China's Leadership in the United Nations: Image Enhancement and Institutional Legitimacy[*]

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Abstract

As China assumes leadership in several key United Nations (UN) agencies, we assess the impact of this leadership on China's global image, particularly in democratic states. We argue that a rising power uses IO leadership to portray itself as a responsible power. However, these efforts may have negative effects on the perceived legitimacy of IOs, which may be subsequently viewed as subject to major power capture. We test these expectations in pre-registered survey experiments in Brazil—a China-friendly case—and France—a China-skeptical case—finding that while China's leadership of the UN enhances its image among skeptical publics, it negatively affects IO legitimacy in both populations. To a lesser extent, US leadership of IOs also reduces their legitimacy, suggesting publics are also concerned about great power control of IOs broadly. These findings advance our understanding of image management, soft power, and IO legitimacy, contributing to broader debates on China's growing role in global governance.

Keywords: International organizations, China, United Nations, soft power

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Introduction

China now leads four of the 15 specialized United Nations (UN) agencies (Trofimov, Hinshaw, and O'Keeffe, 2020). This includes organizations with mandates for facilitating cooperation on technology, agricultural and food security, aviation safety, and development (the International Telecommunications Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization). China characterizes these leadership campaigns as a way to improve its image as a responsible power dedicated to involvement in the UN specifically, and in multilateralism more generally, and has specific aims of improving its image among democratic audiences.

Western powers portray China's leadership of IOs as a major threat to the status quo.[1] In the US, for instance, the Trump Administration created a rhetorical campaign against China that questioned whether Chinese officials governing global bodies could remain neutral and independent from the demands of the Chinese Communist Party, accusing the World Health Organization—a UN agency—of being a propaganda tool for China to positively shape how the global community perceived its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. In light of these accusations, the Trump administration paused US funding pending a review of how China influences the organization.[2]

What is the impact of China's leadership of UN agencies, and to what extent do these efforts facilitate positive views of China among global audiences? In other words, does leadership of international organizations accomplish the intended goal of image improvement, or does it cause backlash? Democracies in particular are a hard case for China's soft power efforts to succeed given the rising perception of China as a threat. We argue that for a rising power like China, leading in international organizations provides an opportunity to improve its image in democratic societies. Within the rules-based order, the most basic norms privilege active engagement in international organizations (IOs).

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[1] Wall Street Journal, How China is Taking Over International Organizations.

[2] NPR, National Security Adviser O'Brien Alleges WHO Is 'Propaganda Tool For The Chinese'

The identity of a rising power is based on whether it engages as a responsible power or seeks to withdraw from IOs as a revisionist power (Johnston, 2003). In democratic societies, a rising power's leadership of IOs improves its identity as it signals acceptance of principles such as multilateralism and the rule of law.

However, major states taking leadership of IOs is unlikely to be costless for the IOs themselves: We theorize that great power leadership negatively impacts IO legitimacy. China and the United States compete over executive leadership of organizations and frame the other side as harming the mission of the organization.[3] We theorize that growing geopoltical competition for IO leadership damages the perceived neutrality of IOs among international audiences.

To test the theoretical expectations that China's leadership of IOs improves its image in democratic societies, we conducted a pre-registered survey experiment on representative democratic samples that were more China-friendly (Brazil) and China-skeptical (France). We specifically test China's leadership of the UN as Secretary General of several specialized agencies, a quality it promotes to international audiences through Chinese-sponsored global media. We find that China's leadership has positive effects on its image in the more skeptical environment, highlighting an important benefit that China obtains from leading UN organizations. Also in line with our expectations, Chinese leadership of the IO leads to reduced perceptions of IO legitimacy. Surprisingly, however, American leadership also reduces perceived IO legitimacy, which suggests that IO legitimacy is susceptible to perceptions of capture by great powers in general.

This research builds new understandings of soft power. Most foundational studies of soft power offer US-centric theories (Nye, 1990; Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush, 2021), but scholars are beginning to assess the applicability of theories to the case of China in light of its heavy investments in cultivating favorable opinions abroad (Nye, 2012; Shambaugh, 2015; Repnikova, 2022; Green-Riley, 2023; Mattingly et al., 2024). While most such work anticipates that China's regime type will fail to attract support from global audiences (Nye, 2012), our findings demonstrate an avenue where China's soft

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[3]Wall Street Journal, How China is Taking Over International Organizations.

power succeeds among a hard test case of democratic audiences. The findings suggest the power of multilateralism and IO leadership as a tool of image enhancement.

Second, our findings contribute to the literature on Chinese foreign policy that assesses China's impact on world politics. It joins a growing body of research that examines China's increasing involvement in the UN and the consequence (Johnston, 2003, 2019; Haug and Waisbich, 2024; Kastner, Pearson, and Rector, 2020; Lam and Fung, 2024; Foot, 2024). Building on this work, we provide a strategic explanation that explains China's increasing engagement in IO leadership based on enhancements to its image: China can signal a responsible identity to international audiences that increases its favorability among audiences most likely to view it as a threat.

China, International Organizations, and Soft Power

China faces an image problem among many global democratic audiences. A state's image is how a state wishes to be perceived by others. Image problems arise when the image a state wishes to project is inconsistent with the image that others hold (Jervis, 1989: 14).[4] Recent scholarship has examined the mixed effects of many of China's efforts to enhance its image by cultivating soft power around the globe and pointed to several reasons why such efforts have proven challenging to execute successfully.

To secure a favorable image, a rising power often seeks to cultivate soft power efforts in order to increase attraction (Nye, 1990, 2004, 2008). While prior work has largely focused on a US-centric framework for garnering soft power, identifying how the efforts of civil society or public diplomacy shapes favorable reactions among foreign audiences (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush, 2021), China has increasingly sought to cultivate soft power in order to build a favorable global image. Understanding the need to secure

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[4]Image in this sense is similar to other concepts discussed in the IR literature such as prestige and status, both of which are stated issues of importance to China. Prestige is defined as "public recognition of admired achievements or qualities" (Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, 2014: 16) and status is defined relative to other states as "collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on valued attributes" that must be granted by members of the international community (Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, 2014: 7).

support, China positions itself as a responsible power and global leader (负责任大国) Foot (2001). These investments in cultivating China's image include spending billions of dollars to secure favorable opinions of China abroad (Shambaugh, 2015; Repnikova, 2022; Green-Riley, 2023; Mattingly et al., 2024). As China's international activity grows, it seeks to advance a vision of global order that requires the support and approval of international audiences (Voeten, 2021). However, authoritarian powers are more likely to be perceived as threatening by citizens in liberal democracies, who perceive them as a harmful global influence. Such states therefore face greater difficulties in cultivating soft power amongst such audiences (Chu, 2021).

One especially stark problem for China is its declining image in democratic nations where the narrative of 'China threat' has become prominent, and the subsequent decline in favorability of China's image has declined in such countries (Nye, 2012; Green-Riley, 2023; DeLisle, 2020).[5] Following the United States, many democratic countries shifted their stance of describing China through the lens of an economic partner to declaring China a rival. In a strategic outlook paper published in 2019, the European Union labeled China a "systemic rival." China's image has declined in democratic nations as the media highlights human rights violations.[6] China's assertive foreign policy, especially in the South China Sea, and communication strategy creates an aggressive and threatening image amongst democratic populations (Shirk, 2023; Mattingly and Sundquist, 2023).

The desire for a positive image is not only based on the need for good standing or status but is instrumental in accomplishing strategic goals. In democratic countries where China wishes to conduct people-to-people exchanges, increase its market share, broaden its cultural appeal, and gain trading partners, the skepticism and caution of audiences starkly limits China's ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. The success of China's Belt and Road Initiative is based on countries continuing to join and participate. However, many democratic members, such as Italy are withdrawing. Narratives about China's "debt trap diplomacy" create a negative image of China as an untrustworthy

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[5]E.g., Pew, August 31, 2023; Pew, December 5, 2019.

[6]Morcos, "France's Shifting Relations with China."

partner, challenging the bilateral ties that Chinese leaders are attempting to strengthen and the image it seeks to cultivate as a responsible leader. Indicating its rising domestic importance, Chinese scholars are actively examining how to craft a more favorable international image and improve the reception of China's proposals and programs around the world (Xiao and Mingchong, 2024; Lu and Zhu, 2024; Li and Yinquan, 2018). In light of the demand for image enhancement, CCP officials call for strengthening China's image and better telling China's story to global communities.

