bhavnani and Lacina 2015, 2018). What is left out of existing work, however, is a systematic analysis of public opinion about climate-induced migration. Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman (2014: 132) implicitly recognize this, calling for more work “on the dynamics of environmental migration in receiving countries.”

Does Climate Change Cause Migration?

Do climatic changes actually drive migration? The empirical record is mixed, but a growing body of macro- and microlevel studies identify links between environmental change and migration both *within* and *between* countries. In particular, most evidence suggests that sudden onset environmental catastrophes like hurricanes and floods, as well as gradual onset climatic changes like desertification, drought, and soil erosion can cause affected populations to migrate in response. A unifying theme across these studies is that migration is one of several adaptations that affected populations may choose in response to environmental changes.⁴ As Hunter, Luna, and Norton (2015: 385) explain, “Humans have long responded to environmental conditions through migration, and population movement is increasingly being seen as a long-standing adaptive response.”

In seminal models of migration, individuals weigh the costs of leaving versus the prospective benefits of migrating to various destination countries before deciding whether and where to go, subject to uncertainty and budget constraints. Factors driving individuals to leave their home countries are “push” factors, while factors inducing gravitation toward certain destinations are “pull” factors. In the context of climate migration, extant

¹For useful reviews of the recent literature on migration, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) and Song (2018).

²For useful reviews of the recent literature on climate change, see Bernauer (2013) and Egan and Mullin (2017).

³See Reuveny (2007); Nordås and Gleditsch (2007); Black, Kniveton, and Schmidt-Verkerk (2011); and Koubi (2019) for several prominent exceptions.

⁴We opt for the language of choice in order to emphasize the agency of affected individuals. This follows scholarship on voluntary and forced migration, which analyzes migrant decisionmaking in a choice-based, rationalist, utility-maximizing framework (Czaika 2009; Grogger and Hanson 2011; Hanson and McIntosh 2016).

research studies the role of environmental changes as “push” factors.

At the macrolevel, evidence suggests that deviations in temperature and precipitation (Backhaus, Martinez-Zarzoso, and Muris 2015) and flooding drive interstate migration, particularly when agriculturally-dependent regions are affected (Coniglio and Pesce 2015). These changes drive especially greater migration to urban and wealthier areas (Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2006). In fact, Reuveny and Moore (2009) show that the migration-promoting effect of environmental degradation is equivalent in magnitude to socioeconomic and political factors. Notwithstanding some evidence that climatic factors have only limited (Beine and Parsons 2015; Grace et al. 2018) or even a negative influence on migration (Cattaneo and Peri 2016; Riomena et al. 2018), at least at present (Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman 2014), these studies suggest that policymakers’ concerns about waves of climate-induced migrants moving across borders are not baseless.

Moreover, studies of the effects of climatic factors on interstate migration are likely to miss substantial migratory flows that occur within countries. As the examples of displacement after Hurricane Dorian and the Kerala floods suggest, many climate-induced migrants are likely to move within national borders. Microlevel studies are better suited to detect these internal flows, and a growing number of them suggest that internal climate migration is a widespread phenomenon. For example, the Dust Bowl in Oklahoma (McLeman and Smit 2006; Hornbeck 2012), droughts in Mali (Findley 1994), land degradation and deforestation in Nepal (Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire 2010), warming temperatures in Indonesia (Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer, and Hsiang 2012) and Pakistan (Mueller, Clark, and Kosec 2014), coastal erosion in Bangladesh (Penning-Rowsell, Sultana, and Thompson 2013), flooding in Vietnam (Dun 2011), and crop failures in Bangladesh (Gray and Mueller 2010) and Mexico (Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer 2010) have all triggered internal—and some international—migration.

Labor Market Competition and Sociotropic Concerns

Migration scholars recognize two dominant models of preference-formation on immigration: the political economy model and the sociotropic model (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). According to the political economy model, individuals’ preferences over migration are a function of their education and factor endowments, which jointly determine the extent to which individuals’ will personally face competition from migrants for labor market opportunities and public resources (Khoo 1994; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Work linking climate change to conflict via the effects of environmental change on migration often relies on political economy arguments, such as the contention that climate migrants will compete with local natives for scarce resources (Reuveny 2007), and especially for jobs (McIntosh 2008).⁵

An alternative approach to migration attitudes, the sociotropic model, suggests that opinion is driven by symbolic considerations about the effects of migration on the nation as a whole. In particular, many studies in this tradition suggest that attitudes about migrants are driven by racial and other identitarian biases, as well as considerations about national economic and cultural welfare (Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller

⁵Although Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan (2009) note that it is unclear perceptions of labor market competition vary according to migrants’ reason for migrating.

and Hopkins 2014). Leveraging a natural experiment based on Swiss votes over immigrants' citizenship applications, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) show that several forms of discrimination drive immigration policy preferences. First, statistical discrimination causes voters to use immigrants' country of origin as a cue to determine migrants' likely levels of integration; voters reward applicants for observable traits that facilitate integration, such as occupation and language skills. Second, xenophobic taste-based discrimination causes voters to systematically prefer immigrants from countries viewed as more socially proximate. These xenophobic reactions are most intense where immigrant out-groups are geographically concentrated and threaten to tip the demographic balance. Insofar as most climate-induced migration occurs within countries, sociotropic models may be less relevant in understanding attitudes; internal migrants moving within countries should not trigger strong concerns about national cultural welfare, for instance. On the other hand, arguments about the effects of climate migrants on ethnic relations within host communities echo sociotropic arguments (Reuveny 2007). Moreover, evidence that climate migration is associated with the rise of populist parties and nativist violence suggests (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015, 2018), perhaps, that climate migration does trigger acute concerns about how climate migrants will impact the demographic composition and overall economic health of host communities.

Recent evidence on the individual-level correlates of migration attitudes generally supports the sociotropic model (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 2015). Education is the most robust correlate of migration attitudes, and its effect is not driven by the fact that more educated individuals will face lower labor market competition from low-skilled migrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Partisanship and employment status are also relevant, with Democrats and employed individuals generally preferring more liberal migration policies (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 2015). In our subsequent experimental analysis, we build on these known correlates when analyzing the relationship between attitudes about migration generally and climate migration specifically.

Reasons for Migrating and Public Opinion

While we do not discount the importance of labor market and sociotropic factors in migration attitudes, our main theoretical argument builds from new work suggesting that humanitarian considerations also play an important role. In a large scale study of attitudes in Western Europe, Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2016) show that migrants who move in search of economic opportunities receive significantly less public support than individuals fleeing persecution. Migrants' vulnerabilities also affect the support they receive. These results also hold in Jordan (Alrababa'h et al. 2020). Studying internal migration in Vietnam and Kenya, Spilker et al. (2020) find a preference for climate and economic migrants versus persecuted migrants. These findings are ripe for future study, and suggest that attitudes about persecuted versus economic migrants vary between developed versus developing countries, and international versus internal migrants.

The Role of Empathy in Migration Attitudes

Recent research shows differences in public support for economic migrants versus refugees are rooted in contrasting perceptions of voluntariness. Whereas economic

migrants are perceived as voluntary migrants responsible for their own situations, persecuted individuals are perceived as involuntary migrants not responsible for their plight (Verkuyten 2004; Verkuyten, Mepham, and Kros 2018). At the micro-level, differing perceptions of voluntariness and responsibility trigger different emotional responses (Weiner 1995; de Waal 2008). Economic migrants elicit anger because they are perceived as self-responsible and hence undeserving of support; refugees elicit empathy because their situation is perceived as beyond their control (Verkuyten, Mepham, and Kros 2018).

As Davis (1983) and de Waal (2008) explain, empathy entails a three step process. First, a subject becomes emotionally aroused upon seeing another individual's emotional distress. When others' emotional distress induces personal distress, egoistic behavior drives observers to seek to help those in need in order to alleviate their own personal distress. Observing suffering also leads individuals to sympathize in an other-regarding manner. Finally, sympathizers engage in perspective-taking, seeking to put themselves in the victim's place. When observers imagine others' emotional states, their own personal arousal is heightened, driving more empathetic, ameliorative behavior.

Although Spilker et al.'s (2020) findings on internal migration in the developing world defy the generalization that empathy is greater for persecuted migrants than labor migrants, a possible explanation stands out. Internal labor migration is common and accepted in the developing settings Spilker et al. (2020) study. The commonness of internal labor migration potentially makes it easier for respondents to empathize with internal labor migrants on the basis of shared experiences, like if the respondent or a family member migrated internally for work. As Williamson et al. (2020) demonstrate, recollecting personal and familial experiences of migration heightens support for migrants. Hence, Spilker et al.'s (2020) findings are wholly consistent with an account whereby empathy rooted in personal experience underlies greater support for economic migrants in the a developing world, internal migration context. Personal identification with the challenge of internal labor migration in the developing world might explain why Spilker et al. (2020) document greater support for labor migrants than persecuted individuals.

More generally, several recent studies highlight the importance of empathy as a mechanism underlying support for migrants. In sub-Saharan Africa, individuals exposed to violence in civil war are more supportive of refugees, especially from social and ethnic out-groups, because exposure to past violence increases empathy, driving support for migration hosting (Hartman and Morse 2020). Similarly, Williamson et al. (2020) show that when primed to think about family experiences of migration, individuals in the U.S. are more supportive of policies to aid migrants. Third, Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018) show that when primed to take the perspective of Syrian refugees—a key step of empathy elicitation—U.S. citizens become more likely to advocate for policies to support these refugees. Finally, more empathetic individuals are more concerned with humanitarianism and less responsive to purported threats posted by migrants (Newman et al. 2015).

Building on these arguments, we hypothesize that climate-induced migrants occupy an intermediate place in the public view. (see also Suhrke 1994: 483). Because climatic events are beyond human control, individuals fleeing these events are attributed with low responsibility for their actions: climate migrants are viewed as involuntary migrants, in contrast to economic migrants. On the other hand, climate migrants do not flee deliberate campaigns of persecution like refugees. The targeted nature of persecution elevates the

affective sympathy, and in turn empathy, that observers feel for victims (de Waal 2008). Whereas flight is typically the only resort for individuals facing persecution, those affected by extreme climatic events have a variety of adaptive options, of which migration is one possible response (McLeman 2014). As such, climate migrants are viewed as more self-responsible—and hence less deserving of empathy—than refugees.

Labor Market Competition, Nativism, Climate Migration, and Conflict?

As the preceding discussion implies, environmental change is associated with out-migration in some contexts. Given the distributional and demographic consequences of migration and the socioeconomic effects of climate change, the growing consensus that climate migration occurs raises additional questions about the relationship between climate-induced migration and conflict. In particular, because climate change can disturb economic growth and because climate migrants may compete with host communities for jobs and resources, or alter the ethnic balance in host communities (e.g. Reuveny 2007) policymakers often express concerns about the effect of climate migration on conflict.

A long-standing contention holds that the social impacts of climate change, like reduced agricultural productivity, economic decline, and population displacement, serve as drivers for conflict (Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994). Apart from its material effects, moreover, climate change can spur conflict by stimulating aggression, a psychological response to warmer temperatures (Bollfrass and Shaver 2015). Climatic changes have also been linked to prominent historical phenomena, like the General Crisis of the 17th Century (Zhang et al. 2011), and more recent conflicts like the Syrian Civil War.⁶ Several review articles and meta-analyses also confirm the link between climate change and conflict (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Still, the climate-conflict relationship is predicated on the social and political effects of environmental change (Levy 1995; Salehyan 2008).

Unsurprisingly, then, migration is one of the primary mechanisms through which climate change is alleged to lead to conflict. Specifically, climatic events are said to cause conflict indirectly by inducing migration, in turn triggering violent competition between migrants and host communities over employment opportunities and resources, and exacerbating ethnic tensions (Reuveny 2007). These problems are compounded by the fact that governments have been slow to react or provide social welfare protections in the wake of climate-induced migrant influxes (McLeman 2014). In fact, local officials in receiving regions may even stoke tensions between climate migrants and host citizens to protect their parochial interests (Kahl 1998). For instance, in Indian states with weaker ties to the central government—and hence fewer resources to offset host community grievances or deter further migration—influxes of flood-driven migrants propel the rise of populist parties and the outbreak of anti-migrant rioting (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015, 2018). This perspective is also consistent with Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman’s (2015) finding that

⁶Ash and Obradovich (2019) argue that drought in Syria led to migration from drought-stricken areas, and that drought migrants in turn joined anti-regime protests, precipitating the war. This argument parallels Von Uexkull et al.’s (2016) argument about the association between drought and conflict, and Hendrix and Salehyan’s (2012) findings on the relationship between drought and protest. On the other hand, Selby et al. (2017) find no evidence that drought conditions in Syria contributed to migratory pressures or conflict escalation.

flood-driven migrant flows are not associated with new conflict outbreaks, but do exacerbate existing conflicts.

The relationship between climate migration and conflict renders understanding public opinion about climate migrants imperative. As Koubi (2019: 354) elaborates, “it is crucial to understand ... how residents in the host locations perceive [climate migrants] in order to be able to prevent conflict in the receiving areas.” While public opinion plays a central role in the relationship between host communities and migrants, existing theories linking climatic events and conflict through a climate migration channel simply assume that host publics will oppose the presence of these individuals. Some evidence supports this presumption. For example, Linke et al. (2018) find that Kenyan drought migrants are frequent targets of nativist violence. Conflict cycles can emerge because these migrants are more likely to support violence after having been victimized in anti-migrant attacks.

