

“Supplementary Material”

Who Sets the Agenda? Diplomatic Experience and Small Power Influence in the United Nations *World Politics*

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<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/C61VGR>.

1 Descriptive Statistics

1.1 GA Agenda-Setting Procedures

The process of agenda setting follows a formal procedure laid out in the UN Charter and the General Assembly’s Rules and Procedures, which delegates this responsibility to the General Committee. The membership of the General Committee consists of the President of the General Assembly, the 21 Vice Presidents, and the Chairmen of the six Main Committees. This always includes the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China), and rotating representation from the other geographical blocs, each of which employs separate procedures for selecting their Vice Presidents—for example, the African bloc has a rotation scheme, while some blocs have internal elections (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014). Every state has an equal right to submit new agenda proposals, which may be co-sponsored. The General Committee then considers all proposed agenda items and determines whether they will be included on the GA’s agenda. Many agenda items are adopted by consensus, though votes can be requested and are decided by a simple majority rule (Alker, 1964; Kaufmann, 1980; Smith, 2006). Each year, these items are contained in the Preliminary List of Items, the Provisional Agenda, the Supplementary List of Items, and all of the General Committee reports. While most items are proposed by states, some are also submitted by 15 institutional proposers (President of the General Assembly, Secretary-General, the Trusteeship Council, etc).

While these institutional rules are specific to the UN, they also are similar to many other IOs (and in some cases even serve as a template). For example, in the EU, Coreper II similarly determines the agenda for the EU Council.

1.2 Quantitative Measures

Figure A-1: Missingness Maps




Table A-1: Independent Variable Summary Statistics

Var.	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.	Pct. Missing
Polity ^a	-10	-7.00	2.00	0.98	8.00	10	0.08
IO Memberships ^b	2	35.00	50.00	51.24	66.00	126	0.00
Duration UN Membership ^c	0	14.00	28.00	30.34	45.00	74	0.00
Vol. Budget Contribution ^d	2	13.78	15.33	15.38	17.01	23	0.84
Embassies Hosted ^e	0	13.00	29.00	36.97	53.00	184	0.78
Alliances ^f	1	1.00	2.00	2.54	3.00	21	0.45
Defense Pacts ^g	1	1.00	1.00	1.78	2.00	11	0.45
GDP ^h	13196545	1985582686.50	9931134941.00	193927349208.62	59110874241.00	20600000000000	0.19
Population (Log) ⁱ	9	14.60	15.78	15.62	16.86	21	0.11
Military Exp. ^j	0	1.21	1.93	2.78	3.21	117	0.33
Military Exp. Log Dollars	-Inf	17.76	19.52	-Inf	21.41	27	0.30
Log Num. of UN Staff ^k	0	1.79	2.83	2.78	3.74	7	0.66
Share of UN Staff ^l	0	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0	0.66
Amb. Gender ^m	0	1.00	1.00	0.89	1.00	1	0.08
Level Rep. ⁿ	0	1.00	1.00	1.38	2.00	2	0.60
Amb. Tenure (Strict) ^o	1	1.00	2.00	3.10	4.00	28	0.02
Amb. Tenure (Lenient) ^p	1	4.00	5.00	6.48	8.00	37	0.02

a 1945-2018 (all years) ([Center for Systemic Peace, 2018](#))

b 1945-2012, interpolated for 2012-2018 ([Pevehouse et al., 2020](#))

c 1945-2012, interpolated for 2012-2018 ([Pevehouse et al., 2020](#))

d 2009-2018, manually collected from [UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination \(2019\)](#). The agencies included are WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UNDP, WHO, UNRWA, FAO, UN, IAEA, UNODC, UNAIDS, ILO, UNFPA, IFAD, PAHO, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNWOMEN, WMO, ICAO, UNIDO, WTO, IARC, OPCW, UNITAR, ITC, UNCDF, UNESCO, IMO, CTBTO, WIPO, UNU, UNSSC, UNFCCC, ITU, UNITAID, ICC, UNWTO, UNRISD, DPKO, and UNOPS.