As China pursues efforts to enhance its image among democratic audiences, it is unclear the extent to which its investments in soft power will reap dividends. Some innocuous language programs to teach foreign students Mandarin in the United States have generated limited impact and at times have created backlash (Green-Riley, 2023). On the other hand, (Mattingly et al., 2024) find that China's investments in global media campaigns led to increased support for China relative to the United States. China's economic messaging can be particularly persuasive in developing countries, including those in Africa and Latin America. Others find that officials are more receptive to China's image as a global leader in development when they experience negative aspects of the liberal order, including suffering negative shocks to domestic economies in the global financial crisis (Broz, Zhang, and Wang, 2020). Part of the challenge in determining efficacy is understanding the mechanism through which attraction occurs. As Goldstein argues, soft power is maddeningly difficult to manufacture because efforts to cultivate it often seem disingenuous (Goldstein, 2017: 18).

Such work has illuminated that China's soft power strategies are broad and considered important to its rise, but largely overlooked China's increased participation in IOs as part of its soft power strategy. We build on a growing attention to another significant strategy that China has employed—engagement in IOs (Fung and Lam, 2021, 2022; Haug, Foot, and Baumann, 2024; Lam and Fung, 2024)—shifting attention from how such engagement can result in influence over IO operations towards instead assessing its effects on global perceptions of China. China actively promotes its UN engagement as part of its soft power communications strategies. For example, China's international

media organization CGTV launched a channel called "UN Insider." In a message about CGTV's launch of UN Insider, China's Ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun noted that China has "been a leader, a pacesetter, and a role model" at the UN and will continue to play the role of a "responsible major country" by supporting multilateralism with the UN playing a central role.[7] Within CGTV content, China's leadership is highlighted, including coverage of China's Security Council Presidency. Focusing on this particular strategy of engaging in IOs for image enhancement, we ask: Does China's increasing leadership activity at the UN improve perceptions, or does it set off alarm bells in the West that the UN will be captured by a threatening power? Will efforts to improve soft power by working through IOs backfire, or will linkages with the United Nations appeal to democratic audiences?

Theory: Rising Powers, IO Leadership and Image Enhancement

Although an authoritarian rising power like China is expected to be perceived as a threat among democratic audiences, it can pursue forms of engagement to alleviate such concerns (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Carpenter, 2014; Morse and Pratt, 2022). When these strategies succeed, states that were previously portrayed as a member of the outgroup receive greater acceptance by international society (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 154). Engagement in IOs, and particularly the United Nations (UN)—an IO with high levels of perceived legitimacy and recognition among democratic audiences—has become an increasingly prominent strategy in China's attempts to improve its global image.

Specifically for a rising power, operating within the structure of the UN offers a channel for assuaging threat perception and crafting an image as a "responsible stakeholder."[8] This strategy aims to present an image of China as a responsible power that operates within the existing framework of international cooperation, rather than seeking to fundamentally challenge global institutions. China invests in several strategies to present an image of a responsible power that works through the framework of IOs, ranging

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[7] Ambassador Zhang Jun's Message to the Premiere of CGTN "UN Insider," September 16, 2023.

[8] See also statement by Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, September 21, 2005.

from leading UN agencies as the Secretary General—as discussed in the introduction—and sending its citizens to serve as international civil servants in IOs (Fung and Lam, 2021, 2022; Haug, Foot, and Baumann, 2024; Lam and Fung, 2024), though the share still remains relatively small (Parizek and Stephen, 2021a,b). China actively encourages its nationals to participate in UN standard setting and working groups (Voo, 2019). China also uses partnerships with individual UN agencies to contribute funding and capacity building to UN mandates, including the Sustainable Development Goals (Haug and Waisbich, 2024). These efforts are precisely framed to garner support, emphasizing the need to create win-win cooperation and build a shared future (Nathan and Zhang, 2022).

Working through multilateral bodies like the UN seeks to reassure those wary of China's intentions (Doshi, 2021: 104). China desires to improve its image through the leadership of multilateral bodies to reduce doubts, distrust, and perceptions of China as a threat (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003; Goldstein, 2001). This strategy centers on "the importance of marketing its views in order to bolster its international image" (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003: 30). For instance, the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is part of China's attempt to counteract the "China threat" narrative by portraying itself as a constructive regional player working to promote peace and stability.

Leadership in the UN further serves to foster a favorable identity. IO endorsement is a powerful signal of an 'acceptable' identity because they are symbols of legitimacy and neutrality (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). For example, when a great power secures the support of the United Nations in the context of military interventions, it conveys information that signals the legitimacy of the operation (Tago and Ikeda, 2015). Others have found that for states with questionable identities, IOs like the European Union provide a seal of approval that reassures and alleviates concerns (Gray, 2009). Similarly, engaging with the UN and obtaining leadership roles also signal an acceptance of China's candidacy and vetting by the member states voting in elections for secretary-general positions, and can extend the penumbra of institutional legitimacy onto China.

IOs have varying levels of support and legitimacy among global audiences.[9] Organi-

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[9]E.g., FES Global Census 2022.

zations such as the UN have an especially favorable image among democratic audiences.[10] While elites tend to view IOs as more legitimate than the population (Dellmuth et al., 2022), the UN is perceived as considerably more legitimate than China in most democratic countries. Involvement in the UN suggests respect for rule of law and commitment to principles valued by democratic societies. In addition, leading institutions that fall under a liberal vision of international order helps shape an image that will otherwise be perceived through the lens of China's domestic regime type and assertive actions.

Therefore, just as social opprobrium and efforts to "name and shame" construct a negative image for actors on the world stage (e.g., Terman and Voeten, 2018), a rising power can engage in institutions and undertake a leadership role to construct a *positive* and responsible image, signaling a desire for engagement rather than revisionism. We theorize that IO leadership increases favorable opinions of the rising power among democratic audiences (Chu, 2019; Chapman and Li, 2023). We preregister a series of explicit expectations about the effects of IO leadership on image. By leading an important IO, such as the UN agencies, a state can enhance its image and deny opportunities for challengers to enhance their own (Morse and Pratt, 2022). These images have important instrumental value, as a positive image can facilitate future tangible benefits as discussed above, leading to more influence and authority more diffusely in international politics. Image enhancement through leadership is particularly salient for China, given its perceived deficit. We anticipate that leading IOs—and particularly IOs with high levels of perceived legitimacy, such as the UN—improves China's image as a responsible stakeholder among international audiences.

H_1: **China's leadership of the UN increases China's image.**[11]

While a major power's leadership of an IO may improve its image, especially among democratic audiences, it may simultaneously impact the IO. International organizations

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[10]Pew, September 5, 2024.

[11]We originally pre-registered hypotheses with expectations about 'reputation' rather than 'image,' but which were substantively identical. We believe that image is the more precise term that captures our theoretical quantity of interest, and therefore choose to use 'image' here.

are valued among member states for their neutrality and independence. Great power leadership of IOs may instead cue domestic audiences that the great power wishes to use the appointments to achieve strategic goals, negatively impacting institutional legitimacy. This skepticism is rooted in the historical inconsistency of great powers (Farrell and Finnemore, 2013), who often contradict their stated positions through actions that prioritize national security interests over international norms. The US, for instance, has been criticized for undermining the legitimacy of IOs it underwrote due to its frequent divergence in practice from stated values (Finnemore, 2009; Hurd, 2007; Goldsmith, 2018). Such contradictions pose a risk to the legitimacy of IOs when these great powers assume leadership roles. Rather than faithfully executing the role of a civil servant, a major power can use IO leadership to achieve foreign policy objectives. For great power leadership, the public may no longer see IOs as independent actors but rather as agents of great powers' foreign policy (e.g., Chaudoin, 2016; Brutger and Strezhnev, 2022). On the other hand, leadership by small or medium powers can be perceived as more neutral (e.g., Björkdahl, 2007; Panke, 2010).

However, IOs are generally already aligned with the status quo of Western powers, and because the preferences of such states are already well-known, leadership by Western leaders such as the US is not expected to have large effects on the image of either the state or the IO it leads: leadership in this case is less informative of a signal about the state's image and role in the international system (e.g., Chapman, 2007).

On the other hand, global audiences have had fewer opportunities to learn about China's values and preferences over multilateral cooperation, and therefore have greater uncertainty about China's image and its alignment with the status quo orientation of the UN. Given that global publics generally have quite positive views of the UN as an institution[12]—and thus, implicitly favor the Western status quo orientation of the institution—we expect that China's leadership could have negative effects on perceptions of institutional legitimacy, even while perceptions of China might improve. Furthermore, the effects of China's leadership on important IOs could lead to larger updates, both

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[12]Pew, August 31, 2023.

about China itself as well as how China's leadership might affect the direction of the IO.

Taken together, these facts lead to our next set of theoretical expectations: that China's leadership of the UN decreases perceptions of legitimacy, and that the effects of leadership are negative for both great powers, but greater in the case of China's leadership than for the US.