This evidence notwithstanding, other studies challenge the notion that host communities will unilaterally oppose climate migration. For instance, McLeman and Smit (2006) show that previous waves of Dust Bowl migrants from Oklahoma to California facilitated the integration of subsequent waves of Dust Bowl migrants. This finding is consistent with broader evidence from the migration literature about the importance of networks as a “pull” to specific destinations (Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets 2014). Before individuals migrate, kin networks can relay information about conditions in prospective destinations, as well as risks along the way. Within destination countries, these networks ease integration (Rüegger and Bohnet 2018), reduce the risk of xenophobic attacks (Freibel, Gallego and Mendola 2013), and help secure higher-paying jobs (Munshi 2003) and better housing (Light, Bernard and Kim 1999).

Climate Change Beliefs

In terms of climate change attitudes, existing research identifies three sets of factors correlated with public opinion: demographics, risk perceptions, and personal experiences (Egan and Mullin 2017). The three strongest demographic predictors of climate change beliefs are partisanship, gender, and religiosity. The effect of partisanship on climate change beliefs is unsurprising given the substantial political polarization of elite rhetoric and trust in science in the United States, and increasingly, worldwide (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Egan and Mullin 2017). Numerous studies show that political liberals are more likely to believe in and support actions to mitigate anthropogenic climate change. Similarly, women (Leiserowitz 2006; Hornsey et al. 2016) and less religious individuals (Arbuckle and Konisky 2015; Egan and Mullin 2017) are more likely to believe in climate change and support mitigation efforts.

Apart from demographic characteristics, both risk perceptions and personal experiences also impact climate change attitudes. Regarding the latter, risk perceptions vary across individuals according to their values and worldviews. Given the slow, long-standing threat posed by climate change, these views and values bear importantly on attitudes about climate change. For instance, several recent studies indicate that egalitarian-minded people are substantially more likely to support climate change mitigation than people who value hierarchical social organization (Leiserowitz 2006; Kahan et al. 2012; Hornsey et al. 2016). Apart from values and beliefs, risk perceptions are also affected by

personal experiences and geographic vulnerability to threats. In particular, personal experiences of climate change are associated with increased belief (Egan and Mullin 2012). In the context of climate migration, this evidence suggests that people with certain values—empathy, for instance—will be more supportive of climate migrants. Similarly, individuals with more personal experiences with migrants or climate change may be more supportive of settling climate migrants. As noted above, empathy should help people, especially those with past exposure to climate change, take the perspective of prospective climate migrants. Above all, however, our empirical tests described below will allow us to test whether mass attitudes about climate migration track more closely with opinion on migration or climate change broadly.

From Climate Migration Attitudes to Climate Change Mitigation?

While comparative evaluations of climate migration help benchmark where climate-induced migrants fit on the spectrum of broader public attitudes about migration, we are also interested in understanding whether: (1) attitudes about climate migration are more similar to attitudes about climate change or about migration, and in turn whether priming the salience of climate migration—that is, putting a human face on the turmoil wrought by anthropogenic climate change—can increase individual support for climate change mitigation policies; and (2) how different values and experiences affect attitudes about climate migration.

We anticipate links between climate migration attitudes and both general migration and general climate change attitudes. This follows because climate migration is an issue area that bridges climate change and migration. Preference formation is complex, and often subject to competing stimuli (Druckman and Lupia 2016). In the context of climate change, some evidence suggests that declining mass prioritization of climate change mitigation efforts is a function of the fact that climate change mitigation competes with economic concerns in the public eye. This preference competition implies the potential for competition in individual preferences over migration and climate change. Emphasizing the intermediate, bridging function of climate migration, a phenomenon that straddles migration and climate change, we argue that increasing the salience of climate-induced migration will increase individuals preferences for action to address climate migration, climate change, and migration.

Our expectation that greater salience of climate migration will increase support for climate change mitigation also follows because climate migration and climate change mitigation efforts are interdependent—developed states may pursue mitigation to alleviate climate pressures in the South, and thereby reduce South-North climate migration (Marotzke et al. 2020). In essence, we posit that making climate migration more salient will induce individuals to support climate change mitigation in order to ease climatic pressures in migrants’ origin communities, and thereby to reduce climate displacement. This intuition also builds from evidence that individuals are more supportive of climate action when they face higher relative costs from climate change (Del Ponte et al. 2017), such as would be the case for those exposed to climate migration. When the potential welfare losses from climate change are large, people contribute more to mitigation. This is likely to be the case in the context of increasing climate migration, at least in the short-run, because climate migrants are likely to represent a short-term fiscal burden on host communities. We prime this impact in our vignettes to drive home the prospective short-term losses from climate change-driven migration.

Pre-Registration

Both studies were pre-registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP). Our pre-registration plan (EGAP #20190905AA) is available [here](#). Note that the order of hypotheses listed here follows the order in our pre-registration plan. We have altered the order of the hypotheses in the main text for clarity of presentation. Specifically, H_{7a} and H_{7b} here pertain to H_1 and H_2 in the main text. Here, H_{7a} and H_{7b} are relevant for the conjoint experiment and H_1 through H_6 apply to the priming experiment. The following hypotheses were pre-registered:

H_1 : Increased salience of climate-driven migration increases issue importance of climate-driven migration.

H_2 : Increased salience of climate-driven migration increases issue importance of climate change.

H_3 : Increased salience of climate-driven migration increases issue importance of migration.

H_4 : Increased salience of climate change increases issue importance of climate-driven migration.

H_5 : Increased salience of migration increases issue importance of climate-driven migration.

H_6 : When salient issues are framed as having national consequences, perceived issue importance will be higher than when salient issues are framed as having international consequences.

H_{7a} : Climatic motivations for migration increase positive evaluations of migrant profiles relative to economic-based reasons for migration.⁷

H_{7b} : Climatic motivations for migration reduce positive evaluations of migrant profiles relative to humanitarian-based reasons for migration.⁸

⁷Corresponds to H_1 in main text.

⁸Corresponds to H_2 in main text.

Experimental Sample

We conducted a series of survey experiments with nationally representative samples of the adult (18 years or older) population in the U.S. and Germany. We fielded the study with Dynata (formerly known as Survey Sampling International/SSI), which maintains high quality nationally representative panels. Samples for each of our experiments targeted 1000 respondents in each country, for a total of 4000 respondents across two experiments in two countries. Our surveys were administered between August and September of 2019, following piloting on non-representative samples to test the survey design during April and May of 2019. To confirm representativeness of the samples, we check the results with population based weights, and find no significant differences between the weighted and unweighted results, both of which are presented in this appendix. No completed task responses to our conjoint survey are deleted. As a robustness check, we show that there are no changes in the results of Study 1 when the sample is restricted to only respondents who completed all 9 tasks (See [Diagnostic Tests: Study 1](#)). This test is not necessary for Study 2, as no incomplete responses were collected in this latter experiment.

We collected data on pre-treatment variables identified as important by our theory and previous literature ([Table 1](#)). The specific measures can be found in the [Survey Texts](#) section of this appendix. *Age* is collected, as are indicator variables for whether the respondent is *Native Born* and for *Gender*. *Education*, *Religiosity*, *Trust in Government*, and *Political Interest* are also collected as scales ranging from low values to high values. *Ideology* is a scale that spans from conservative at low values to liberal at high values, while *Partisanship* is measured on a scale from Republican to Democrat. Indicator variables are also created for two geographic measures: *Urban* indicates whether the respondent lives in one of the ten largest cities in the country,⁹ and *Border State* indicates whether the respondent lives in a border state where migration concerns would be most salient (in the US, states on the Mexican border, and in Germany, the states in the eastern region).¹⁰ We opted to operationalize border state as the East-West German division in the German sample because this division is salient for debates on migration policy; research suggests that anti-migrant sentiment is much greater in states of the former German Democratic Republic (Bencek and Strasheim 2016; Ziller and Goodman 2020). To check the robustness of the German border state measure, we test several different operationalizations (See [Diagnostic Tests: Study 1](#) and [Diagnostic Tests: Study 2](#)). This information was obtained by the geolocation information associated with the response data. Partisanship is not included in the German sample because it would not be comparable across countries, and the social dominance index is not included in the German sample for reasons of cultural sensitivity. Specifically, research suggests the social dominance index is less reliable in German samples because it elicits prejudiced attitudes toward out-groups, which many Germans are wary of expressing owing to their country’s Nazi past (Kleppestø et al. 2019; Frindte, Wittig, and Wammetsberger 2005). Our native German survey translator also expressed to us that in their view, the social dominance index would make German survey takers uncomfortable.

⁹New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, and San Jose in the US; Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt Am Main, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, Dortmund, Essen, and Leipzig in Germany.

¹⁰Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico in the US; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt, Sachsen, and Thuringen in Germany.

Foreign policy orientation, *Social Dominance*, and *Empathy* are multiple-item indices measured with four questions, for which each question response falls on a 1 to 5 scale. For each index, an item correlation is calculated with Cronbach's alpha, and an index is created as the mean across the four questions, thus the ultimate outcome is on a 0-5 scale. High values of foreign policy orientation are associated with internationalist attitudes, while low values are associated with isolationism. High values of social dominance are associated with hierarchical attitudes, while low values are associated with communal attitudes. High values of empathy are associated with empathy, while low values are associated with its absence. We find no evidence of systematic imbalance on any of these features.

Table 1: Pre-Treatment Variables

Variable	Coding	Expectations: Importance	Expectations: Migrant Eval.
Partisanship	1 (Strong Republican) to 6 (Strong Democrat)	—	↑
Age	Continuous	—	↓
Foreign Policy Orientation	Scale 0 (isolationist) to 5 (internationalist), average over 4 questions (Alpha = 0.65 for US, 0.49 for GER)	—	↑
Social Dominance	Scale 0 (communal) to 5 (hierarchical), average over 4 questions (Alpha = 0.76 for US, omitted for GER)	—	↓
Empathy	Scale 0 (low empathy) to 5 (high empathy), average over 4 questions (Alpha = 0.73 for US, 0.66 for GER)	↑	↑
Native Born	Binary, 0 (not native born) or 1 (native born)	—	↑
Gender	Binary, 0 (male) or 1 (female)	↑	↑
Education	Scale 0 (less education) to 6 (most education)	↑	↑
Ideology	Scale 0 (conservative) to 6 (liberal)	—	↑
Religiosity	Scale 0 (least religious) to 6 (most religious)	↓	↑
Trust in Government	Scale 0 (least trust) to 3 (most trust) ↑ ?	—	
Political Interest	Scale 0 (least interest) to 4 (most interest)	↑	↑
Employment Status	Factor (Employed full time=7; Employed part time=6; Self-employed=5; Student=4; Homemaker=3; Retired=2; Unemployed=1)	↓	↑
Border State	Binary, 0 (not border) 1 (border)	↑	—
Urban	Binary, 0 (not urban) 1 (urban)	—	—

Experimental Design: Study 1

The first survey experiment tests H_{1A} and H_{1B} with a choice-based conjoint design. Compared to standard experimental designs where researchers are limited to varying a small number of factors, conjoint designs are better able to capture complex phenomena, separating various causes of a single effect. In a choice-based conjoint design, respondents are randomly assigned to observe a subset of levels of a set of features, in other words, the treatment is reconceptualized as a matrix of features and levels from which a sample is drawn. An example of the choice task is shown in Figure 20. Conjoint designs rely on a series of pooling assumptions that are similar to those of standard within-subjects experimental designs, including stability, no-carryover effects, and no profile-order effects on the potential outcomes, as well as randomization of profiles for pairwise independence (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The number of tasks and attributes were chosen to maximize power without reducing response quality (Bansak et al. 2018).

The levels of attributes varied randomly within and across the profiles presented to respondents. The probability of each level of each attribute was drawn uniformly. To maintain logical coherence of the randomly drawn migrant profiles, we include one restriction in the design, which precluded the combination of ‘Language Fluency: None’ and ‘Origin: Another region in your country’ from occurring together.¹¹ For each respondent, the order in which attributes were shown was also randomly varied, though this order was consistent across all nine of the choice tasks. The conjoint design was identical in the US and German design, with the exception of agnostic, which was replaced with atheist in Germany to better match the cultural context. Across all of our experimental designs, we avoid concerns about non-compliance via satisficing raised by Harden et al. (2019) by requiring respondents to stay on the screens showing the experimental manipulation for five seconds.

We follow the procedure set out by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) to estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE). The AMCE, as the increased probability that a migrant profile would be chosen from the baseline to this level, averaged over all of the possible levels of the other attributes, allows us to understand the importance of each attribute in individual-level migration attitudes. This is done by averaging the effects of the different attributes over the distribution of the other attributes, which are conditionally independent, and obtaining a weighted average of possible attribute combinations. The AMCE is a nonparametric estimator with full randomization and orthogonality of attributes. This implies that while most combinations of attribute levels are never shown, the relative importance of attributes can be estimated, as their distributions relative to other attributes are identical. Unlike traditional model based approaches to studying behavior, this approach does not rely on the specific mechanisms by which individuals reach a particular decision.