e 1970-2010, interpolated between 3 and 5-year measurements ([Rhamey et al., 2013](#))

f 1945-2012 ([Gibler, 2009](#))

g 1945-2012 ([Gibler, 2009](#))

h 1960-2018 ([World Bank, 2019](#))

i 1960-2018 ([World Bank, 2019](#))

j 1960-2018 ([World Bank, 2019](#))

k 1997-2015 ([Parizek & Stephen, 2021](#))

l 1997-2015 ([Parizek & Stephen, 2021](#))

m 1945-2018 (all years), manually constructed with `genderize`

n 1970-2017 ([Baturu et al., 2017](#))

o 1945-2018 (all years), manually collected

p 1945-2018 (all years), manually collected

Figure A-2: Correlation of Independent Variables




Figure A-3: Treatment Distribution Across Units and Time



Table A-2: Small Powers Well Represented Among Top Proposers

	Proposer	Total Num. Proposals	Proposer	Proposals Weighted by Membership Years
1	Russia/USSR	128	Russia/USSR	1.73
2	India	84	Yemen	1.72
3	Egypt	76	Ukraine	1.50
4	Iraq	68	Belarus	1.21
5	Cuba	65	India	1.17
6	Pakistan	63	Southern Yemen	1.04
7	Philippines	62	Egypt	1.03
8	USA	60	Iraq	0.92
9	Syria	56	Cuba	0.88
10	Costa Rica	54	Pakistan	0.88
11	Romania	52	Philippines	0.85
12	Nicaragua	51	Romania	0.81
13	Indonesia	50	USA	0.81
14	Sudan	50	Sudan	0.79
15	Yemen	50	Czechoslovakia	0.79
16	Guinea	47	Syria	0.79
17	Lebanon	45	Guinea	0.77
18	Libya	45	Senegal	0.76
19	Senegal	45	Algeria	0.74
20	Morocco	44	Costa Rica	0.73
21	Afghanistan	43	Indonesia	0.72
22	Iran	43	Mali	0.71
23	Algeria	42	Libya	0.70
24	Mali	42	Morocco	0.70
25	Saudi Arabia	42	Nicaragua	0.69

Notes: The total number of proposals by country is shown in the left column; the total number of proposals divided by the number of years of the country's UN membership (until 2018) is shown in the right column.

Table A-3: Small Powers Have Some of the Longest Diplomatic Tenure

	Country	Strict Measure	Country	Lenient Measure
1	Turkmenistan	11.82	Monaco	18.00
2	Djibouti	11.24	Liechtenstein	16.30
3	Liechtenstein	8.13	Djibouti	14.98
4	Madagascar	7.43	Turkmenistan	13.96
5	Palestine	7.15	Palestine	12.46
6	Kuwait	7.11	Nicaragua	12.22
7	Southern Yemen	7.00	Antigua and Barbuda	12.14
8	Nauru	6.75	Madagascar	11.77
9	Angola	6.74	Dominica	11.53
10	Guyana	6.61	Azerbaijan	11.46
11	Samoa	5.98	Micronesia	11.10
12	Holy See	5.96	Kuwait	10.33
13	Botswana	5.91	Morocco	10.17
14	Micronesia	5.31	Samoa	10.12
15	Qatar	5.18	Guyana	9.87
16	Norway	5.05	Southern Yemen	9.78
17	Dominica	5.05	Saudi Arabia	9.69
18	Congo (PR)	4.92	Eritrea	9.62
19	Monaco	4.85	San Marino	9.57
20	Gabon	4.65	Liberia	9.42
21	Oman	4.49	Belize	9.39
22	Saint Kitts and Nevis	4.44	Nauru	9.35
23	Bahrain	4.39	Tanzania	9.10
24	Sao Tome and Principe	4.37	Congo (PR)	9.07
25	Tajikistan	4.36	Angola	9.05

Notes: The strict measure is the sum of consecutive years served by the ambassador. The lenient measure is the sum of the consecutive and non-consecutive years served by the ambassador and the deputy in either position.