> H_2: **China's leadership of the UN decreases the UN's perceived legitimacy.**

> H_3: **American leadership of the UN has less effects on the US' perceived reputation compared to China's.**

> H_4: **American leadership of the UN has less effects on the UN's perceived legitimacy compared to China's.**

Experimental Design

To assess our expectations about the effects of China's leadership of the UN on its image, we deploy between-subjects survey experiments in two representative populations: Brazil, a country with a relatively favorable baseline towards China, and France, a country with a relatively unfavorable baseline.[13] Brazil is a representative case of developing states. Brazil, as a member of the BRICS countries, often maintains close relations with China. During the Lula administration, Brazil's approach to China is described as "active non-alignment" to maintain cooperation with China amid geopolitical rivalry between China and the US.[14]

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[13]We conducted this survey on a nationally representative sample of the general public with Dynata, a survey firm. We recruited 533 respondents from Brazil and 537 respondents from France. Surveys were expert-translated into Portuguese and French. Because of data quality concerns, all respondents included in the final sample successfully pass an attention check. The full survey text can be found in the Appendix.

[14]Berg and Beana, "The Great Balancing Act: Lula in China and the Future of U.S.-Brazil Relations."

France represents a more status-quo-oriented public, and therefore a case where we expect attitudes to be harder to shift. This public is expected to be generally representative of attitudes in industrialized Western states. As a pivotal member of both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), France's stance on China is shaped by its membership and alliance with the US. This was exemplified in a 2019 European Union strategic paper, which characterized China as a 'systemic rival.' French public opinion towards China has seen a marked shift, with unfavorable views rising from 42 percent in 2002 to 70 percent in 2020, a trend largely attributed to concerns over China's policies in Xinjiang and broader human rights issues.[15] Despite this growing wariness, France has demonstrated a willingness to engage with China; a notable instance being President Macron's visit to China amid heightened US-China tensions, interpreted by many as an attempt to position France as a mediator to foster collaborative channels between China and the West.

The experimental results validate this expectation of different baseline attitudes towards China between Brazil and France (Figure 1). French respondents were more likely to perceive China as a threat (average score of 3.25 out of 5) and as an enemy (3.24 out of 5) compared to Brazilian respondents (2.22 and 2.58 out of 5 respectively).

Respondents first complete a pre-treatment demographic questionnaire to gather on relevant moderators related to international outlooks and perspectives on China— including questions on foreign policy orientation, perception of China as a friend, enemy, and relative threat—as well as a conventional battery of core demographic questions. To mitigate the negative effects of respondent inattention, we include a pre-treatment attention screener that doubles as a 'bot' filter (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances, 2014), as well as a 'captcha' question. Prior research demonstrates that removing inattentive respondents *before* the treatment is assigned does not lead to bias (Aronow, Baron, and Pinson, 2019). We remove respondents who do not complete the study or fail the screener.[16]

After completing a pre-treatment demographic questionnaire, subjects are pre-

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[15] Morcos, "France's Shifting Relations with China."

[16] Descriptive statistics and balance tests can be found in the Appendix.

Figure 1: China Threat Perception

Note: The 'Threat' question asks respondents to rank their agreement with the statement, 'This country poses a threat to my country.' on a scale of 1-5. The 'Enemy' question asks respondents 'Do you consider China to be a friend or enemy of Brazil/France?' with response options of 'Ally, friendly, unfriendly, enemy, not sure'.

sented with one of three vignettes describing IO leadership: a control, in which a Swiss national is elected as the IO head, the China condition, in which a Chinese national is elected as the head, and a US condition, in which an American national is elected as the IO head. The sample treatment text for the China condition is included below.[17] We select a Swiss national as the control condition, both because Switzerland is a country that is active in diplomacy and therefore an externally valid example of a nationality that could be an IO executive, but also because democratic audiences are more likely to perceive it outside of a geopolitical lens due to its stated neutral stance.[18] To increase the salience of the vignette treatments, the relevant information is highlighted in bold, underlined, and italicized text, and respondents are asked to summarize the vignette article. The China treatment was provided as follows:

> Specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN) perform important functions, including working to eradicate poverty and improve sustainable development; facilitating cooperation between governments on health, safety, and technology; and promoting literacy, education, and other social issues. Elections are held at the UN to select the leader of each UN specialized agency, and all countries can vote in the elections.
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> An official from ***China*** was recently elected to lead a specialized agency of the UN. Several states campaigned actively in the election for the position. The Chinese official will manage the work of the UN agency and lead the employees and staff in developing international projects. The ***Chinese*** leader will play an active role in activities like hiring new staff, setting the agency's issue priorities, and creating partnerships with outside organizations and donors.

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[17] Treatment texts of the other conditions are included in the Appendix.

[18] We acknowledge that no country is truly neutral and audiences in different parts of the world may see Switzerland as more aligned with the West. However, we assert that Switzerland is perceived as a more neutral than average country case in democracies. Indeed, a 2022 poll conducted in 18 countries illustrates that Switzerland's neutrality is both salient and perceived as a positive attribute, Presence Switzerland Image Monitor.

After the manipulation, all respondents answered a series of outcome questions about their attitudes towards the US, China, Switzerland, and the UN to assess how IO leadership affects their perceived image of the leading country. Because image is a broad and multi-dimensional concept, including multiple and related measures allows us to capture a more complete picture of these dynamics. We develop these outcome measures related to a rising power's image drawing on previous work on legitimacy and trust (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2020; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Dellmuth, and Tallberg, 2023), reputation (Brutger and Kertzer, 2018; Brutger, 2021), leadership (Mattingly et al., 2023), threat perception, and behavioral measures related to foreign policy (Myrick, 2021).[19] First, we include questions measuring the effect of the country's leadership of the UN agency on its reputation and the UN's reputation, as well as how much respondents approve of the country and of the UN. Next, we ask how much confidence the respondent has in each of the three countries as well as the UN, and how much they trust each (this is a standard question of trust adapted from the Eurobarometer). In our main analysis, we represent each country-level outcome separately. Since these measures have high internal coherence, we create a series of index outcomes as well.[20]

We also ask respondents to express their views about foreign policy outcomes. If leading an IO improves a state's reputation, we expect this increases subsequent support for cooperation with that country, as publics update their expectations about that state playing a responsible and orderly role in international politics rather than a threatening or revisionst role. To measure support for cooperative foreign policies, we adopt a mea-

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[19] Full questionnaire is available in the Appendix.

[20] For each country, we create an 'image' index that combines the legitimacy and trust questions. The standard Cronbach's α is 0.91 for China, 0.91 for the US, and 0.86 for Switzerland. The standard α is 0.84 for China and 0.83 for the US. For the US and China, we also create a foreign policy cooperation index that combines the diplomacy, aid, and business cooperation questions. The standard α is 0.84 for China and 0.83 for the US. We also create a reputation index that combines both reputation questions for the assigned country condition, with a standard α of 0.84. Finally, we create an index for IO perceptions, combining the reputation, legitimacy, and trust questions on the UN, with a standard α of 0.85.

sure from Mattingly et al. (2023) asking respondents about their preferences for global leadership, including whether individuals prefer for the US or China to play a greater leadership role in global affairs. In addition, drawing from Myrick (2021), we develop a general measure of support for cooperation with each of the US, China, and Switzerland, as well as several indicators specific to assess support for the respondent's country's foreign policy toward China and the US, including engaging in diplomacy, receiving aid and infrastructure development funding, and engaging in business partnerships with firms from that country, as well as a general measure about the favorability of cooperation with that country. Finally, we include a manipulation check question.

Our theoretical claim is that by taking leadership of UN agencies, China seeks to improve its image by signaling to domestic populations in democratic states that it is a non-threatening, responsible, legitimate actor committed to operating within the framework of the liberal international order. However, this depends on the assumption that international publics receive this signal—in other words, that populations pay attention to such leadership and associate participation in IOs like the UN with these features. China's foreign policy clearly operates under the assumption that foreign publics pay attention to its engagement in multilateral organizations and invests substantial resources and effort towards this aim, as discussed above.

Though we lack direct evidence in support of the claim that publics in democratic states pay attention to China's leadership in international organizations, we have several reasons to expect that it would be true. First, given the high salience of the UN across the world, it is reasonable to expect that global publics might be attuned to major shifts in institutional leadership. For example, in recent polling, 54% of Brazilian respondents believed that their country should be more involved in the UN, and thus may have incentives to pay attention to political developments at the UN that may be conducive (or inhibit) the accomplishment of this goal.[21]

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[21]FES Global Census 2022. Further supporting this expectation, the baseline level of trust in the UN in our survey experiment—i.e., among respondents in the control group—is 0.65 out of 1 in France, and 0.66 in Brazil. Baseline perceptions of UN legitimacy were 3.55 out of 5 in France and 3.69 in Brazil.