We obtain two outcome measures on the migrant profiles (the forced-choice task as well as the ratings task). We conduct our analysis using the forced choice task, as this has been found to most accurately recover actual benchmarks (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). Forced-choice tasks also have an advantage in requiring respondents

¹¹While including many profile restrictions can compromise the orthogonality of a conjoint design, this minuscule number of number of restrictions does not jeopardize the overall estimation in this conjoint design (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

to make trade-offs and neutralizing attitudes about overall levels of immigration, which allows for focus on the key attributes that come into play in making decisions *between* migrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). This outcome variable is therefore binary if the profile was preferred relative to its alternative choice. AMCEs are estimated using a regression of the binary forced-choice outcome on the full set of attribute levels, which are operationalized as indicator variables. For each indicator variable, one reference category is omitted, which is considered as the baseline level of that attribute. The baseline level of each attribute is noted in italics in Table 1 in the main paper. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level, as each respondent completed multiple choice tasks.

For the US sample, after removing 2,558 choice tasks where respondents did not complete the task, we are left with 18,966 individual choice tasks, pooling across 1,086 respondents. In the German sample, we must remove 2,000 choice tasks, resulting in 18,862 individual choice tasks across 1,074 respondents for analysis. The main results are shown in Table 2 and Table 3. The results are robust to the rating measure of the dependent variable, shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Main Results: Study 1

Table 2: AMCE, US Sample (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	
Reason for Migration	Drought	0.035	0.012	**
Reason for Migration	Flooding	0.037	0.012	**
Reason for Migration	Wildfires	0.040	0.011	***
Reason for Migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.076	0.012	***
Gender	Male	-0.044	0.007	***
Language Fluency	Broken	0.043	0.009	***
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.104	0.009	***
Occupation	Cleaner	0.072	0.011	***
Occupation	Teacher	0.140	0.011	***
Occupation	Doctor	0.187	0.012	***
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.026	0.012	*
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.026	0.011	*
Origin	Myanmar	-0.022	0.012	
Origin	Ukraine	-0.011	0.012	
Religion	Christian	0.060	0.009	***
Religion	Muslim	-0.047	0.009	***
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.013	0.011	
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.038	0.011	***
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	-0.003	0.012	
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.046	0.012	***

Table 3: AMCE, German Sample (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	
Reason for Migration	Flooding	0.086	0.012	***
Reason for Migration	Drought	0.081	0.012	***
Reason for Migration	Wildfires	0.060	0.012	***
Reason for Migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.162	0.013	***
Gender	Male	-0.050	0.007	***
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.140	0.010	***
Language Fluency	Broken	0.048	0.009	***
Occupation	Doctor	0.179	0.012	***
Occupation	Teacher	0.146	0.011	***
Occupation	Cleaner	0.063	0.010	***
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.017	0.013	
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.021	0.013	
Origin	Myanmar	-0.008	0.013	
Origin	Ukraine	-0.022	0.013	
Religion	Christian	0.008	0.009	
Religion	Muslim	-0.085	0.010	***
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.022	0.011	
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.024	0.012	*
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.035	0.012	**
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.014	0.012	

Summary Statistics: Study 1

To avoid concerns about bias (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018) associated with dropping respondents who may have mistakenly entered their ages as too low (≤ 17) or high (e.g. 99), we do not omit these respondents in our main analyses. Results are substantively similar when we omit them (see Table 6 and Table 7).

Table 4: Experiment 1 Summary Statistics, US Sample

Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Age	0	31.00	46.00	46.01	60.00	99
Foreign Policy Orientation	0	1.75	2.00	2.12	2.50	4
Social Dominance	0	1.75	2.00	2.04	2.25	4
Empathy	0	1.75	2.25	2.21	2.50	4
Partisanship	1	1.00	1.00	1.46	2.00	2
Gender	0	0.00	1.00	0.52	1.00	1
Education	0	1.00	3.00	2.97	4.00	5
Ideology	0	2.00	3.00	2.98	4.00	6
Native Born	0	1.00	1.00	0.93	1.00	1
Employment	1	1.00	2.00	2.90	5.00	7
Trust in Government	0	1.00	2.00	1.59	2.00	2
Political Interest	0	0.00	1.00	0.93	1.00	3
Religiosity	0	1.00	3.00	2.93	5.00	5

Table 5: Experiment 1 Summary Statistics, German Sample

Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Age	12	31.00	47.00	45.64	60.00	83
Foreign Policy Orientation	0	1.67	2.00	1.92	2.33	4
Empathy	0	2.00	2.25	2.20	2.50	4
Gender	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Education	0	1.00	2.00	2.34	4.00	5
Ideology	0	1.00	3.00	2.55	3.00	6
Native Born	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Employment	1	1.00	2.00	2.90	5.00	7
Trust in Government	0	1.00	1.00	1.37	2.00	2
Political Interest	0	0.00	0.00	0.68	1.00	3
Religiosity	0	3.00	4.00	3.91	5.00	5

Diagnostic Tests: Study 1

First, diagnostic tests show that each level of each attribute was shown in equal proportion (Figure 3 and Figure 4) and that there was no systematic preference for the right- or left-hand profiles (Figure 5 and Figure 6).

Second, we subset the data to remove respondents under the age of 18—in the US case, this resulted in the removal of 223 tasks across 13 respondents, and in the German case, this resulted in the removal of 108 tasks across 6 respondents. In neither the US nor Germany was there a substantive difference from the main results calculated from the full sample (Table 6 and Table 7).

Third, we replicate the main results removing any respondents who did not complete all 9 choice tasks—in the US case, this resulted in the removal of 408 tasks across 55 respondents, and in the German case, this resulted in the removal of 232 tasks across 39 respondents. (Table 8 and Table 9). In neither the US nor Germany was there a substantive difference from the main results calculated from the full sample.

Fourth, we replicate the results with a restricted set of profiles that are most intuitive to be considered internal migrants. In this US case, we removed migrant profiles with the combination of ‘Another region in your country’ as Origin and ‘Political/religious/ethnic persecution’ as Reason for migration. In the German case, we removed migrant profiles with the combination of ‘Another region in your country’ as Origin and ‘Political/religious/ethnic persecution’, ‘Drought’, or ‘Wildfire’ as Reason for migration. This resulted in the removal of 722 tasks in the US case and 1063 tasks in the German case. In neither the US nor Germany was there a substantive difference from the main results calculated from the full sample (Table 10 and Table 11). As an extreme test, we remove *all* internal profiles—that is, any migrant profile where the reason for migrating is ‘Another region in your country’. Even in this stricter test, there are no substantive differences from the main results in either the US (Table 12) or German case (Table 13). We also find no systematic substantive differences from the main results in either the US or German case when examining *only* internal migrants—that is, only migrants for whom Origin is ‘Another region in your country,’ (Table 14 and Table 15). We can thus conclude that the pattern of preferences holds for both internal and international migrant profiles.

Fifth, we further examine the robustness of the German border state measure with several different operationalizations of this variable, which are specified in Table 16. We find that changing the operationalization of the border state variable does not affect the marginal means of the key reasons for migration (See Figure 9).

Sixth, we also present marginal mean outcomes (Figure 7 and Figure 8), which follow the same pattern as the AMCE results. We also show that the pattern of results hold when the forced-choice dependent variable is replaced by the rating dependent variable, which is measured on a scale from 0-7 (Figure 1 and Figure 2). It is notable, however, that while climate migrants are still preferred to economic migrants in this specification, in the US case, the difference between preference for climate migrants and persecuted migrants is no longer statistically significant.

Figure 1: AMCE, Rating Outcome (US Sample), 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 2: AMCE, Rating Outcome (German Sample), 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 3: Attribute Proportions – US Sample




Figure 4: Attribute Proportions – German Sample




Figure 5: Left vs. Right Profile Selection – US Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 6: Left vs. Right Profile Selection – German Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Table 6: AMCE, US Sample Age Over 18 (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	
Reason for Migration	Drought	0.034	0.012	**
Reason for Migration	Flooding	0.036	0.012	**
Reason for Migration	Wildfires	0.037	0.011	**
Reason for Migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.075	0.013	***
Gender	Male	-0.043	0.007	***
Language Fluency	Broken	0.042	0.009	***
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.105	0.009	***
Occupation	Cleaner	0.073	0.011	***
Occupation	Doctor	0.188	0.012	***
Occupation	Teacher	0.141	0.011	***
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.027	0.012	*
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.028	0.011	*
Origin	Myanmar	-0.024	0.012	*
Origin	Ukraine	-0.011	0.012	
Religion	Christian	0.060	0.009	***
Religion	Muslim	-0.046	0.009	***
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.011	0.011	
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.037	0.011	***
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	-0.003	0.012	
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.048	0.012	***

Table 7: AMCE, German Sample Age Over 18 (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	
Reason for Migration	Flooding	0.088	0.012	***
Reason for Migration	Drought	0.081	0.012	***
Reason for Migration	Wildfires	0.060	0.012	***
Reason for Migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.163	0.013	***
Gender	Male	-0.050	0.007	***
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.141	0.010	***
Language Fluency	Broken	0.047	0.009	***
Occupation	Doctor	0.179	0.012	***
Occupation	Teacher	0.146	0.011	***
Occupation	Cleaner	0.061	0.010	***
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.016	0.013	
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.021	0.013	
Origin	Myanmar	-0.007	0.013	
Origin	Ukraine	-0.021	0.013	
Religion	Christian	0.009	0.009	
Religion	Muslim	-0.085	0.010	***
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.022	0.011	
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.023	0.012	*
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.035	0.012	**
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.015	0.012	

Table 8: AMCE, US Sample Completing All 9 Tasks (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	
Gender	Male	-0.044	0.007	***
Language Fluency	Broken	0.041	0.009	***
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.103	0.009	***
Occupation	Cleaner	0.072	0.011	***
Occupation	Doctor	0.188	0.012	***
Occupation	Teacher	0.140	0.011	***
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.025	0.012	*
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.026	0.011	*
Origin	Myanmar	-0.021	0.012	
Origin	Ukraine	-0.010	0.012	
Reason for migration	Drought	0.035	0.012	**
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.039	0.012	**
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.079	0.013	***
Reason for migration	Wildfires	0.041	0.011	***
Religion	Christian	0.057	0.009	***
Religion	Muslim	-0.049	0.009	***
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.015	0.011	
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.039	0.011	***
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	-0.004	0.012	
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.046	0.012	***

Table 9: AMCE, German Sample Completing All 9 Tasks (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	
Gender	Male	-0.052	0.008	***
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.140	0.010	***
Language Fluency	Broken	0.048	0.009	***
Occupation	Doctor	0.181	0.012	***
Occupation	Teacher	0.148	0.011	***
Occupation	Cleaner	0.063	0.010	***
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.019	0.013	
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.022	0.013	
Origin	Myanmar	-0.011	0.013	
Origin	Ukraine	-0.025	0.013	
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.086	0.012	***
Reason for migration	Drought	0.081	0.012	***
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.164	0.013	***
Reason for migration	Wildfires	0.061	0.012	***
Religion	Christian	0.007	0.009	
Religion	Muslim	-0.086	0.010	***
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.023	0.011	*
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.025	0.012	*
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.034	0.012	**
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.013	0.012	

Table 10: AMCE, US Sample Excluding ‘Implausible’ Internal Migrant Profiles (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err		Δ
Gender	Male	-0.042	0.008	***	0.002
Language Fluency	Broken	0.044	0.009	***	0.001
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.104	0.010	***	-0.000
Occupation	Cleaner	0.071	0.011	***	-0.001
Occupation	Doctor	0.189	0.012	***	0.003
Occupation	Teacher	0.141	0.011	***	0.001
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.030	0.013	*	-0.005
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.031	0.012	*	-0.005
Origin	Myanmar	-0.026	0.012	*	-0.005
Origin	Ukraine	-0.015	0.013		-0.005
Reason for migration	Drought	0.035	0.012	**	0.000
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.037	0.012	**	0.000
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.081	0.013	***	0.005
Reason for migration	Wildfires	0.040	0.011	***	0.000
Religion	Christian	0.061	0.010	***	0.001
Religion	Muslim	-0.046	0.009	***	0.001
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.010	0.012		-0.003
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.039	0.011	***	0.001
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	-0.000	0.012		0.002
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.046	0.012	***	-0.000

Δ comparison to full model, Table 2 in main paper.

Table 11: AMCE, German Sample Excluding ‘Implausible’ Internal Migrant Profiles (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err		Δ
Gender	Male	-0.049	0.008	***	0.001
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.139	0.010	***	-0.001
Language Fluency	Broken	0.049	0.009	***	0.001
Occupation	Doctor	0.178	0.012	***	-0.001
Occupation	Teacher	0.141	0.012	***	-0.005
Occupation	Cleaner	0.059	0.011	***	-0.004
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.030	0.018		-0.013
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.034	0.018		-0.013
Origin	Myanmar	-0.021	0.018		-0.013
Origin	Ukraine	-0.036	0.018	*	-0.013
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.087	0.012	***	0.000
Reason for migration	Drought	0.084	0.012	***	0.003
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.168	0.014	***	0.006
Reason for migration	Wildfires	0.061	0.013	***	0.002
Religion	Christian	0.007	0.009		-0.000
Religion	Muslim	-0.084	0.010	***	0.002
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.021	0.012		-0.001
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.023	0.012		-0.001
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.036	0.012	**	0.001
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.013	0.013		0.000

Δ comparison to full model, Table 2 in main paper.

Table 12: AMCE, US Sample Excluding All Internal Migrant Profiles
(Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err		Δ
Gender	Male	-0.048	0.008	***	-0.003
Language Fluency	Broken	0.045	0.010	***	0.002
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.101	0.010	***	-0.003
Occupation	Cleaner	0.068	0.012	***	-0.004
Occupation	Doctor	0.188	0.013	***	0.001
Occupation	Teacher	0.142	0.012	***	0.002
Origin	Afghanistan	-0.015	0.012		0.000
Origin	Ethiopia	-0.015	0.011		0.000
Origin	Myanmar	-0.011	0.011		-0.000
Reason for migration	Drought	0.032	0.013	*	-0.004
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.026	0.013	*	-0.011
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.076	0.013	***	0.000
Reason for migration	Wildfires	0.035	0.013	**	-0.005
Religion	Christian	0.061	0.010	***	0.001
Religion	Muslim	-0.040	0.010	***	0.007
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.012	0.013		-0.000
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.037	0.013	**	-0.000
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	-0.004	0.013		-0.001
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.043	0.013	***	0.003

Δ comparison to full model, Table 2 in main paper, with baseline origin changed to Ukraine.

Table 13: AMCE, German Sample Excluding All Internal Migrant Profiles
(Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err		Δ
Gender	Male	-0.051	0.008	***	-0.001
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.141	0.010	***	0.001
Language Fluency	Broken	0.047	0.009	***	-0.001
Occupation	Doctor	0.181	0.012	***	0.002
Occupation	Teacher	0.144	0.012	***	-0.002
Occupation	Cleaner	0.062	0.011	***	-0.000
Origin	Ethiopia	0.005	0.012		-0.000
Origin	Afghanistan	0.001	0.012		0.000
Origin	Myanmar	0.015	0.011		-0.000
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.079	0.013	***	-0.008
Reason for migration	Drought	0.080	0.013	***	-0.001
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.164	0.014	***	0.002
Reason for migration	Wildfire	0.057	0.013	***	-0.002
Religion	Christian	0.004	0.010		-0.003
Religion	Muslim	-0.087	0.010	***	-0.001
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.022	0.012		0.000
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.026	0.013	*	0.002
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.040	0.013	**	0.005
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.008	0.013		0.005

Δ comparison to full model, Table 2 in main paper, with baseline origin changed to Ukraine.

Table 14: AMCE, US Sample Excluding All International Migrant Profiles (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err		Δ
Gender	Male	-0.030	0.016		0.014
Language Fluency	None	-0.036	0.019		0.007
Occupation	Cleaner	0.089	0.024	***	0.018
Occupation	Doctor	0.182	0.022	***	-0.005
Occupation	Teacher	0.134	0.023	***	-0.006
Reason for migration	Drought	0.049	0.025	*	0.014
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.080	0.025	**	0.044
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.075	0.025	**	-0.000
Reason for migration	Wildfires	0.059	0.024	*	0.019
Religion	Christian	0.054	0.019	**	-0.006
Religion	Muslim	-0.076	0.019	***	-0.029
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.014	0.024		0.001
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.040	0.024		0.002
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.002	0.026		0.005
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.059	0.026	*	-0.013

Δ comparison to full model, Table 2 in main paper, with baseline language fluency changed to broken.

Table 15: AMCE, German Sample Excluding All International Migrant Profiles (Compared to baseline levels)

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err		Δ
Gender	Male	-0.046	0.019	*	0.004
Language Fluency	Fluent	0.083	0.019	***	-0.009
Occupation	Doctor	0.166	0.027	***	-0.013
Occupation	Teacher	0.155	0.026	***	0.009
Occupation	Cleaner	0.066	0.026	*	0.004
Reason for migration	Flooding	0.130	0.029	***	0.044
Reason for migration	Drought	0.085	0.031	**	0.005
Reason for migration	Political/religious/ethnic persecution	0.150	0.029	***	-0.013
Reason for migration	Wildfire	0.072	0.029	*	0.013
Religion	Christian	0.027	0.022		0.019
Religion	Muslim	-0.079	0.023	***	0.006
Vulnerability	Food insecurity	0.021	0.029		-0.001
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	0.009	0.029		-0.015
Vulnerability	No surviving family members	0.005	0.028		-0.030
Vulnerability	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)	-0.044	0.029		-0.030

Δ comparison to full model, Table 2 in main paper, with baseline language fluency changed to broken.

Marginal Means: Study 1

Figure 7: Marginal Means – US Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 8: Marginal Means – German Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 9: Marginal Means – German Sample, 95% Confidence intervals, varying Border State specification




Table 16: German Border State Variable

State	Original Specification	Specification 2	Specification 3	Specification 4
Baden-Wurttemberg	0	0	0	0
Bayern	0	1	0	1
Bremen	0	0	0	0
Hamburg	0	0	0	0
Hessen	0	0	0	0
Niedersachsen	0	0	0	0
Nordrhein-Westfalen	0	0	0	0
Rheinland-Pfalz	0	0	0	0
Saarland	0	0	0	0
Schleswig-Holstein	0	0	0	0
Brandenburg	1	1	1	1
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	1	1	1	1
Sachsen	1	1	1	1
Sachsen-Anhalt	1	1	0	0
Thuringen	1	1	0	0
Berlin	0	0	0	0

Heterogeneous Effects: Study 1

To identify variation in subgroup attitudes, we follow Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley (2019), which estimate marginal means of the different relevant groups. This approach is preferable to comparing AMCEs across subgroups, as these interactions are sensitive to the reference category that is employed. By comparing marginal means, we can avoid the problem of comparing AMCEs for different subgroups, which rely on estimation from the same baseline in order to make comparisons. Using a nonparametric analysis of variance comparison, significant subgroup heterogeneity in preferences was detected in the US sample between Republicans and Democrats (Figure 10), older and younger individuals (Figure 11), and individuals with and without college degrees (Figure 13). Interactions between partisanship and religion and employment were particularly notable, with markedly stronger responses to in-group and outgroup religions for Republicans and older respondents, as well as a greater aversion to unemployed migrants. On the key attribute of reason for migration, all subgroups responded similarly across the attribute levels. On other tested covariates, including gender, empathy, employment, and across covariates in the German sample, subgroup heterogeneity was not detected (see Figures 12, 14, and 15).

In addition to these tests of heterogeneous effects by pre-treatment covariates, we also examine the interaction of the origin and reasons for migration attributes in the experimental design. Examining the Average Marginal Interaction Effects (AMIE) of reason for migration and origin in Figures 18 and 19, we see that nearly the interaction effects all fail to achieve statistical significance in 95% confidence intervals in both the US and German cases. To facilitate this assessment of origin effects, we construct a binary attribute of origin, grouping together all foreign origin countries to compare to profiles from the same country. The marginal means with the binary measure of origin show little substantive deviation from the main results: migrants from the same country are preferred compared to those from foreign countries in both samples (see Figures 16 and 17, and Table 17). With the exception of flooding in the US case, migrants from the same country as the respondent and other countries are not evaluated differently across the different reasons for migration, which may be partly attributed to the relatively more frequent occurrence of flooding (due to hurricanes, etc.) in the US compared to other migration-inducing climate events. In the German case, however, the pattern is different: migrants from the Germany are preferred compared to foreign migrants when the reason for migration is wildfire, flooding, or economic benefit, and is nearly significant for cases of drought. This may reflect the increased attention given the high salience of migration in the EU.

Figure 10: Marginal Mean Differences: Partisanship – US Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 11: Marginal Mean Differences: Age – US Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 12: Marginal Mean Differences: Employment – US Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 13: Marginal Mean Differences: College Degree – US Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 14: Marginal Mean Differences: Employment – German Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 15: Marginal Mean Differences: College Degree – German Sample, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 16: Marginal Means – US Sample, Binary Origin, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 17: Marginal Means – German Sample, Binary Origin, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 18: AMCE – US Sample, Interaction of Origin and Reason for Migration, 95% Confidence intervals




Figure 19: AMCE – German Sample, Interaction of Origin and Reason for Migration, 95% Confidence intervals



Table 17: Marginal Mean Differences on Reason for Migration by Origin
(Same country - Other country)

Sample	Level	Est.	SE	P
US	Drought	0.028	0.020	0.176
US	Economic	0.003	0.020	0.863
US	Flooding	0.058	0.020	0.004
US	Persecution	0.001	0.021	0.969
US	Wildfires	0.029	0.020	0.154
GER	Drought	0.045	0.024	0.063
GER	Economic	0.044	0.022	0.045
GER	Flooding	0.085	0.023	0.000
GER	Persecution	0.021	0.023	0.351
GER	Wildfires	0.050	0.023	0.030

Experimental Design: Study 2

The second survey experiment tests H_2 through H_6 with a $3 \times 2 + 1$ between-subjects factorial design. Respondents were asked a series of pre-treatment questions to gather data on relevant moderators, then presented with a mock article. The final sample size for the US is 1181 respondents, with 1147 respondents for the German sample. The article presented mock scientific findings on the rising incidence of the relevant issue – *migration*, *climate change*, or *climate-driven migration*. This means of salience priming is reasonably externally valid, as it mirrors the processes of issue framing that take place in media and public discourses. The relevant issue was manipulated in the first factor as the subject of the article. Salience was manipulated by the second factor, which localized the issue in the respondent’s *home country* or *worldwide*. The control group received an article about soccer. All of the experimental primes can be seen at [Experimental Prompts: Study 2](#). Subsequently, the values of the outcome variables were measured and manipulation checks were conducted. The treatment was followed with an open-ended question asking the respondent to summarize the article in order to increase the power of the treatment. Survey materials are available upon request to the corresponding author.

The outcome measures are multiple-item indices of issue importance assigned to *Climate Change*, *Migration*, and *Climate-Induced Migration*, measured with six questions, for which each question is a 1 to 5 scale. For each index, an item correlation is calculated with Cronbach’s alpha, and an index is created as the mean across the four questions, thus the ultimate outcome is on a 0-5 scale.¹²

To assess the results of Study 2, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE), which is an unbiased estimator of the individual level treatment effect due to our random assignment of respondents to treatment groups (Gerber and Green 2012). Differences in means between the control and treatment groups can be assessed with two tailed t-tests, and are also checked with bootstrapped sampling. In the both the weighted and unweighted sample, the baseline levels of issue importance were quite high. In the unweighted results, US respondents had mean issue importance scores of 3.198 for climate change, 3.105 for migration, and 2.985 for climate migration in the baseline groups (out of 5). The results were similar for Germany, with even higher baselines of 4.544 for climate change, 3.118 for migration, and 3.128 for climate migration. Given this high baseline level, it is unsurprising that our experimental manipulation does not produce any significant mean differences between groups, and we find null effects of increasing salience via priming on increased likeliness to rate climate change, migration, or climate-induced migration as important.

¹²For the US study, the indices for Climate, Migration, and Climate Migration have alphas of 0.94, 0.89, and 0.92 respectively. For Germany, the values were 0.93, 0.81, and 0.87 respectively.

Main Results: Study 2

While there were not significant effects of the treatments in Study 2, there are important pre-treatment covariates that have relationships with the outcomes. Analyzing the results in a multivariate regression framework allows us to better understand these patterns. Table 18 and Table 19 display unweighted OLS results for Study 2 in the U.S. and Germany respectively. Many of the pre-treatment covariates have relationships with the outcomes of issue importance ratings in the directions we would expect. In the US sample, higher levels of internationalism (*Foreign Policy Orientation*), empathy, and interest in politics were fairly strongly associated with higher assignments of issue importance. The effects of empathy were particularly strong across all issues. If the empathy level of the respondent increases by one point on the five point scale, the likelihood of assigning issue importance is increased by approximately half a point (on a five point scale), which provides strong support for H_5 . The average marginal effects of empathy in both samples can be seen in Figure 20. Higher levels of education and increased levels of employment also related to higher levels of assigned issue importance, although education is not a significant predictor of importance for climate migration. In addition, more Democratic respondents and more liberal respondents were also more likely to rate each of the three issues as important. Older respondents were less likely to assign issue significance, as were hierarchically-minded and male respondents (*Social Dominance*) on the issue of climate change.¹³

The results take on extremely similar patterns when observing the German sample. Again, empathy is the most important predictor of issue importance, and education, political interest, and internationalism were similarly related, but to a lesser magnitude. Interestingly, higher levels of trust in government and residence in urban areas are significantly associated with higher levels of importance, which was not the case in the US. Older respondents were less likely to assign issue significance, as were males. Compared to the US sample, ideology was a less important factor, as was employment status.¹⁴

These patterns generally correspond to existing findings on climate change and migration attitudes, but we are the first to assess them specifically in the context of climate migration, and to compare their magnitudes to those of the effects of increased salience. The results also generally support the expectations of the sociotropic model of migration attitudes over the predictions of the economic model, as we find that education is an important predictor of attitudes, while the relationship between increased employment and attitudes is inconsistent across the indices and the two populations.

¹³These findings remain when the US sample is subset to only Republican respondents.

¹⁴There were no incomplete observations in either the US or German sample.