Second, even if public audiences may not directly note when new states are elected to lead UN technical agencies, powerful states emphasize their new leadership roles in other public diplomacy activities to portray China as a responsible power. In public statements directed at audiences in France and Brazil, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized China's role as a responsible power. Themes of stability, predictability, and order through global governance were common, with specific emphases on upholding an "equal and orderly multipolar world."[22] Given the emphasis on these types of values, it would be reasonable to expect China to highlight its role in leading IOs—evidence in line with these values—in its targeted strategic messaging to these types of international publics.[23]

Empirical Results

To test our main expectation laid out in Hypothesis 1—that is, if China is able to leverage the informal powers of executive leadership to enhance its image—then we should expect its perceived image to be higher in the *China* condition compared to the *Control* condition. To evaluate Hypothesis 2—our expectation that China's leadership has negative effects on the UN's legitimacy—we compare our outcome measures of IO legitimacy in the *China* condition compared to the *Control* condition. To place these findings into context, we compare them to the effects of US leadership. In Hypotheses 3 and 4, we assert that the effect of leadership by the US should be less than for China, both in terms of its effect on country image and IO legitimacy. In other words, we expect $|China - Control| > |US - Control|$ for country image and IO legitimacy outcomes. If the alternative explanation of great power capture framework, the relative magnitude of the effects of leadership on IO legitimacy should be similar for the US and China, which should both be larger than the control case. In both cases, we first assess the index

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[22]E.g., Statement by Xi Jinping, January 25, 2024; Statement by Xi Jinping, August 15, 2024

[23]Future work could fruitfully explore the degree to which global publics pay attention to different dynamics of IO politics—including such major activities as the introduction of new programs, institutional reforms, and changes in leadership.

outcomes before turning to the individual item results.

China's Image

Somewhat surprisingly, given French skepticism and Brazilian openness towards China and its intentions, we find that Chinese leadership of IOs had moderately positive effects on its identity among French respondents, but not among Brazilian respondents (Figure 2). China's leadership of the UN agency improved its perceived image as well as public support for different types of foreign policy cooperation in France, but across all outcomes in Brazil, China's leadership had no significant effects, though the effects on image are directionally positive in Brazil as well.

While one may have expected that China's leadership would have stronger effects on Brazilians due to their relative *ex ante* openness towards closer relations, we suggest that the difference in results between France and Brazil can instead be attributed to ceiling effects. Because French respondents started with a lower baseline favorability towards China, there was more room for them to substantially improve in response to the treatment. In both cases, Chinese leadership of the UN agency leads to a directionally positive change in its reputation across all indicators, suggesting that though the magnitude of the effects are likely to vary depending on country contexts, one can infer that for most international audiences, they can be expected to be positive, providing overall support for Hypothesis 1.

Drilling down into the individual item responses (Figure 3), our findings indicate that China's leadership in UN organizations correlates with a roughly six-percentage-point increase in trust among French respondents (see Figure 3, top panel). In addition to status, China's ability to gain a leadership role within the UN fosters specific foreign policy benefits in its relations with French respondents. Specifically, respondents exhibited a six-percentage-point increase in their agreement with the potential for Franco-Chinese cooperation and an eight-percentage point increase in their support for accepting Chinese aid and engaging in infrastructure development initiatives led by China. This trend suggests public endorsement in France for involvement with China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative, particularly when China is seen as partnering with the UN through

Figure 2: Effects of IO leadership on country images: Index outcomes

Bars represent 95% confidence intervals for coefficient estimates

Note: For full model results with control variables, see Appendix Tables A-5 — A-9 and A-11 — A-16.

Figure 3: Effects of IO leadership on country images: Individual outcomes

Bars represent 95% confidence intervals for coefficient estimates

Note: For full model results with control variables, see Appendix Tables A-5 — A-9 and A-11 — A-16.

leadership roles. However, it is noteworthy that China's UN leadership does not seem to influence French public opinion regarding the desire for diplomatic engagement.

For Brazil, we find that China's leadership of international organizations raises support for China's global leadership relative to the United States. When Brazilian respondents are presented with the hypothetical scenario, 'Suppose either China or the United States will be the most powerful nation in the world in ten years. Would you prefer the United States or China?', we observe a significant increase—a seven-percentage-point rise—in support for China following its leadership role in the UN. This is a powerful win for Chinese foreign policy goals to gain an image as a great power and global leader, especially as it increasingly competes with the US for leadership of the global order and courts Brazil to join its marquee Belt and Road Initiative. However, there are no significant effects of China's leadership for Brazilian respondents on trust or aid, perhaps due to the Brazilian public starting from a more trusting place.

US Image

Are these image gains a 'China story' or do they generalize to other states? We expect that because public opinion about China tends to be negative and furthermore that international publics lack information about China's intentions relative to more established Western powers, China's leadership of IOs is more likely to affect its image compared to leadership by Western powers. Our results generally support this expectation: we find that the marginal effects of leadership are greater for China's image than for America's. On our index outcome measures (Figure 2), the effects in France are null across all measures, and significant but substantively small in Brazil, and is much smaller than the positive image effects of China's leadership treatment condition obtained in the French case. On the specific indicators of status and foreign policy goals (Figure 3), American leadership of the UN leads to no statistically significant impact on its image relative to a baseline condition of the Swiss leading the UN in either country. This suggests that China, rather than the US, possesses the opportunity to reap image enhancement benefits from the UN. It also provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, that the US will not gain from IO leadership in the same way that we have found China's image to

profit.

China's Leadership and IO Legitimacy

While we have shown that China's leadership of IOs can have positive effects on China's image, does it have an impact more directly on IO legitimacy? We hypothesized that by raising the threat of changes in the operation of the UN, Chinese leadership of IOs could lower perceptions of IO legitimacy (Hypothesis 2). Our findings reveal that China's leadership diminishes the perceived legitimacy of the UN with a nine percentage point drop in the aggregate sample, a trend consistent across the French and Brazilian contexts (Figure 4). For instance, in France, the legitimacy of the UN under Chinese leadership declined by about ten percentage points compared to Swiss leadership. In Brazil, the effect is similarly negative but somewhat less pronounced, with a seven percentage point decrease. These results also hold in the disaggregated results (Figure 5), in which we observe that the negative effects of China's leadership are particularly salient in the case of UN reputation ("What do you think the effect of China leading the United Nations agency will be on the reputation of the United Nations' and 'How much do you approve or disapprove of China after the election of the official from China to lead the UN agency?')

This difference in effects between the two samples may reflect variation in baseline favorability towards the UN in the different contexts: a recent poll in both countries found that 61% of French respondents viewed the UN favorably compared to only 53% of Brazilian respondents.[24] Just as French respondents' lower baseline towards China left more room for their evaluations of the country to rise, their higher baseline towards the UN left more room for their evaluations of the institution to fall. Once again, though, in both cases we observe directionally consistent results, suggesting the generalizability of Hypothesis 2's expectations across different country contexts.

Figure 4: Effects of leadership on IO legitimacy: Index outcomes

Effect of China's UN Leadership on IO Legitimacy

Model ●— Overall ●— France ●— Brazil

Bars represent 95% confidence intervals for coefficient estimates

For full model results with control variables, see Appendix Tables A-10 and A-17 − A-18.

Figure 5: Effects of leadership on IO legitimacy: Individual outcomes

Bars represent 95% confidence intervals for coefficient estimates

For full model results with control variables, see Appendix Tables A-10 and A-17 − A-18.

Figure 6: Effects of leadership on IO legitimacy: Great power capture?

Bars represent 95% confidence intervals
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

For full model results with control variables, see Appendix Tables A-10 and A-17 − A-18.

Great Power Capture?

Are these negative effects on institutional legitimacy unique to China—a rising power with potentially uncertain motives—or do they reflect a more general dynamic of backlash against great power capture of IOs that are valued for their independence and neutrality?

Our evidence is somewhat mixed—leadership by China leads to more negative evaluations of the UN in both France and Brazil. In France but not in Brazil, US leadership also has a negative effect on IO evaluations, but the effects are markedly stronger for China. France's high baseline favorability can also help to explain why US leadership of the UN agency also has a negative effect on perceived IO legitimacy in France, resulting in a 6 percentage point decrease in the legitimacy index—though again, the negative effects are particularly salient when it comes to the reputation sub-item but not legitimacy or trust sub-items—and not in Brazil. Despite these negative IO reputational effects driven by US leadership of the IO in the French study, the magnitude of the impact is still much smaller than the effects of Chinese leadership—the effect is approximately half as severe as that of China's, with a decrease of approximately five percentage points in the overall model, though the result is not significant when examining the Brazilian sample only. This reflects a similar pattern to the magnitude of leadership effects on country image.