Table 18: Issue Importance: US Sample, Unweighted

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	−0.17 (0.13)	−0.08 (0.11)	−0.11 (0.12)
Treat: Word Migration	0.07 (0.13)	0.04 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)
Treat: US Climate	0.23* (0.13)	0.18 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate	0.13 (0.13)	0.17 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)
Treat: US Climate Migration	−0.06 (0.13)	−0.10 (0.12)	0.0000 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.02 (0.13)	0.07 (0.11)	0.02 (0.12)
Partisanship	0.10*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age	−0.01** (0.002)	−0.005*** (0.002)	−0.01*** (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.28*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	−0.14*** (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.04)
Native Born	−0.11 (0.14)	−0.08 (0.12)	−0.17 (0.13)
Gender	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.15** (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Ideology	0.14*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.12*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.28*** (0.09)	0.18** (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)
Border State	−0.001 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	0.05 (0.12)
Urban	−0.17 (0.36)	0.15 (0.32)	−0.002 (0.34)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.21	0.23

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


Table 19: Issue Importance: German Sample, Unweighted

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: GER Migration	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.05 (0.11)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.002 (0.12)	−0.02 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.11)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.09 (0.12)	−0.09 (0.10)	−0.08 (0.11)
Treat: World Climate	−0.21* (0.12)	−0.18* (0.10)	−0.13 (0.11)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.15 (0.12)	−0.09 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.11)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.04 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.10)	−0.0004 (0.11)
Age	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.14*** (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)
Native Born	0.19 (0.14)	0.19 (0.12)	0.10 (0.13)
Gender	0.02 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)
Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.03 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.15*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Employment Status	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Eastern State	−0.15 (0.10)	−0.16** (0.08)	−0.13 (0.09)
Urban	−0.01 (0.08)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.07)
Constant	1.17*** (0.24)	0.56*** (0.20)	0.32 (0.21)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.20	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 20: Average Marginal Effects of Empathy on Issue Importance



Note: Bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Summary Statistics: Study 2

Table 20: Experiment 2 Summary Statistics, US Sample

Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Age	18	31.00	46.00	46.25	61.00	99
Foreign Policy Orientation	0	2.25	2.75	2.71	3.25	5
Social Dominance	0	1.50	2.25	2.17	3.00	5
Empathy	0	3.00	3.50	3.43	4.00	5
Partisanship	1	2.00	4.00	3.68	5.00	6
Gender	0	0.00	1.00	0.55	1.00	1
Education	0	2.00	4.00	3.97	6.00	6
Ideology	0	3.00	4.00	3.99	5.00	7
Religiosity	0	1.00	3.00	2.91	5.00	6
Native Born	0	1.00	1.00	0.91	1.00	1
Employment	0	2.00	5.00	4.42	7.00	7
Trust in Government	0	2.00	2.00	2.09	2.00	3
Political Interest	0	2.00	3.00	2.96	4.00	4

Table 21: Experiment 2 Summary Statistics, German Sample

Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Age	1	20.00	35.00	33.76	46.00	74
Foreign Policy Orientation	0	2.67	3.33	3.18	3.67	5
Empathy	0	3.00	3.50	3.49	4.00	5
Gender	0	0.00	1.00	0.53	1.00	1
Education	0	2.00	3.00	3.27	5.00	6
Ideology	0	4.00	4.00	4.39	6.00	7
Religiosity	0	1.00	2.00	2.17	3.00	6
Native Born	0	1.00	1.00	0.94	1.00	1
Employment	0	2.00	6.00	4.98	7.00	7
Trust in Government	0	1.00	1.00	1.58	2.00	3
Political Interest	0	3.00	4.00	3.22	4.00	4

Diagnostic Tests: Study 2

We test for balance on pre-treatment covariates, comparing each treatment group to the control group which received the soccer vignette (See Tables 22 and 23). In addition, we further examine the robustness of the German border state measure with several different operationalizations of this variable, which are specified in Table 16. These results can be seen in Tables 24, 25, and 26. While the coefficients for the border state indicator do vary, particularly in the third specification, there is no substantive or statistical difference on the coefficients of the other variables across the specifications or compared to the original specification. As such, the results presented in subsequent sections after 26 use the original specification of the border state variable only. Specifications of these subsequent tests with the alternate operationalizations of border state are substantively identical and available upon request.

Table 22: Study 2 Balance Tests, US Sample

Var.	Treatment ID	Treatment	T-Test P val.	Ctrl. Mean	Treatment Mean
1 Age	1	US Migration	0.43	46.65	45.13
2 Age	2	World Migration	0.61	46.65	47.63
3 Age	3	US Climate	0.53	46.65	45.45
4 Age	4	World Climate	0.36	46.65	44.87
5 Age	5	US Climate Migration	0.91	46.65	46.87
6 Age	6	World Climate Migration	0.79	46.65	47.15
7 Foreign Policy Orientation	1	US Migration	0.67	2.72	2.76
8 Foreign Policy Orientation	2	World Migration	0.68	2.72	2.76
9 Foreign Policy Orientation	3	US Climate	0.10	2.72	2.57
10 Foreign Policy Orientation	4	World Climate	0.49	2.72	2.78
11 Foreign Policy Orientation	5	US Climate Migration	0.58	2.72	2.67
12 Foreign Policy Orientation	6	World Climate Migration	0.89	2.72	2.71
13 Social Dominance	1	US Migration	0.13	2.10	2.25
14 Social Dominance	2	World Migration	0.97	2.10	2.11
15 Social Dominance	3	US Climate	0.41	2.10	2.19
16 Social Dominance	4	World Climate	0.33	2.10	2.20
17 Social Dominance	5	US Climate Migration	0.41	2.10	2.18
18 Social Dominance	6	World Climate Migration	0.60	2.10	2.16
19 Empathy	1	US Migration	0.60	3.47	3.42
20 Empathy	2	World Migration	0.92	3.47	3.48
21 Empathy	3	US Climate	0.62	3.47	3.42
22 Empathy	4	World Climate	0.47	3.47	3.40
23 Empathy	5	US Climate Migration	0.58	3.47	3.41
24 Empathy	6	World Climate Migration	0.68	3.47	3.42
25 Partisanship	1	US Migration	0.53	1.44	1.47
26 Partisanship	2	World Migration	0.42	1.44	1.48
27 Partisanship	3	US Climate	0.21	1.44	1.50
28 Partisanship	4	World Climate	0.65	1.44	1.46
29 Partisanship	5	US Climate Migration	0.84	1.44	1.45
30 Partisanship	6	World Climate Migration	0.29	1.44	1.38
31 Gender	1	US Migration	0.76	0.55	0.53
32 Gender	2	World Migration	0.88	0.55	0.54
33 Gender	3	US Climate	0.21	0.55	0.61
34 Gender	4	World Climate	0.80	0.55	0.56
35 Gender	5	US Climate Migration	0.80	0.55	0.53
36 Gender	6	World Climate Migration	0.69	0.55	0.52
37 Education	1	US Migration	0.34	4.10	3.93
38 Education	2	World Migration	0.52	4.10	3.99
39 Education	3	US Climate	0.81	4.10	4.06
40 Education	4	World Climate	0.40	4.10	3.95
41 Education	5	US Climate Migration	0.15	4.10	3.86
42 Education	6	World Climate Migration	0.32	4.10	3.92
43 Ideology	1	US Migration	0.70	3.93	4.00
44 Ideology	2	World Migration	0.35	3.93	4.09
45 Ideology	3	US Climate	0.57	3.93	3.83
46 Ideology	4	World Climate	0.43	3.93	4.07
47 Ideology	5	US Climate Migration	0.22	3.93	4.15
48 Ideology	6	World Climate Migration	0.86	3.93	3.90
49 Religiosity	1	US Migration	0.91	2.92	2.90
50 Religiosity	2	World Migration	0.78	2.92	2.98
51 Religiosity	3	US Climate	0.49	2.92	3.06
52 Religiosity	4	World Climate	0.99	2.92	2.93
53 Religiosity	5	US Climate Migration	0.55	2.92	2.81
54 Religiosity	6	World Climate Migration	0.50	2.92	2.79
55 Native Born	1	US Migration	0.36	0.91	0.93
56 Native Born	2	World Migration	0.47	0.91	0.88
57 Native Born	3	US Climate	0.99	0.91	0.91
58 Native Born	4	World Climate	0.17	0.91	0.95
59 Native Born	5	US Climate Migration	0.45	0.91	0.88
60 Native Born	6	World Climate Migration	0.74	0.91	0.90
61 Employment	1	US Migration	0.38	4.46	4.69
62 Employment	2	World Migration	0.42	4.46	4.67
63 Employment	3	US Climate	0.99	4.46	4.46
64 Employment	4	World Climate	0.18	4.46	4.10
65 Employment	5	US Climate Migration	0.35	4.46	4.21
66 Employment	6	World Climate Migration	0.68	4.46	4.35
67 Trust in Government	1	US Migration	0.97	2.08	2.08
68 Trust in Government	2	World Migration	0.99	2.08	2.08
69 Trust in Government	3	US Climate	0.99	2.08	2.08
70 Trust in Government	4	World Climate	0.45	2.08	2.13
71 Trust in Government	5	US Climate Migration	0.13	2.08	2.17
72 Trust in Government	6	World Climate Migration	0.45	2.08	2.02
73 Political Interest	1	US Migration	0.16	3.06	2.91
74 Political Interest	2	World Migration	0.28	3.06	2.94
75 Political Interest	3	US Climate	0.38	3.06	2.96
76 Political Interest	4	World Climate	0.34	3.06	2.96
77 Political Interest	5	US Climate Migration	0.25	3.06	2.94
78 Political Interest	6	World Climate Migration	0.23	3.06	2.92

Note: Balance tests compare mean covariate values in each treatment group to the control group (soccer article) mean.

Table 23: Study 2 Balance Tests, German Sample

Var.	Treatment	T-Test P val.	Ctrl. Mean	Treatment Mean
1 Age	Germany Migration	0.87	31.52	31.82
2 Age	World Migration	0.26	31.52	33.59
3 Age	Germany Climate	0.13	31.52	34.31
4 Age	World Climate	0.01	31.52	36.35
5 Age	Germany Climate Migration	0.05	31.52	35.29
6 Age	World Climate Migration	0.28	31.52	33.49
7 Foreign Policy Orientation	Germany Migration	0.59	2.94	2.89
8 Foreign Policy Orientation	World Migration	0.88	2.94	2.95
9 Foreign Policy Orientation	Germany Climate	0.83	2.94	2.92
10 Foreign Policy Orientation	World Climate	0.64	2.94	2.98
11 Foreign Policy Orientation	Germany Climate Migration	0.99	2.94	2.94
12 Foreign Policy Orientation	World Climate Migration	0.61	2.94	2.98
13 Empathy	Germany Migration	0.77	3.16	3.14
14 Empathy	World Migration	0.12	3.16	3.03
15 Empathy	Germany Climate	0.96	3.16	3.16
16 Empathy	World Climate	0.87	3.16	3.15
17 Empathy	Germany Climate Migration	0.60	3.16	3.12
18 Empathy	World Climate Migration	0.56	3.16	3.12
19 Gender	Germany Migration	0.52	0.51	0.47
20 Gender	World Migration	0.11	0.51	0.59
21 Gender	Germany Climate	0.42	0.51	0.55
22 Gender	World Climate	0.70	0.51	0.53
23 Gender	Germany Climate Migration	0.83	0.51	0.49
24 Gender	World Climate Migration	0.55	0.51	0.54
25 Education	Germany Migration	0.92	3.18	3.16
26 Education	World Migration	0.77	3.18	3.24
27 Education	Germany Climate	0.56	3.18	3.30
28 Education	World Climate	0.09	3.18	3.51
29 Education	Germany Climate Migration	0.29	3.18	3.39
30 Education	World Climate Migration	0.68	3.18	3.11
31 Ideology	Germany Migration	0.82	5.34	5.30
32 Ideology	World Migration	0.37	5.34	5.17
33 Ideology	Germany Climate	0.22	5.34	5.11
34 Ideology	World Climate	0.80	5.34	5.30
35 Ideology	Germany Climate Migration	0.48	5.34	5.21
36 Ideology	World Climate Migration	0.35	5.34	5.52
37 Religiosity	Germany Migration	0.45	2.35	2.22
38 Religiosity	World Migration	0.06	2.35	2.03
39 Religiosity	Germany Climate	0.27	2.35	2.17
40 Religiosity	World Climate	0.27	2.35	2.16
41 Religiosity	Germany Climate Migration	0.60	2.35	2.26
42 Religiosity	World Climate Migration	0.02	2.35	1.98
43 Native Born	Germany Migration	0.17	0.96	0.92
44 Native Born	World Migration	0.33	0.96	0.93
45 Native Born	Germany Climate	0.46	0.96	0.94
46 Native Born	World Climate	0.58	0.96	0.94
47 Native Born	Germany Climate Migration	0.23	0.96	0.93
48 Native Born	World Climate Migration	0.62	0.96	0.95
49 Employment	Germany Migration	0.47	4.48	4.62
50 Employment	World Migration	0.59	4.48	4.59
51 Employment	Germany Climate	0.54	4.48	4.35
52 Employment	World Climate	0.76	4.48	4.54
53 Employment	Germany Climate Migration	0.71	4.48	4.40
54 Employment	World Climate Migration	0.90	4.48	4.45
55 Trust in Government	Germany Migration	0.69	1.61	1.58
56 Trust in Government	World Migration	0.30	1.61	1.53
57 Trust in Government	Germany Climate	0.90	1.61	1.60
58 Trust in Government	World Climate	0.47	1.61	1.55
59 Trust in Government	Germany Climate Migration	0.93	1.61	1.61
60 Trust in Government	World Climate Migration	0.91	1.61	1.61
61 Political Interest	Germany Migration	0.98	3.26	3.25
62 Political Interest	World Migration	0.64	3.26	3.20
63 Political Interest	Germany Climate	0.57	3.26	3.19
64 Political Interest	World Climate	0.61	3.26	3.31
65 Political Interest	Germany Climate Migration	0.45	3.26	3.17
66 Political Interest	World Climate Migration	0.32	3.26	3.15

Note: Balance tests compare mean covariate values in each treatment group to the control group (soccer article) mean.

Table 24: Issue Importance: Climate Change, German Sample, Unweighted

Treat: GER Migration	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.12 (0.12)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.002 (0.12)	−0.003 (0.12)	−0.003 (0.12)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.09 (0.12)	−0.10 (0.12)	−0.09 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate	−0.22* (0.12)	−0.22* (0.12)	−0.22* (0.12)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.16 (0.12)	−0.15 (0.12)	−0.16 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.05 (0.12)	−0.04 (0.12)	−0.05 (0.12)
Age	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.14*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Empathy	0.51*** (0.05)	0.50*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.05)
Native Born	0.18 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)
Gender	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.15*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Border State2	−0.07 (0.07)		
Border State3		−0.30** (0.13)	
Border State4			−0.09 (0.08)
Urban	−0.002 (0.07)	−0.01 (0.07)	0.003 (0.07)
Constant	1.16*** (0.24)	1.18*** (0.24)	1.16*** (0.24)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 25: Issue Importance: Migration, German Sample, Unweighted

Treat: GER Migration	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.10)	−0.08 (0.10)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.03 (0.10)	−0.03 (0.10)	−0.03 (0.10)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.09 (0.10)	−0.10 (0.10)	−0.09 (0.10)
Treat: World Climate	−0.18* (0.10)	−0.18* (0.10)	−0.18* (0.10)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.09 (0.10)	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.09 (0.10)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.02 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.10)	−0.02 (0.10)
Age	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.06 (0.04)	0.06* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.46*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)
Native Born	0.18 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
Gender	−0.09 (0.06)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.09 (0.06)
Education	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Ideology	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Political Interest	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Employment Status	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Border State1	0.001 (0.06)		
Border State2		−0.26** (0.11)	
Border State3			0.01 (0.07)
Border State4	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.06)
Urban	0.53*** (0.20)	0.57*** (0.20)	0.53** (0.20)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.20	0.20

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 26: Issue Importance: Climate Migration, German Sample, Un-weighted

Treat: GER Migration	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.04 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.11)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.08 (0.11)	−0.08 (0.11)	−0.08 (0.11)
Treat: World Climate	−0.13 (0.11)	−0.14 (0.11)	−0.14 (0.11)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.03 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.11)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.004 (0.11)	−0.002 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.11)
Age	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Empathy	0.47*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.47*** (0.04)
Native Born	0.09 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)
Gender	−0.12** (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)
Education	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08* (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.08* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Employment Status	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Border State1	−0.03 (0.07)		
Border State2		−0.27** (0.12)	
Border State3			−0.05 (0.07)
Border State4	−0.01 (0.07)	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.01 (0.07)
Urban	0.30 (0.21)	0.33 (0.21)	0.30 (0.21)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Weighted Results: Study 2

Entropy weights are constructed for gender, education, age, and partisanship. (Hainmueller 2012). The weighted results follow the same substantive patterns as the unweighted results.

Table 27: Issue Importance: US Sample, Weighted

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)
Treat: Word Migration	0.07 (0.13)	0.05 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)
Treat: US Climate	0.25* (0.13)	0.19 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate	0.17 (0.13)	0.20* (0.12)	0.17 (0.12)
Treat: US Climate Migration	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate Migration	0.02 (0.13)	0.10 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Partisanship	0.11*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age Bin: 26-34	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.13)
Age Bin: 35-54	0.20* (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)
Age Bin: 55-64	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.13)
Age Bin: 65+	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.27** (0.12)	-0.28** (0.12)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.25*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Empathy	0.52*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.04)
Native Born	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.13)	-0.30** (0.14)
Gender	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.003 (0.07)
Ed. Bin: Some College	0.14 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Ed. Bin: Bachelor	0.24** (0.10)	0.20** (0.09)	0.17* (0.09)
Ed. Bin: Post Bachelor	0.10 (0.12)	0.003 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.12)
Ideology	0.16*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Religiosity	-0.005 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.06 (0.07)	0.001 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.34*** (0.09)	0.21*** (0.08)	0.19** (0.09)
Border State	0.07 (0.13)	0.004 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)
Urban	-0.54 (0.37)	-0.11 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.34)
Observations	1,134	1,134	1,134
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.24	0.24

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Omitted reference categories are 18-25 for age and high school for education.

Interaction Effects: Study 2

Table 28: Issue Importance: US Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Empathy

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	0.17 (0.57)	0.15 (0.50)	0.36 (0.53)
Treat: Word Migration	0.05 (0.55)	-0.14 (0.49)	0.22 (0.52)
Treat: US Climate	0.68 (0.58)	0.47 (0.52)	0.58 (0.54)
Treat: World Climate	0.75 (0.61)	0.63 (0.54)	0.53 (0.57)
Treat: US Climate Migration	0.77 (0.60)	0.78 (0.53)	0.93* (0.56)
Treat: World Climate Migration	0.16 (0.54)	0.20 (0.48)	0.46 (0.51)
Partisanship	0.10*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age	-0.01** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.28*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)
Empathy	0.59*** (0.11)	0.54*** (0.10)	0.52*** (0.10)
Native Born	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.13)
Gender	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Ideology	0.14*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Religiosity	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.12*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.28*** (0.09)	0.18** (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)
Border State	-0.005 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)
Urban	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.15)
Treat: US Migration*Empathy	0.003 (0.15)	0.05 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.14)
Treat: Word Migration*Empathy	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.15)
Treat: US Climate*Empathy	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.16)
Treat: World Climate*Empathy	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.25* (0.15)	-0.27* (0.16)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Empathy	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.14)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Empathy	-0.44 (0.50)	-0.04 (0.44)	-0.35 (0.47)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.21	0.22

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 29: Issue Importance: US Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Border State

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.14)
Treat: Word Migration	0.11 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.05 (0.14)
Treat: US Climate	0.18 (0.15)	0.16 (0.13)	0.17 (0.14)
Treat: World Climate	0.11 (0.15)	0.12 (0.13)	0.17 (0.14)
Treat: US Climate Migration	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.13)	0.04 (0.14)
Treat: World Climate Migration	-0.01 (0.14)	0.03 (0.13)	0.07 (0.13)
Partisanship	0.10*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age	-0.01** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.28*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.04)	0.42*** (0.04)
Native Born	-0.11 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.13)
Gender	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Ideology	0.14*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Religiosity	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.12*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.25 (0.24)	0.02 (0.22)	0.22 (0.23)
Border State	-0.001 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)
Urban	0.15 (0.32)	0.32 (0.29)	0.09 (0.30)
Treat: US Migration*Border State	-0.16 (0.32)	0.24 (0.28)	0.07 (0.30)
Treat: Word Migration*Border State	0.20 (0.32)	0.15 (0.28)	-0.10 (0.30)
Treat: US Climate*Border State	0.10 (0.32)	0.22 (0.29)	-0.03 (0.30)
Treat: World Climate*Border State	-0.06 (0.34)	-0.10 (0.30)	-0.23 (0.32)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Border State	-0.04 (0.33)	0.22 (0.29)	-0.22 (0.31)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Border State	-0.18 (0.37)	0.15 (0.33)	-0.03 (0.35)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.21	0.22

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 30: Issue Importance: US Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Native Born

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	−0.79 (0.53)	−0.25 (0.48)	−0.33 (0.50)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.83 (0.56)	−0.20 (0.50)	−0.42 (0.52)
Treat: US Climate	−0.64 (0.80)	0.39 (0.71)	0.04 (0.75)
Treat: World Climate	−0.83 (0.53)	−0.36 (0.47)	−0.40 (0.49)
Treat: US Climate Migration	−0.45 (0.58)	−0.34 (0.52)	−0.07 (0.55)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−1.30** (0.54)	−0.57 (0.48)	−0.39 (0.50)
Partisanship	0.10*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age	−0.01** (0.002)	−0.005*** (0.002)	−0.01*** (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.28*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	−0.15*** (0.04)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.04)
Native Born	−0.93** (0.45)	−0.42 (0.40)	−0.51 (0.42)
Gender	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.16** (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Ideology	0.13*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.28*** (0.09)	0.17** (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)
Border State	−0.02 (0.12)	0.003 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)
Urban	0.63 (0.55)	0.16 (0.49)	0.23 (0.52)
Treat: US Migration*Native Born	0.94* (0.57)	0.25 (0.51)	0.52 (0.54)
Treat: Word Migration*Native Born	0.91 (0.81)	−0.21 (0.72)	0.11 (0.76)
Treat: US Climate*Native Born	1.02* (0.54)	0.56 (0.48)	0.61 (0.51)
Treat: World Climate*Native Born	0.40 (0.60)	0.24 (0.53)	0.07 (0.56)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Native Born	1.36** (0.55)	0.68 (0.49)	0.44 (0.52)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Native Born	0.60 (0.54)	0.46 (0.48)	0.34 (0.51)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.21	0.22

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 31: Issue Importance: US Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Partisanship

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	0.002 (0.29)	0.22 (0.26)	0.21 (0.28)
Treat: Word Migration	0.45 (0.29)	0.14 (0.25)	0.16 (0.27)
Treat: US Climate	0.10 (0.29)	0.24 (0.26)	0.12 (0.28)
Treat: World Climate	-0.07 (0.30)	-0.06 (0.27)	0.01 (0.28)
Treat: US Climate Migration	0.20 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.27)	0.02 (0.29)
Treat: World Climate Migration	-0.11 (0.29)	0.23 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.28)
Partisanship	0.12** (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Age	-0.01** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.28*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.51*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.04)	0.42*** (0.04)
Native Born	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.13)
Gender	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Ideology	0.14*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Religiosity	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.12*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.28*** (0.09)	0.18** (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)
Border State	0.002 (0.12)	0.004 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)
Urban	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)
Treat: US Migration*Partisanship	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
Treat: Word Migration*Partisanship	0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
Treat: US Climate*Partisanship	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Treat: World Climate*Partisanship	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.005 (0.07)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Partisanship	0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Partisanship	-0.29 (0.41)	0.05 (0.36)	-0.02 (0.38)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.21	0.23
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 32: Issue Importance: US Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Age

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	−0.75** (0.38)	−0.71** (0.34)	−0.92*** (0.35)
Treat: Word Migration	0.02 (0.37)	−0.36 (0.33)	−0.07 (0.35)
Treat: US Climate	−0.39 (0.37)	−0.41 (0.33)	−0.37 (0.35)
Treat: World Climate	−0.19 (0.37)	−0.26 (0.33)	−0.12 (0.35)
Treat: US Climate Migration	−0.63 (0.39)	−0.54 (0.35)	−0.46 (0.37)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.28 (0.36)	−0.54* (0.32)	−0.35 (0.34)
Partisanship	0.10*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Age	−0.01** (0.01)	−0.01*** (0.01)	−0.01*** (0.01)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.28*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	−0.14*** (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.49*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.04)
Native Born	−0.12 (0.14)	−0.08 (0.13)	−0.17 (0.13)
Gender	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.15** (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)
Education	0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Ideology	0.14*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.12*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.28*** (0.09)	0.18** (0.08)	0.16** (0.08)
Border State	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)
Urban	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Treat: US Migration*Age	0.001 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Treat: Word Migration*Age	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Treat: US Climate*Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Treat: World Climate*Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Age	0.16 (0.42)	0.57 (0.38)	0.37 (0.40)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.21	0.23

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 33: Issue Importance: US Sample, Weighted, Interaction of Treatment with Empathy

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	0.33 (0.59)	0.15 (0.52)	0.43 (0.55)
Treat: Word Migration	0.17 (0.55)	-0.05 (0.49)	0.32 (0.52)
Treat: US Climate	0.62 (0.57)	0.30 (0.51)	0.46 (0.54)
Treat: World Climate	0.70 (0.62)	0.73 (0.55)	0.43 (0.58)
Treat: US Climate Migration	1.01* (0.61)	0.88 (0.54)	1.12** (0.57)
Treat: World Climate Migration	0.03 (0.53)	0.08 (0.47)	0.31 (0.50)
Partisanship	0.11*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age Bin: 26-34	-0.005 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.13)
Age Bin: 35-54	0.19 (0.12)	0.14 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)
Age Bin: 55-64	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.13)
Age Bin: 65+	-0.20 (0.13)	-0.27** (0.12)	-0.28** (0.13)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.24*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Empathy	0.61*** (0.11)	0.57*** (0.10)	0.55*** (0.10)
Native Born	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.30** (0.14)
Gender	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.002 (0.07)
Ed. Bin: Some College	0.13 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Ed. Bin: Bachelor	0.24** (0.10)	0.19** (0.09)	0.17* (0.09)
Ed. Bin: Post Bachelor	0.09 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.12)
Ideology	0.16*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)
Religiosity	-0.003 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.06 (0.07)	0.003 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.34*** (0.09)	0.21*** (0.08)	0.20** (0.09)
Border State	0.07 (0.13)	-0.001 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)
Urban	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.15)
Treat: US Migration*Empathy	-0.03 (0.15)	0.03 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.14)
Treat: Word Migration*Empathy	-0.11 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.15)
Treat: US Climate*Empathy	-0.15 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.16)
Treat: World Climate*Empathy	-0.30* (0.17)	-0.28* (0.15)	-0.32** (0.16)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Empathy	-0.004 (0.15)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.14)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Empathy	-0.81 (0.50)	-0.26 (0.44)	-0.64 (0.47)
Observations	1,134	1,134	1,134
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.24	0.24

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Omitted reference categories are 18-25 for age and high school for education.