This finding moderately supports our expectation in Hypothesis 4, and further suggests that public responses to IO leadership tells a story of rising power image management rather than one of great power capture. Indeed, Figure 6 illustrates that the differences between country leadership on UN legitimacy are not statistically different from each other, nor are they tremendously different from baseline levels of support under Swiss leadership. However, it remains the case that great power leadership, whether by China or the US, is viewed less favorably than the more neutral Swiss leadership. Though Western powers may be seen as more favorably than rising powers like China,

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[24]Pew, August 31, 2023.

IOs should still heed this potential source of legitimacy erosion.

Conclusion

Engagement in the UN can have meaningful benefits for a rising power. We theorize that by obtaining leadership positions in well-regarded IOs, China is employing a soft power strategy to improve a rising power's image as a "responsible power." China's investment of time and resources to securing IO leadership positions aims—at least in part—to cultivate support among democratic publics to further its broader foreign policy goals. However, we further expect that such efforts might also lead to negative perceptions of the IO, as global publics fear capture by great powers, particularly when they may lack information about the intention of the state in question.

In our survey experiment, we test and find evidence for these expectations. We examined how IO leadership impacts China's image in democratic nations, which is arguably the hardest case for China to find any effect of enhancing its image. We find that individuals in France—a China-skeptical population—rate China's image more favorably when China leads IOs, though in Brazil, a more China-friendly public, there is less room for China's image to be improved via this mechanism. We do not find the same effect for the US. This suggests that one of the major benefits the UN offers China is the currency of a positive image as a responsible stakeholder. At the same time, Brazilian audiences — an important player in the competition between the US and China — increased their preference for a China-led rather than US-led international order after learning of China's IO leadership. Rather than withdrawing from international organizations, the results suggest that by conceding leadership of IOs, the US misses an opportunity to attract important global audiences. Building on these findings, future research should probe how China deploys these improvements to its image, for example in the partnerships China constructs between its global initiatives and the UN.[25] Future work should also extend these findings to China's efforts beyond leadership, including China's funding, staffing, and partnerships with the United Nations, and to probe the salience of such efforts with

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[25]This includes the Belt and Road, AIIB, and World Internet Conference.

global publics in different types of states—including China's domestic audience.

The results of China improving its image as a responsible power provide a new narrative in the ongoing debates about the implications of China's leadership for global governance (Weiss and Wallace, 2021; Johnston, 2019), and expand our understanding of China's soft power foreign policy (Green-Riley, 2023; Repnikova, 2022). While some have argued that China is engaging in international organizations to make the world "safe for autocracy" (Weiss, 2019), our results suggest an additional, but overlooked motivation: a desire to improve China's image.

Our results also supported our expectation that China's leadership of IOs has negative effects on IO legitimacy, as well as a broader pattern of backlash against great power competition. Leadership by both China and the US reduces perceptions of legitimacy, though the effects are more than twice as large in the case of China—and the negative response to US leadership only occurs in the case of France. While this result supports our theoretical expectations that uncertainty and perceived threat lead to negative effects on IO perceptions as a result of China's leadership, it also suggests that great power leadership more generally is a channel that could result in the erosion of institutional legitimacy (Lenz and Viola, 2017; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019). As IOs confront increasing backlash, retrenchment, and member state withdrawal (Walter, 2021; Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019), such evidence is particularly important for identifying a source that could affect global perceptions of and confidence in IOs.

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Supplementary Materials for China's Leadership of IOs: Reputational Gains, Distributional Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy

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October 15, 2024

Contents

A Empirical Appendix

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A-1: Summary Statistics, France Sample

	Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
1	Age	6	35.00	49.00	48.97	64.00	82
2	Male	1	1.00	1.00	1.47	2.00	2
3	Education	1	2.00	3.00	3.27	5.00	5
4	Trust in Government	1	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	3
5	Political Interest	1	3.00	3.00	3.14	4.00	4
6	Foreign Policy Orientation	1	2.75	3.25	3.18	3.50	5
7	Conservatism	1	2.00	3.00	3.06	4.00	5
8	Income	1	1.00	2.00	2.17	3.00	6
9	China Enemy	1	3.00	3.00	3.31	4.00	5
10	China Threat	1	3.00	3.00	3.33	4.00	5
11	USA Enemy	1	1.00	2.00	1.93	2.00	5
12	USA Threat	1	2.00	2.00	2.47	3.00	5

Table A-2: Summary Statistics, Brazil Sample

	Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
1	Age	17	30.00	38.50	40.73	51.00	80
2	Male	1	1.00	1.00	1.47	2.00	2
3	Education	1	2.00	4.00	3.60	4.00	5
4	Trust in Government	1	1.00	1.00	1.55	2.00	3
5	Political Interest	1	3.00	4.00	3.48	4.00	4
6	Foreign Policy Orientation	2	2.75	3.25	3.32	3.75	5
7	Conservatism	1	2.00	3.00	3.12	4.00	5
8	Income	1	2.00	4.00	3.70	5.00	6
9	China Enemy	1	1.00	2.00	2.17	2.00	5
10	China Threat	1	1.00	2.00	2.59	4.00	5
11	USA Enemy	1	1.00	2.00	1.92	2.00	5
12	USA Threat	1	1.00	2.00	2.21	3.00	5

Table A-3: Balance Tests, France Sample

	Var.	Treatment	T-Test P val.	Ctrl. Mean	Treatment Mean
1	Age	China	0.73	48.47	49.08
2	Age	USA	0.64	48.47	49.33
3	Male	China	0.47	1.49	1.45
4	Male	USA	0.70	1.49	1.47
5	Education	China	0.05	3.15	3.44
6	Education	USA	0.63	3.15	3.22
7	Trust in Government	China	0.64	1.47	1.51
8	Trust in Government	USA	0.43	1.47	1.53
9	Political Interest	China	0.05	3.10	3.31
10	Political Interest	USA	0.46	3.10	3.02
11	Foreign Policy Orientation	China	0.70	3.17	3.20
12	Foreign Policy Orientation	USA	0.92	3.17	3.18
13	Conservatism	China	0.32	3.03	3.13
14	Conservatism	USA	0.89	3.03	3.02
15	Income	China	0.19	2.05	2.21
16	Income	USA	0.08	2.05	2.25
17	China Enemy	China	0.83	3.28	3.31
18	China Enemy	USA	0.67	3.28	3.33
19	China Threat	China	0.48	3.40	3.33
20	China Threat	USA	0.28	3.40	3.28
21	USA Enemy	China	0.95	1.92	1.92
22	USA Enemy	USA	0.92	1.92	1.94
23	USA Threat	China	0.82	2.49	2.46
24	USA Threat	USA	0.90	2.49	2.47

Table A-4: Balance Tests, Brazil Sample

	Var.	Treatment	T-Test P val.	Ctrl. Mean	Treatment Mean
1	Age	China	0.06	39.24	42.16
2	Age	USA	0.30	39.24	40.78
3	Male	China	0.68	1.49	1.46
4	Male	USA	0.48	1.49	1.45
5	Education	China	0.72	3.52	3.56
6	Education	USA	0.11	3.52	3.72
7	Trust in Government	China	0.69	1.56	1.53
8	Trust in Government	USA	0.87	1.56	1.55
9	Political Interest	China	0.85	3.51	3.49
10	Political Interest	USA	0.31	3.51	3.43
11	Foreign Policy Orientation	China	0.45	3.30	3.35
12	Foreign Policy Orientation	USA	0.98	3.30	3.30
13	Conservatism	China	0.84	3.11	3.09
14	Conservatism	USA	0.67	3.11	3.16
15	Income	China	0.68	3.58	3.65
16	Income	USA	0.11	3.58	3.89
17	China Enemy	China	0.96	2.15	2.15
18	China Enemy	USA	0.63	2.15	2.20
19	China Threat	China	0.64	2.65	2.58
20	China Threat	USA	0.46	2.65	2.54
21	USA Enemy	China	0.92	1.90	1.89
22	USA Enemy	USA	0.64	1.90	1.95
23	USA Threat	China	0.90	2.20	2.21
24	USA Threat	USA	0.83	2.20	2.23

A.2   Pre-Registration and IRB

This study was pre-registered at OSF and was reviewed by the IRB of the authors' university.

A.3   Questionnaire

A.3.1   Pre-Test

- *(Gender)*: What is your gender?

  - Male

  - Female

  - Neither/Prefer not to say

- *(Education)*: What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

  - Elementary or some high school

  - High school graduate/GED

  - Some college/Associate's degree

  - College/university graduate

  - Post-graduate degree

- *(Ideology)*: In general, I think of myself as:

  - Extremely liberal

  - Liberal

  - Slightly liberal

  - Moderate, middle of the road

  - Slightly conservative

  - Conservative

  - Extremely conservative

- *(Employment)*: Which of these options best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?

  - Employed full time

  - Employed part time

  - Unemployed

  - Student

  - Retired

  - Homemaker

  - Self-employed

- *(Sector)*: Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are employed?

- – Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support
- – Real estate or rental and leasing
- – Mining
- – Professional, scientific or technical services
- – Utilities
- – Management of companies or enterprises
- – Construction
- – Admin, support, waste management or remediation services
- – Manufacturing
- – Educational services
- – Wholesale trade
- – Health care or social assistance
- – Retail trade
- – Arts, entertainment or recreation
- – Transportation or warehousing
- – Accommodation or food services
- – Information
- – Other services (except public administration)
- – Finance or insurance
- – Unclassified establishments

- *(Age)*: How old are you?

- *(Income)*: What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?

  - – Less than $25,000
  - – $25,000-$49,999
  - – $50,000-$74,999
  - – $75,000-$99,999
  - – $100,000-$149,999
  - – $150,000 or more
  - – Prefer not to say

- *(Trust Government)*: How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in [Brasilia/Paris] to do what is right?

  - – Just about always
  - – Most of the time
  - – Only some of the time

- *(Political Interest)*: Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs:

  - Most of the time
  - Some of the time
  - Only now and then
  - Hardly at all

- *(Foreign Policy Orientation)*: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. *(In response to each statement, respondent selects from: Definitely disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, definitely agree*

  - The use of military force only makes problems worse.
  - Generally speaking, [Brazil/France] can trust other nations.
  - Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
  - (Brazil/France) is superior to other nations.

- *(Frenemy)*: We are interested in your views towards several countries. How friendly or unfriendly would you say are relations between [Brazil/France] and this country? *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: Ally, friendly, unfriendly, enemy, not sure*

  - China
  - U.S.
  - Germany
  - Egypt
  - Indonesia

- *(Threat Perception)*: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: This country poses a threat to [Brazil/France]. *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: Definitely disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, definitely agree*

  - China
  - U.S.
  - Germany
  - Egypt
  - Indonesia

- *(Screener)*: We would like to get a sense of your general preferences.

  Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables, can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives

below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of these options.

What is your favorite color?

– White

– Black

– Red

– Pink

– Green

– Blue

A.3.2   Treatment

You will now be shown a news article. Please read over the article carefully because at the end of this survey you will be asked questions to check your memory and comprehension.

You will be required to view the article for at least 15 seconds, but should feel free to take more time. Then, you will be asked a few more questions.

(Respondents are randomly assigned to be shown one of the following treatments and asked to summarize the article in one or two sentences.)

(Control): Specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN) perform important functions, including working to eradicate poverty and improve sustainable development; facilitating cooperation between governments on health, safety, and technology; and promoting literacy, education, and other social issues. Elections are held at the United Nations to select the leader of each UN specialized agency, and all countries can vote in the elections.

An official from Switzerland was recently elected to lead a specialized agency of the UN. Several states campaigned actively in the election for the position. The Swiss official will manage the work of the UN agency and lead the employees and staff in developing international projects. The Swiss leader will play an active role in activities like hiring new staff, setting the agency's issue priorities, and creating partnerships with outside organizations and donors.

(China): Specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN) perform important functions, including working to eradicate poverty and improve sustainable development; facilitating cooperation between governments on health, safety, and technology; and promoting literacy, education, and other social issues. Elections are held at the United Nations to select the leader of each UN specialized agency, and all countries can vote in the elections.

An official from China was recently elected to lead a specialized agency of the UN. Several states campaigned actively in the election for the position. The Chinese official will manage the work of the UN agency and lead the employees and staff in developing international projects. The Chinese leader will play an active role in activities like hiring new staff, setting the agency's issue priorities, and creating partnerships with outside organizations and donors.

(US): Specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN) perform important functions, including working to eradicate poverty and improve sustainable development; facilitating cooperation between governments on health, safety, and technology; and promoting literacy, education, and other social issues. Elections are held at the United Nations to select the leader of each UN specialized agency, and all countries can vote in the elections.

An official from the United States of America was recently elected to lead a specialized agency of the UN. Several states campaigned actively in the election for the position. The American official will manage the work of the UN agency and lead the employees and staff in developing international projects. The American leader will play an active role in activities like hiring new staff, setting the agency's issue priorities, and creating partnerships with outside organizations and donors.

A.3.3　Outcome Measures

- *(Reputation1)*: What do you think the effect of China/US/Switzerland leading the United Nations agency will be on the reputation of: *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: Very negative effect, somewhat negative effect, neither negative nor positive effect, somewhat positive effect, very positive effect)*

    - China/US/Switzerland
    - the United Nations

- *(Reputation2)*: How much do you approve or disapprove of China/US/Switzerland after the election of the official from China/US/Switzerland to lead the UN agency? *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: Definitely disapprove, somewhat disapprove, neither approve nor disapprove, somewhat approve, definitely approve)*

    - China/US/Switzerland
    - the United Nations

- *(Legitimacy)*: On a scale of 1 (no confidence) to 5 (full confidence) how much confidence do you have in each of: *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: No confidence, not very confident, neither confident nor unconfident, somewhat confident, very confident)*

    - China
    - the United States of America
    - Switzerland
    - the United Nations

- *(Trust)*: For each of the following, how much do you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: Do not trust at all, mostly distrust, neither trust nor distrust, somewhat trust, trust completely)*

    - China
    - the United States of America

- Switzerland
- the United Nations

- *(Leadership)*: Suppose either China or the United States will be the most powerful nation in the world in ten years. Would you:

  - Strongly prefer China
  - Somewhat prefer China
  - Prefer neither China nor the United States
  - Somewhat prefer the United States
  - Strongly prefer the United States

- *(Cooperation)*: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: this country poses an opportunity for cooperation with [Brazil/France]. *(In response to each listed country, respondent selects from: Definitely disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, definitely agree)*

  - China
  - the United States of America
  - Switzerland

- *(Instruments)*: In your opinion, how acceptable or unacceptable is it for the [Brazilian/French] government to take the following actions? *(In response to each listed statement, respondent selects from: Totally unacceptable, somewhat unacceptable, neither acceptable nor unacceptable, somewhat acceptable, totally acceptable)*

  - Engage in diplomacy (directly talk with foreign leaders) with the United States of America
  - Engage in diplomacy (directly talk with foreign leaders) with China
  - Receive aid and infrastructure development funding from China
  - Receive aid and infrastructure development funding from the United States of America
  - Engage in business partnerships with firms from China
  - Engage in business partnerships with firms from the United States of America

- *(Manipulation Check)*: In the article you read, the country elected was:

  - The United States
  - China
  - A different country
  - Not mentioned
  - Switzerland
  - Germany

A.4 Full Tabular Results

A.4.1 Index Outcome Measures

Table A-5: China Image (France)

	Dependent variable:	
	Image Index	FP Cooperation Index
	(1)	(2)
China	0.051*	0.052*
	(0.023)	(0.022)
US	−0.001	0.032
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Education	−0.006	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.0003	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age	−0.002**	−0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.004	0.027
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Trust in Govt	0.051***	0.035*
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Pol Interest	−0.010	0.019
	(0.010)	(0.010)
FP Orientation	−0.033*	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Conservatism	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)
China Enemy	−0.057***	−0.041***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
China Threat	−0.092***	−0.059***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	0.027*	−0.020
	(0.011)	(0.011)
USA Threat	0.025**	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.867***	0.761***
	(0.101)	(0.101)
Observations	450	450
R^2	0.387	0.229
Adjusted R^2	0.367	0.204
Residual Std. Error (df = 435)	0.190	0.189
F Statistic (df = 14; 435)	19.582***	9.240***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-6: China Image (Brazil)

	Dependent variable:	
	Image Index	FP Cooperation Index
	(1)	(2)
China	0.045	0.005
	(0.028)	(0.028)
US	−0.015	0.002
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Education	−0.009	−0.026*
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Income	0.004	0.016
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	−0.001	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.008	−0.002
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Trust in Govt	0.112***	0.040*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Pol Interest	−0.014	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.018)
FP Orientation	0.029	0.014
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Conservatism	−0.014	−0.035*
	(0.015)	(0.015)
China Enemy	−0.032*	−0.052***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
China Threat	−0.098***	−0.075***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	−0.016	−0.024
	(0.013)	(0.013)
USA Threat	0.008	0.022
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.719***	1.026***
	(0.129)	(0.129)
Observations	370	370
R^2	0.469	0.369
Adjusted R^2	0.448	0.345
Residual Std. Error (df = 355)	0.223	0.223
F Statistic (df = 14; 355)	22.434***	14.858***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-7: USA Image (France)