Table 34: Issue Importance: US Sample, Weighted, Interaction of Treatment with Border State

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.14)
Treat: Word Migration	0.11 (0.15)	0.0003 (0.13)	0.07 (0.14)
Treat: US Climate	0.18 (0.15)	0.16 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)
Treat: World Climate	0.17 (0.15)	0.19 (0.13)	0.22 (0.14)
Treat: US Climate Migration	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.13)	0.02 (0.14)
Treat: World Climate Migration	0.03 (0.15)	0.06 (0.13)	0.08 (0.14)
Partisanship	0.11*** (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age Bin: 26-34	0.003 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)
Age Bin: 35-54	0.21* (0.12)	0.14 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)
Age Bin: 55-64	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.13)
Age Bin: 65+	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.28** (0.12)	-0.29** (0.12)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.25*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Empathy	0.52*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.04)
Native Born	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.29** (0.14)
Gender	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.003 (0.07)
Ed. Bin: Some College	0.14 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Ed. Bin: Bachelor	0.24** (0.10)	0.20** (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)
Ed. Bin: Post Bachelor	0.10 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.12)
Ideology	0.16*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)
Religiosity	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.06 (0.07)	-0.0004 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.30 (0.25)	0.05 (0.23)	0.29 (0.24)
Border State	0.07 (0.13)	0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)
Urban	0.11 (0.33)	0.30 (0.29)	0.04 (0.31)
Treat: US Migration*Border State	-0.18 (0.34)	0.26 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.32)
Treat: Word Migration*Border State	0.29 (0.33)	0.16 (0.30)	-0.04 (0.31)
Treat: US Climate*Empathy	0.01 (0.34)	0.09 (0.30)	-0.27 (0.31)
Border State: World Climate*Border State	0.06 (0.35)	0.04 (0.31)	-0.15 (0.33)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Border State	-0.07 (0.34)	0.24 (0.31)	-0.23 (0.32)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Border State	-0.54 (0.37)	-0.09 (0.33)	-0.34 (0.35)
Observations	1,134	1,134	1,134
Adjusted R ²	0.30	0.24	0.24

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Omitted reference categories are 18-25 for age and high school for education.

Table 35: Issue Importance: US Sample, Weighted, Interaction of Treatment with Native Born

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	-1.12* (0.59)	-0.47 (0.53)	-0.53 (0.56)
Treat: Word Migration	-0.76 (0.64)	-0.34 (0.57)	-0.36 (0.60)
Treat: US Climate	-0.80 (0.93)	0.21 (0.82)	-0.08 (0.87)
Treat: World Climate	-1.03* (0.59)	-0.42 (0.53)	-0.58 (0.56)
Treat: US Climate Migration	-0.60 (0.62)	-0.43 (0.55)	-0.17 (0.58)
Treat: World Climate Migration	-1.15** (0.58)	-0.40 (0.51)	-0.28 (0.54)
Partisanship	0.11*** (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Age Bin: 26-34	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.13)
Age Bin: 35-54	0.21* (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)
Age Bin: 55-64	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.13)
Age Bin: 65+	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.28** (0.12)	-0.29** (0.13)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.25*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Empathy	0.52*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.44*** (0.04)
Native Born	-1.11** (0.50)	-0.57 (0.45)	-0.69 (0.47)
Gender	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.0001 (0.07)
Ed. Bin: Some College	0.14 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)
Ed. Bin: Bachelor	0.24** (0.10)	0.20** (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)
Ed. Bin: Post Bachelor	0.11 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.12)
Ideology	0.16*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)
Religiosity	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.06 (0.07)	0.003 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.34*** (0.09)	0.21*** (0.08)	0.20** (0.09)
Border State	0.05 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)
Urban	0.97 (0.61)	0.38 (0.54)	0.44 (0.57)
Treat: US Migration*Native Born	0.86 (0.65)	0.40 (0.58)	0.44 (0.61)
Treat: Word Migration*Native Born	1.09 (0.94)	-0.01 (0.83)	0.24 (0.88)
Treat: US Climate*Native Born	1.26** (0.61)	0.65 (0.54)	0.79 (0.57)
Treat: World Climate*Native Born	0.58 (0.63)	0.31 (0.56)	0.15 (0.59)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Native Born	1.23** (0.60)	0.52 (0.53)	0.33 (0.56)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Native Born	0.34 (0.58)	0.28 (0.51)	0.08 (0.54)
Observations	1,134	1,134	1,134
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.24	0.24

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Omitted reference categories are 18-25 for age and high school for education.

Table 36: Issue Importance: US Sample, Weighted, Interaction of Treatment with Partisanship

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: US Migration	0.01 (0.32)	0.27 (0.28)	0.19 (0.30)
Treat: Word Migration	0.26 (0.32)	0.03 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.30)
Treat: US Climate	0.24 (0.31)	0.29 (0.28)	0.16 (0.29)
Treat: World Climate	-0.17 (0.32)	-0.13 (0.29)	-0.12 (0.30)
Treat: US Climate Migration	0.29 (0.32)	-0.01 (0.28)	-0.003 (0.30)
Treat: World Climate Migration	-0.05 (0.32)	0.28 (0.28)	-0.22 (0.30)
Partisanship	0.12** (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Age Bin: 26-34	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)
Age Bin: 35-54	0.20 (0.12)	0.14 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)
Age Bin: 55-64	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.13)
Age Bin: 65+	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.28** (0.12)	-0.28** (0.12)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.25*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)
Social Dominance	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Empathy	0.53*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.04)
Native Born	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.30** (0.14)
Gender	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.003 (0.07)
Ed. Bin: Some College	0.14 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)
Ed. Bin: Bachelor	0.25** (0.10)	0.21** (0.09)	0.19** (0.09)
Ed. Bin: Post Bachelor	0.10 (0.12)	0.003 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.12)
Ideology	0.16*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Religiosity	-0.004 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.06 (0.07)	-0.001 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
Employment Status	0.34*** (0.09)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.20** (0.09)
Border State	0.07 (0.13)	-0.003 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)
Urban	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)
Treat: US Migration*Partisanship	-0.06 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Treat: Word Migration*Partisanship	0.002 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.002 (0.07)
Treat: US Climate*Partisanship	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)
Treat: World Climate*Partisanship	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.002 (0.07)
Treat: US Climate Migration*Partisanship	0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Partisanship	-0.63 (0.42)	-0.18 (0.37)	-0.27 (0.39)
Observations	1,134	1,134	1,134
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.24	0.24

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Omitted reference categories are 18-25 for age and high school for education.

Table 37: Issue Importance: German Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Empathy

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: GER Migration	−0.95*	−0.63	−0.51
	(0.52)	(0.44)	(0.46)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.42	−0.09	−0.14
	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.29	−0.37	−0.42
	(0.54)	(0.46)	(0.48)
Treat: World Climate	−0.64	−0.35	−0.27
	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	0.13	−0.10	−0.12
	(0.56)	(0.48)	(0.50)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−1.22**	−0.65	−0.72
	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Age	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.13***	0.06	0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Empathy	0.37***	0.38***	0.38***
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Native Born	0.15	0.18	0.09
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Gender	0.02	−0.08	−0.12**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	0.06***	0.03*	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideology	0.03*	−0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religiosity	−0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust in Government	0.15***	0.05	0.08*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Political Interest	0.13***	0.14***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment Status	0.02	0.03*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Eastern State	−0.14	−0.16*	−0.13
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Urban	−0.02	−0.06	−0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Treat: GER Migration*Empathy	0.27*	0.18	0.15
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Treat: Word Migration*Empathy	0.13	0.02	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Treat: GER Climate*Empathy	0.06	0.09	0.11
	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Treat: World Climate*Empathy	0.13	0.05	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Treat: GER Climate Migration*Empathy	−0.09	0.002	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Empathy	0.37**	0.20	0.23
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	1.67***	0.85**	0.62
	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.38)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.20	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 38: Issue Importance: German Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Eastern State

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: GER Migration	−0.10 (0.13)	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.12)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.01 (0.13)	−0.01 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.11)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.16 (0.13)	−0.14 (0.11)	−0.13 (0.11)
Treat: World Climate	−0.25* (0.13)	−0.20* (0.11)	−0.17 (0.11)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.17 (0.13)	−0.06 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.12)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.09 (0.13)	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.12)
Age	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.14*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)
Native Born	0.19 (0.14)	0.19 (0.12)	0.09 (0.13)
Gender	0.02 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)
Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.03* (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.16*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)
Employment Status	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Eastern State	−0.33 (0.26)	−0.20 (0.22)	−0.27 (0.23)
Urban	−0.01 (0.08)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.07)
Treat: GER Migration*East	−0.12 (0.36)	−0.20 (0.30)	−0.07 (0.32)
Treat: Word Migration*East	0.09 (0.36)	−0.11 (0.30)	0.14 (0.32)
Treat: GER Climate*East	0.53 (0.38)	0.36 (0.32)	0.44 (0.33)
Treat: World Climate*East	0.32 (0.37)	0.19 (0.32)	0.29 (0.33)
Treat: GER Climate Migration*East	0.15 (0.35)	−0.17 (0.30)	0.005 (0.31)
Treat: World Climate Migration*East	0.33 (0.35)	0.23 (0.30)	0.19 (0.31)
Constant	1.19*** (0.24)	0.57*** (0.21)	0.34 (0.22)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.20	0.21

Note:

S.66

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 39: Issue Importance: German Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Native Born

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: GER Migration	−0.42 (0.48)	−0.93** (0.41)	−0.28 (0.43)
Treat: Word Migration	−0.11 (0.49)	−0.37 (0.42)	−0.03 (0.44)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.48 (0.49)	−0.75* (0.42)	−0.39 (0.44)
Treat: World Climate	−0.44 (0.46)	−0.56 (0.39)	−0.22 (0.41)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.23 (0.51)	0.23 (0.44)	0.46 (0.46)
Treat: World Climate Migration	−0.19 (0.53)	−0.27 (0.45)	0.14 (0.47)
Age	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.003* (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.14*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)
Native Born	−0.001 (0.35)	−0.14 (0.29)	0.08 (0.31)
Gender	0.02 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)
Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.03 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.15*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.08* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)
Employment Status	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Eastern State	−0.15 (0.10)	−0.17** (0.08)	−0.14 (0.09)
Urban	−0.02 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)
Treat: GER Migration*Native Born	0.32 (0.50)	0.92** (0.42)	0.25 (0.44)
Treat: Word Migration*Native Born	0.12 (0.51)	0.37 (0.43)	0.01 (0.45)
Treat: GER Climate*Native Born	0.41 (0.51)	0.70 (0.43)	0.34 (0.45)
Treat: World Climate*Native Born	0.25 (0.48)	0.41 (0.40)	0.10 (0.42)
Treat: GER Climate Migration*Native Born	0.09 (0.53)	−0.32 (0.45)	−0.51 (0.47)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Native Born	0.16 (0.55)	0.27 (0.46)	−0.15 (0.49)
Constant	1.36*** (0.39)	0.96*** (0.33)	0.38 (0.35)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 40: Issue Importance: German Sample, Unweighted, Interaction of Treatment with Age

	Climate	Migration	Climate Migration
Treat: GER Migration	−0.02 (0.28)	−0.21 (0.24)	−0.13 (0.25)
Treat: Word Migration	0.08 (0.27)	0.01 (0.23)	−0.11 (0.24)
Treat: GER Climate	−0.05 (0.28)	−0.06 (0.24)	−0.10 (0.25)
Treat: World Climate	−0.13 (0.28)	−0.03 (0.24)	−0.05 (0.25)
Treat: GER Climate Migration	−0.10 (0.27)	−0.14 (0.23)	−0.03 (0.24)
Treat: World Climate Migration	0.04 (0.26)	−0.16 (0.22)	−0.07 (0.23)
Age	−0.0005 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.005)
Foreign Policy Orientation	0.14*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Empathy	0.50*** (0.05)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.04)
Native Born	0.19 (0.15)	0.20 (0.12)	0.10 (0.13)
Gender	0.02 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.06)	−0.12** (0.06)
Education	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.03 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Religiosity	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Trust in Government	0.15*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Employment Status	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Eastern State	−0.15 (0.10)	−0.16* (0.08)	−0.13 (0.09)
Urban	−0.01 (0.08)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.07)
Treat: GER Migration*Age	−0.003 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Treat: Word Migration*Age	−0.002 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Treat: GER Climate*Age	−0.001 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Treat: World Climate*Age	−0.002 (0.01)	−0.004 (0.01)	−0.002 (0.01)
Treat: GER Climate Migration*Age	−0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.0003 (0.01)
Treat: World Climate Migration*Age	−0.003 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Constant	1.10*** (0.29)	0.58** (0.25)	0.34 (0.26)
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.20	0.21
<i>Note:</i> S.68 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Survey Texts

Pre-Test

1. What is your gender?
 - (a) Male
 - (b) Female
 - (c) Neither/Prefer not to say
2. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
 - (a) Elementary or some high school
 - (b) High school graduate/GED
 - (c) Trade or vocational certification
 - (d) Some college/Associate's degree
 - (e) College graduate
 - (f) Post-graduate degree
3. In general, I think of myself as:
 - (a) Extremely liberal
 - (b) Liberal
 - (c) Slightly liberal
 - (d) Moderate, middle of the road
 - (e) Slightly conservative
 - (f) Conservative
 - (g) Extremely conservative
4. Generally speaking, I think of myself as a:¹⁵
 - (a) Democrat
 - (b) Republican
 - (c) Independent
5. *If Democrat selected:* Would you call yourself a strong Democrat, or a not very strong Democrat?
 - (a) Strong Democrat
 - (b) Not very strong Democrat
6. *If Republican selected:* Would you call yourself a strong Republican, or a not very strong Republican?
 - (a) Strong Republican
 - (b) Not very strong Republican

¹⁵Questions 5-7 were not included in the German survey.