	Dependent variable:	
	Image Index	FP Cooperation Index
	(1)	(2)
China	0.001	0.017
	(0.024)	(0.021)
US	−0.002	0.007
	(0.023)	(0.021)
Education	0.010	0.0002
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.001	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.008)
Age	0.0001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.030	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Trust in Govt	0.079***	0.042**
	(0.015)	(0.013)
Pol Interest	0.004	0.016
	(0.011)	(0.009)
FP Orientation	−0.031	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.015)
Conservatism	0.009	−0.013
	(0.011)	(0.009)
China Enemy	−0.002	−0.007
	(0.012)	(0.010)
China Threat	0.034**	0.032**
	(0.011)	(0.010)
USA Enemy	−0.049***	−0.055***
	(0.011)	(0.010)
USA Threat	−0.101***	−0.046***
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Constant	0.795***	0.680***
	(0.106)	(0.093)
Observations	450	450
R^2	0.406	0.283
Adjusted R^2	0.387	0.260
Residual Std. Error (df = 435)	0.199	0.175
F Statistic (df = 14; 435)	21.206***	12.251***

Note: $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

Table A-8: USA Image (Brazil)

	Dependent variable:	
	Image Index	FP Cooperation Index
	(1)	(2)
China	−0.023	−0.025
	(0.026)	(0.026)
US	−0.056*	−0.016
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Education	0.002	−0.010
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income	0.008	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Age	0.00001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.020	0.009
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Trust in Govt	0.083***	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Pol Interest	0.009	0.042*
	(0.017)	(0.017)
FP Orientation	0.016	0.031
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Conservatism	0.054***	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)
China Enemy	0.007	−0.022
	(0.012)	(0.012)
China Threat	0.019	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.010)
USA Enemy	−0.079***	−0.054***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
USA Threat	−0.097***	−0.040***
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Constant	0.643***	0.674***
	(0.120)	(0.118)
Observations	370	370
R^2	0.434	0.233
Adjusted R^2	0.411	0.203
Residual Std. Error (df = 355)	0.207	0.204
F Statistic (df = 14; 355)	19.426***	7.704***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-9: Switzerland Image

	Dependent variable:	
	Image Index (France)	Image Index (Brazil)
	(1)	(2)
China	−0.038	0.052*
	(0.026)	(0.022)
US	−0.041	0.032
	(0.027)	(0.022)
Education	−0.0001	−0.001
	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income	0.012	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Age	0.002*	−0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.026	0.027
	(0.022)	(0.019)
Trust in Govt	0.043*	0.035*
	(0.017)	(0.014)
Pol Interest	0.012	0.019
	(0.017)	(0.010)
FP Orientation	0.024	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Conservatism	0.022	−0.003
	(0.014)	(0.010)
China Enemy	−0.036**	−0.041***
	(0.012)	(0.011)
China Threat	0.021*	−0.059***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	−0.029*	−0.020
	(0.012)	(0.011)
USA Threat	−0.056***	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.534***	0.761***
	(0.118)	(0.101)
Observations	370	450
R^2	0.246	0.229
Adjusted R^2	0.216	0.204
Residual Std. Error	0.204 (df = 355)	0.189 (df = 435)
F Statistic	8.266*** (df = 14; 355)	9.240*** (df = 14; 435)

Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-10: UN Image

| | Dependent variable: | |
| | Image Index (France) | Image Index (Brazil) |
	(1)	(2)
China	−0.070**	−0.111***
	(0.025)	(0.022)
US	−0.006	−0.063**
	(0.026)	(0.022)
Education	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income	0.009	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Age	0.0002	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.048*	−0.007
	(0.022)	(0.018)
Trust in Govt	0.089***	0.085***
	(0.017)	(0.014)
Pol Interest	0.030	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.010)
FP Orientation	0.029	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Conservatism	0.001	−0.027**
	(0.013)	(0.010)
China Enemy	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.012)	(0.011)
China Threat	−0.034***	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	−0.048***	−0.031**
	(0.012)	(0.010)
USA Threat	−0.021*	−0.049***
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Constant	0.648***	0.770***
	(0.115)	(0.099)
Observations	370	450
R^2	0.349	0.264
Adjusted R^2	0.323	0.240
Residual Std. Error	0.199 (df = 355)	0.186 (df = 435)
F Statistic	13.586*** (df = 14; 355)	11.143*** (df = 14; 435)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

A.4.2 Separate Outcome Measures

Table A-11: China Image (France)

	Legitimacy	Trust	Cooperation	Diplomacy	Aid	Business	Leader
	Dependent variable:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
China	0.039	0.063*	0.054	0.020	0.079**	0.056	0.012
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.023)
US	−0.011	0.009	0.005	0.030	0.023	0.042	−0.005
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.023)
Education	−0.012	0.0004	−0.001	0.018	−0.025*	0.004	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Income	0.001	−0.0001	0.007	0.005	0.011	−0.009	−0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Age	−0.002***	−0.001*	−0.002*	0.0001	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.010	0.002	0.024	0.042	0.005	0.033	−0.0005
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Trust in Govt	0.058***	0.045**	0.024	0.027	0.061***	0.017	−0.014
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Pol Interest	−0.017	−0.003	0.004	0.024	−0.006	0.038**	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)
FP Orientation	−0.037*	−0.030	−0.025	0.042	−0.033	0.005	0.025
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Conservatism	−0.002	−0.0001	0.015	−0.003	−0.018	0.011	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)
China Enemy	−0.057***	−0.057***	−0.083***	−0.032*	−0.045**	−0.045**	−0.032**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
China Threat	−0.088***	−0.097***	−0.063***	−0.052***	−0.049***	−0.077***	−0.053***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	0.029*	0.025*	0.006	−0.054***	0.012	−0.018	0.036**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
USA Threat	0.022*	0.029**	0.026*	0.028*	−0.003	0.019	0.078***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Constant	0.940***	0.793***	0.870***	0.543***	1.029***	0.709***	0.278**
	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.105)
Observations	450	450	450	450	450	450	450
R^2	0.342	0.345	0.246	0.155	0.231	0.179	0.305
Adjusted R^2	0.321	0.324	0.222	0.128	0.206	0.153	0.283
Residual Std. Error (df = 435)	0.213	0.207	0.234	0.248	0.244	0.248	0.196
F Statistic (df = 14; 435)	16.171***	16.376***	10.137***	5.713***	9.328***	6.793***	13.648***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-12: China Image (Brazil)

	Legitimacy (1)	Trust (2)	Cooperation (3)	Diplomacy (4)	Aid (5)	Business (6)	Leader (7)
				Dependent variable:			
China	0.059	0.032	0.066*	−0.019	0.008	0.024	0.089**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.033)
US	−0.009	−0.020	0.002	0.005	−0.002	0.003	0.019
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Education	−0.005	−0.014	−0.014	−0.037**	−0.026	−0.015	−0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Income	−0.001	0.009	0.011	0.017	0.015	0.015	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Age	−0.002	−0.0003	−0.001	0.001	−0.0002	−0.0003	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.016	0.001	0.053*	−0.010	−0.005	0.008	−0.019
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Trust in Govt	0.106***	0.119***	0.045*	0.018	0.076***	0.026	0.046*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Pol Interest	−0.013	−0.015	0.006	0.015	−0.002	0.007	−0.020
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
FP Orientation	0.030	0.027	0.029	−0.001	0.024	0.019	−0.015
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Conservatism	−0.019	−0.009	−0.046**	−0.045**	−0.033	−0.027	−0.062***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
China Enemy	−0.032*	−0.031*	−0.042**	−0.059***	−0.037*	−0.058***	−0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
China Threat	−0.095***	−0.102***	−0.090***	−0.061***	−0.091***	−0.073***	−0.075***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
USA Enemy	−0.013	−0.020	−0.032*	−0.029	−0.024	−0.020	0.066***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
USA Threat	0.003	0.014	0.020	0.027*	0.011	0.029*	0.087***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	0.741***	0.696***	0.929***	1.157***	0.954***	0.967***	0.568***
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.144)	(0.158)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Observations	370	370	370	370	370	370	370
R^2	0.437	0.439	0.427	0.278	0.345	0.297	0.347
Adjusted R^2	0.415	0.416	0.405	0.250	0.319	0.270	0.321
Residual Std. Error (df = 355)	0.238	0.239	0.237	0.249	0.273	0.255	0.260
F Statistic (df = 14; 355)	19.710***	19.803***	18.918***	9.782***	13.345***	10.727***	13.467***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-13: USA Image (France)

	Dependent variable:					
	Legitimacy	Trust	Cooperation	Diplomacy	Aid	Business
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
China	−0.009	0.011	0.009	0.003	0.028	0.019
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)
US	0.005	−0.010	−0.037	0.025	−0.004	0.001
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Education	0.009	0.011	0.004	0.015	−0.010	−0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Income	−0.003	0.006	−0.003	0.016	0.017	0.010
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Age	−0.0001	0.0002	−0.001	0.0002	−0.002*	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.026	−0.034	0.001	0.003	0.0003	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Trust in Govt	0.077***	0.082***	0.035*	0.007	0.078***	0.041*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Pol Interest	0.007	0.001	0.017	0.039***	−0.013	0.023*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
FP Orientation	−0.047*	−0.016	−0.008	0.042*	−0.028	−0.007
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Conservatism	0.009	0.008	−0.001	0.003	−0.021	−0.020
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
China Enemy	−0.002	−0.002	−0.040***	−0.013	−0.005	−0.003
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
China Threat	0.030*	0.037**	0.060***	0.039**	0.031*	0.027*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
USA Enemy	−0.054***	−0.045***	−0.062***	−0.071***	−0.034**	−0.059***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
USA Threat	−0.097***	−0.104***	−0.073***	−0.034**	−0.054***	−0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Constant	0.867***	0.723***	0.876***	0.455***	0.828***	0.758***
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.104)	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.115)
Observations	450	450	450	450	450	450
R²	0.353	0.373	0.369	0.266	0.169	0.233
Adjusted R²	0.332	0.353	0.349	0.243	0.142	0.208
Residual Std. Error (df = 435)	0.223	0.214	0.194	0.217	0.236	0.216
F Statistic (df = 14; 435)	16.975***	18.470***	18.168***	11.269***	6.304***	9.425***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-14: USA Image (Brazil)

	Dependent variable:					
	Legitimacy	Trust	Cooperation	Diplomacy	Aid	Business
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
China	−0.036	−0.010	−0.001	−0.008	−0.034	−0.034
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.026)
US	−0.053	−0.058*	−0.014	0.004	−0.018	−0.032
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Education	0.004	0.0004	0.016	−0.019	−0.003	−0.007
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Income	0.013	0.002	0.013	0.006	0.002	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Age	−0.001	0.001	−0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.027	−0.013	0.014	0.016	0.011	−0.001
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.023)
Trust in Govt	0.089***	0.077***	0.045**	0.009	0.048*	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Pol Interest	0.016	0.003	−0.022	0.045*	0.032	0.049**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.017)
FP Orientation	0.011	0.021	0.028	0.017	0.052*	0.022
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Conservatism	0.057***	0.050***	0.034**	−0.011	0.017	0.016
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)
China Enemy	0.0003	0.013	−0.016	−0.034*	−0.007	−0.025*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.012)
China Threat	0.023*	0.014	0.011	0.016	0.0001	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	−0.083***	−0.076***	−0.079***	−0.054***	−0.058***	−0.051***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.013)
USA Threat	−0.094***	−0.099***	−0.065***	−0.023	−0.062***	−0.036***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Constant	0.632***	0.654***	0.811***	0.791***	0.509**	0.724***
	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.110)	(0.134)	(0.159)	(0.121)
Observations	370	370	370	370	370	370
R^2	0.417	0.401	0.385	0.155	0.211	0.203
Adjusted R^2	0.394	0.377	0.361	0.122	0.180	0.172
Residual Std. Error (df = 355)	0.220	0.218	0.191	0.231	0.275	0.209
F Statistic (df = 14; 355)	18.167***	16.973***	15.890***	4.668***	6.800***	6.474***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-15: Switzerland Image (France)

	Dependent variable:		
	Legitimacy	Trust	Cooperation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
China	−0.003	−0.021	−0.025
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)
US	−0.007	−0.020	−0.065*
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Education	−0.002	0.004	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	−0.015	−0.025*	−0.013
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.0003	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.008	0.004	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Trust in Govt	0.015	0.030*	0.031
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Pol Interest	0.031*	0.037***	0.028*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
FP Orientation	−0.0004	0.035	0.012
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Conservatism	0.013	0.012	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)
China Enemy	−0.001	−0.010	−0.012
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
China Threat	0.003	0.022	0.024
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
USA Enemy	−0.023	−0.022	−0.042***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
USA Threat	−0.022	−0.014	−0.007
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.668***	0.472***	0.583***
	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.117)
Observations	450	450	450
R^2	0.072	0.109	0.119
Adjusted R^2	0.042	0.080	0.090
Residual Std. Error (df = 435)	0.232	0.208	0.219
F Statistic (df = 14; 435)	2.399**	3.802***	4.184***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-16: Switzerland Image (Brazil)

	Dependent variable:		
	Legitimacy	Trust	Cooperation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
China	−0.045	−0.031	−0.040
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
US	−0.042	−0.039	−0.073*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Education	−0.004	0.004	0.007
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	0.015	0.010	0.017*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	0.002*	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.017	0.035	0.039
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Trust in Govt	0.029	0.056**	0.030
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Pol Interest	0.017	0.008	0.017
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
FP Orientation	0.017	0.030	0.019
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Conservatism	0.016	0.028	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
China Enemy	−0.045***	−0.027*	−0.027*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
China Threat	0.018	0.023*	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
USA Enemy	−0.039**	−0.020	−0.021
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
USA Threat	−0.050***	−0.061***	−0.046***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.625***	0.442***	0.582***
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.127)
Observations	370	370	370
R^2	0.242	0.215	0.191
Adjusted R^2	0.213	0.184	0.160
Residual Std. Error (df = 355)	0.216	0.216	0.220
F Statistic (df = 14; 355)	8.113***	6.961***	6.005***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-17: UN Image (France)

	Dependent variable:			
	Legitimacy	Trust	Reputation1	Reputation2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
China	−0.030	−0.055	−0.170***	−0.190***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)
US	−0.040	−0.024	−0.094***	−0.093***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Education	−0.002	0.001	0.003	−0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	0.004	0.004	−0.003	0.002
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.010	−0.026	0.0001	0.008
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Trust in Govt	0.102***	0.090***	0.070***	0.076***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Pol Interest	0.009	0.006	0.004	0.013
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
FP Orientation	0.034	0.030	−0.011	−0.008
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Conservatism	−0.043**	−0.027*	−0.021	−0.019
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
China Enemy	0.006	−0.005	−0.007	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
China Threat	0.017	0.018	0.003	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)
USA Enemy	−0.055***	−0.047***	−0.009	−0.013
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)
USA Threat	−0.056***	−0.060***	−0.043***	−0.037**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Constant	0.696***	0.766***	0.792***	0.828***
	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.116)	(0.123)
Observations	450	450	450	450
R^2	0.230	0.211	0.183	0.198
Adjusted R^2	0.205	0.185	0.157	0.173
Residual Std. Error (df = 435)	0.250	0.244	0.218	0.230
F Statistic (df = 14; 435)	9.269***	8.292***	6.955***	7.692***

Note:		
		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A-18: UN Image (Brazil)

	Dependent variable:			
	Legitimacy	Trust	Reputation1	Reputation2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
China	−0.029	−0.021	−0.137***	−0.094**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.032)
US	0.027	0.028	−0.056	−0.023
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Education	−0.001	−0.008	0.012	−0.017
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Income	0.011	0.017	−0.001	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age	−0.001	−0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	−0.059*	−0.048	−0.062*	−0.023
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Trust in Govt	0.110***	0.103***	0.054**	0.088***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Pol Interest	0.016	0.016	0.039*	0.047*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)
FP Orientation	0.059**	0.072***	−0.026	0.010
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Conservatism	−0.010	−0.020	0.012	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
China Enemy	−0.014	−0.009	−0.0001	−0.009
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
China Threat	−0.023	−0.037**	−0.038**	−0.038**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
USA Enemy	−0.042**	−0.045**	−0.049***	−0.054***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
USA Threat	−0.034**	−0.018	−0.017	−0.017
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Constant	0.620***	0.561***	0.830***	0.582***
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.136)	(0.147)
Observations	370	370	370	370
R^2	0.311	0.330	0.235	0.244
Adjusted R^2	0.283	0.303	0.205	0.214
Residual Std. Error (df = 355)	0.250	0.249	0.235	0.253
F Statistic (df = 14; 355)	11.428***	12.465***	7.802***	8.187***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001