7. *If Independent selected:* Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?
- (a) Closer to the Democratic Party
 - (b) Closer to the Republican Party
8. How often do you attend religious services?
- (a) More than once a week
 - (b) Once a week
 - (c) A few times a month
 - (d) A few times a year
 - (e) Once a year or less
 - (f) Never
9. In what country were you born?
- (a) United States/Germany
 - (b) Somewhere Else
10. Which of these options best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?
- (a) Employed full time
 - (b) Employed part time
 - (c) Unemployed
 - (d) Student
 - (e) Retired
 - (f) Homemaker
 - (g) Self-employed
11. How old are you? much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington/Berlin to do what is right?
- (a) Just about always
 - (b) Most of the time
 - (c) Only some of the time
12. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs:
- (a) Most of the time
 - (b) Some of the time
 - (c) Only now and then
 - (d) Hardly at all
13. (*Foreign Policy Orientation, from Kertzer and Brutger, 2016*)) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Response on a 5 point scale: Definitely disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Definitely agree.

- (a) The use of military force only makes problems worse.
 - (b) Generally speaking, the United States/Germany can trust other nations.
 - (c) Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
 - (d) The United States/Germany is superior to other nations.
14. (*Social Dominance Orientation, from Mutz and Kim, 2017*) There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose these ideas about groups in general? Response on a 5 point scale: Definitely oppose, Somewhat oppose, Neither oppose nor favor, Somewhat favor, Definitely favor.¹⁶
- (a) In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.
 - (b) We should not push for group equality.
 - (c) Group equality should be our ideal.
 - (d) Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.
15. (*Empathy, Interpersonal Reactivity Index for “empathetic concern” and “perspective taking” from Davis, 1983*) How well would you say that each of the following statements describes you? Response on a 5 point scale: Does not describe me at all, Describes me very little, Describes me moderately well, Describes me fairly well, Describes me very well.
- (a) When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel somewhat protective toward them.
 - (b) Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
 - (c) If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other people’s arguments.
 - (d) I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

¹⁶Not included in the German survey.

Survey Instrument: Study 1

Task instructions: "Now we would like to show you the profiles of potential applicants to migrate to your state. You will be shown pairs of potential migrants, along with several of their attributes. We would like to know your opinion regarding whether you would be in favor of sending each applicant back to their location of origin or allowing them to stay in your state. In total, we will show you **nine** comparison pairs. Please take your time when reading the descriptions of each applicant. People have different opinions about this issue, and there are no right or wrong answers." Respondents could not advance to the next page for 10 seconds.

Task outcomes were measured in a forced choice question ("Now imagine that you had to choose one applicant who would be allowed to stay in your state, and the other applicant would be sent back to their own location of origin. Which of the two applicants would you personally prefer to be allowed to stay in your state?") and a rating question for each migrant on a 7 point scale ("On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that your state should absolutely not admit the migrant and 7 indicates that your state should definitely admit the migrant, how would you rate Migrant 1?"). After all 9 asks, respondents were also asked to explain their decision-making in an open-ended question ("What factors were important in making your decisions about the migrant profiles you saw earlier? Please describe in one or two sentences how you made your decisions.")

Figure 21: Example Choice Task

Please carefully review the options detailed below, then please answer the questions.

Which of these migrants do you prefer?

	Migrant 1	Migrant 2
Gender	Male	Female
Occupation	Unemployed	Unemployed
Reason for migration	Flooding	Wildfires
Religion	Agnostic	Muslim
Language Fluency	None	None
Origin	Afghanistan	Ukraine
Vulnerability	Physically handicapped	No surviving family members

Survey Text: Study 2

Task instructions: "You will now be shown a news article. Please read over the article carefully because at the end of this survey you will be asked questions to check your memory and comprehension. You will be required to view the article for at least 15 seconds, but should feel free to take more time. Then, you will be asked a few more questions." After viewing the experimental stimulus, respondents were asked an open-ended question ("In one or two sentences, please summarize the article you just read.").

Outcomes were measured after the experimental stimulus for attitudes on climate change, migration, and climate migration:

1. (*Migration*) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about migration, the movement of people within and between countries for any reason. Response on a 5 point scale: Definitely disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Definitely agree.
 - (a) Migration is not a serious problem.
 - (b) Migration will have a serious impact during my lifetime.
 - (c) I would vote for a politician who promised to take action to address migration.
 - (d) I would personally support a tax increase to fund national programs to support migrants.
 - (e) The U.S./Germany should not do more to help migrants.
 - (f) The international community should do more to help migrants.
2. (*Climate Migration*) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about climate-driven migration, the movement of people within and between countries because of changes in climate patterns, including extreme weather events. Response on a 5 point scale: Definitely disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Definitely agree.
 - (a) Climate-driven migration is not a serious problem.
 - (b) Climate-driven migration will have a serious impact during my lifetime.
 - (c) I would vote for a politician who promised to take action to address climate-driven migration.
 - (d) I would personally support a tax increase to fund national programs to support climate-driven migrants.
 - (e) The U.S./Germany should not do more to help climate-driven migrants.
 - (f) The international community should do more to help climate-driven migrants.
3. (*Climate Change*) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about climate change, a change in climate patterns, including extreme weather events. Response on a 5 point scale: Definitely disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Definitely agree.
 - (a) Climate change is not a serious problem.
 - (b) Climate change will have a serious impact during my lifetime.
 - (c) I would vote for a politician who promised to take action to reduce climate change.

- (d) I would personally support a tax increase to fund national programs to reduce climate change.
 - (e) The U.S./Germany should not do more to reduce climate change.
 - (f) The international community should do more to reduce climate change.
4. The number of migrants who are permitted to come to the U.S./Germany to live should be: Decreased a Lot, Decreased a Little, Stay the Same, Increased a Little, Increased a Lot.
 5. Please indicate your view on the following statement: Human activities are the main cause of climate change: Definitely disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Definitely agree.
 6. (*Relative Importance*) How much of a policy priority do you believe the following areas should be to the United States/Germany? Response on a 5 point scale: Not a priority at all, Slight priority, Medium level priority, Fairly high priority, Top priority.
 - (a) Addressing climate change
 - (b) Addressing climate-driven migration
 - (c) Addressing migration
 - (d) Strengthening the nation's economy
 - (e) Improving the nation's healthcare system
 - (f) Strengthening the U.S. military¹⁷
 7. (*Behavioral Measure*) If you would like more information about ways that you can increase your sustainability and reduce the potential impacts of climate change and climate-driven migration, please click the link below. This is completely optional, and in no way affects your participation in the survey. (*Link: 6 ways ordinary people can prevent climate change, according to researchers and advocates*)

The following manipulation and attention checks were included after the outcome measures:

1. On a scale of 1-100 with 1 being not serious at all and 100 being extremely serious, how serious of a problem do you think that these issues are?
 - (a) Migration
 - (b) Climate Change
 - (c) Climate-driven Migration
 - (d) Data Privacy
2. You read an article about what topic?
 - (a) Climate Change
 - (b) Migration
 - (c) Climate-Driven Migration

¹⁷Not included in the German survey.

- (d) Soccer
- (e) None of the Above

3. The location noted in the article was:

- (a) The United States
- (b) Worldwide
- (c) A Different Country
- (d) Not Mentioned

Experimental Prompts: Study 2

Experimental Prompts: Study 2 All examples shown are from the US survey. The articles were translated into German for the German survey, the references in the local vignette were changed to Germany (i.e. "Germany will increasingly experience"), and the local treatments showed a map of Germany.

Figure 22: Local Migration

Report shows migration will have serious impacts in the U.S.

U.S. Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that the effects of migration will become more serious in the U.S. unless immediate steps are taken.

Impacts of Migration to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that the U.S. will increasingly experience the effects of migration, such as greater pressure on employment, public services, and community resources, unless action is taken. The researchers project that serious impacts will be felt within the next five years, and millions of Americans will be affected. The report explained, "The time is now to prepare for increasing impacts of migration in the U.S."

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness and address the impacts of migration.



Figure 23: Worldwide Migration

Report shows migration will have serious impacts worldwide

World Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that the effects of migration will become more serious globally unless immediate steps are taken.

Impacts of Migration to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that the world will increasingly experience the effects of migration, such as greater pressure on employment, public services, and community resources, unless action is taken. The researchers project that serious impacts will be felt within the next five years, and millions of people will be affected. The report explained, “The time is now to prepare for increasing impacts of migration around the world.”

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness and address the impacts of migration.



Figure 24: Local Climate Change

Report shows climate change will have serious impacts in the U.S.

U.S. Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that the effects of climate change will become more serious in the U.S. unless immediate steps are taken.

Impacts of Climate Change to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that the U.S. will increasingly experience the effects of climate change, such as new weather extremes like floods, droughts, and wildfires, unless action is taken. The researchers project that serious impacts will be felt within the next five years, and millions of Americans will be affected. The report explained, “The time is now to prepare for increasing impacts of climate change in the U.S.”

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness and address the impacts of climate change.



Figure 25: Worldwide Climate Change

Report shows climate change will have serious impacts worldwide

World Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that the effects of climate change will become more serious globally unless immediate steps are taken.

Impacts of Climate Change to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that the world will increasingly experience the effects of climate change, such as new weather extremes like floods, droughts, and wildfires, unless action is taken. The researchers project that serious impacts will be felt within the next five years, and millions of people will be affected. The report explained, “The time is now to prepare for increasing impacts of climate change around the world.”

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness and address the impacts of climate change.



Figure 26: Local Climate Migration

Report shows climate-driven migration will have serious impacts in the U.S.

U.S. Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that the effects of climate-driven migration will become more serious in the U.S. unless immediate steps are taken.

Impacts of Climate-Driven Migration to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that the U.S. will increasingly experience the effects of climate-driven migration, as new weather extremes like floods, droughts, and wildfires cause migration, putting greater pressure on employment, public services, and community resources, unless action is taken. The researchers project that serious impacts will be felt within the next five years, and millions of Americans will be affected. The report explained, “The time is now to prepare for increasing impacts of climate-driven migration in the U.S.”

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness and address the impacts of climate-driven migration.



Figure 27: Worldwide Climate Migration

Report shows climate-driven migration will have serious impacts worldwide

World Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that the effects of climate-driven migration will become more serious globally unless immediate steps are taken.

Impacts of Climate-Driven Migration to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that the world will increasingly experience the effects of climate-driven migration, as new weather extremes like floods, droughts, and wildfires cause migration, putting greater pressure on employment, public services, and community resources, unless action is taken. The researchers project that serious impacts will be felt within the next five years, and millions of people will be affected. The report explained, “The time is now to prepare for increasing impacts of climate-driven migration around the world.”

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness and address the impacts of climate-driven migration.



Figure 28: Control

Report shows soccer popularity will continue to grow

Daily News

A team of researchers published a new report noting that soccer will continue to become more popular in the next few years.

Popularity of Soccer to Grow

A new report from a team of researchers noted that soccer will increasingly become more popular, as more youth leagues, amateur adult leagues, and professional leagues are created. The researchers project that serious growth in the sport's popularity will be felt within the next five years, and millions of new players are expected. The report explained, "The time is now to prepare for the increasing popularity of soccer."

The new report outlines a number of recommendations to individuals to increase awareness about soccer, and on how to become involved in the sport.




Perceptions of Voluntariness and Deservingness

Our theoretical expectation is that climate migrants occupy an intermediate position in the public view, garnering more support than labor migrants and less support than refugees. This expectations builds from existing evidence that perceptions of voluntariness and responsibility condition attitudes about migrants (Verkuyten 2004; Verkuyten, Mepham, and Kros 2018). We contend that climate migrants are viewed as involuntary migrants, in contrast to economic migrants. On the other hand, climate migrants do not flee deliberate campaigns of persecution like refugees. As such, climate migrants are viewed as more self-responsible—and hence less deserving of empathy—than refugees.

Our main experiments show suggestive support for this contention, but to build more direct evidence for these claims, we fielded a third, follow-up survey in August 2020. Our third survey was fielded with 389 respondents on Amazon’s mTurk platform as part of a separate project on climate migration. To measure perceived responsibility and deservingness, we asked respondents to rank the three categories of migrants (labor, climate, persecuted).¹⁸ We weighted the sample to population demographics for age, gender, partisanship, education, and employment status, but unweighted estimates are substantively similar. Results show that labor migrants are perceived as significantly more self-responsible for their migration than climate migrants, who are perceived as significantly more self-responsible than persecuted migrants. Similarly, labor migrants are viewed as significantly less deserving of support than climate migrants, who are viewed as significantly less deserving than persecuted migrants.

Figure 29: Differences in Mean Perceptions of Voluntariness and Deservingness for Different Categories of Migrants



Note: *** = $p < 0.01$; ** = $p < 0.05$

¹⁸Responsibility question: “How responsible would you say each of these migrants is for their situation? In other words, how much control would you say each of these migrants had over their decision to move?”; Deservingness question: “How deserving would you say each of these migrants is to be settled in a new community?”

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