1.3 Interview Data

Table A-4: Geographic Representation of Respondents

		GDP Tercile			
		1	2	3	
Region	Africa		7	6	<i>13</i>
	Americas	2	3	4	<i>9</i>
	Asia	5	2	3	<i>10</i>
	Europe	11	6	2	<i>19</i>
		<i>18</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>51</i>

Table A-5: Level of Representation of Respondents

Level	
Permanent Representative	17
Deputy Permanent Representative	14
Minister Counsellor / Counsellor	1
Counsellor	7
Secretary	11
Attache	1

2 Ambassador Biographies

To probe whether there are important demographic features that predict long tenures, I examine nine of the longest-serving ambassadors, focusing on the post-1980 period to maximize data availability.¹ The profiles of the ambassadors did not suggest major commonalities, with one exception: prior diplomatic experience. Seven of the ambassadors had previously served in other positions in their home Ministry of Foreign Affairs; two had served in other multilateral posts (including the EU, World Bank, and IMF); four had served in other positions at the Mission to the UN before becoming Permanent Representative; and five had served in bilateral posts. While this experience is noteworthy, diplomatic experience is not expected to be fungible across institutional contexts. This is because institutional rules and remits vary across IOs, as do the individuals who comprise the diplomatic corps and the Secretariat. Further, the norms and practices of multilateral permanent representation differ from those of bilateral representation. All this is to say that though other diplomatic experiences may be widely present among the ambassadors, it does not appear to be a prevalent omitted variable in predicting diplomatic experience. Aside from shared diplomatic experience, the ambassadors' professional backgrounds were varied, including business and finance, health, development, education, and legislature. About half were educated at universities in the US or Europe. While most of these individuals were career diplomats, other influential ambassadors—such as the Ambassador from Costa Rica—are political appointees.

These examples illustrate that long-serving UN ambassadors are qualified and diverse individuals. There do not appear to be systematic characteristics that might confound the effects of experience or suggest that particular types of individuals select into longer service.

¹Full profiles are available upon request.

3 Main Results

3.1 Tenure

Table A-6: Predicting Tenure: Fully Saturated Model


	(1)
Male Amb.	-0.009 (0.065)
Polity2	-0.479*** (0.053)
IO Memberships	0.140 (0.169)
Years UN Member	0.481*** (0.096)
Vol. Budget Cont. (log)	-1.23*** (0.183)
Embassies Hosted	0.771*** (0.144)
Alliances	-0.506*** (0.089)
Defense Pacts	0.866*** (0.118)
English Lang.	-0.374** (0.162)
Level Rep.	-0.034 (0.138)
UN Staff (Log)	-0.772*** (0.131)
GDP (log)	-0.446*** (0.063)
Population (log)	-0.520*** (0.086)
Military Exp.	0.332*** (0.050)
Year FE	Yes
Observations	9,654
R ²	0.106

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations.

Table A-7: Predicting Tenure: Individual OLS Model Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Male Amb.	0.024 (0.066)										
Polity2		-0.520*** (0.066)									
IO Memberships			-0.029 (0.091)								
Years UN Member				0.223** (0.089)							
Vol. Budget Cont. (log)					-0.619*** (0.127)						
Embassies Hosted						0.170** (0.084)					
Alliances							0.234*** (0.052)				
Defense Pacts								0.434*** (0.062)			
English Lang.									-0.506*** (0.108)		
Level Rep.										-0.547*** (0.135)	
UN Staff (Log)											-0.502*** (0.077)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,654	9,931	9,931
R ²	0.072	0.083	0.072	0.073	0.073	0.072	0.074	0.078	0.075	0.073	0.075

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations.

Figure A-4: Predicting Tenure: Individual OLS Model Results

Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS model with 95% confidence intervals including one key predictor at a time. Red/circle estimates show general multilateralism controls; blue/triangle estimates show material resource controls.

3.2 Agenda Setting

Table A-8: Predicting Agenda Setting: Fully Saturated Model


	(1)
Experienced (3 Yrs.)	0.083*** (0.028)
Male Amb.	-0.002 (0.006)
Polity2	-0.064*** (0.018)
IO Memberships	-0.229*** (0.045)
Years UN Member	-0.026 (0.022)
Vol. Budget Cont. (log)	0.529*** (0.116)
Embassies Hosted	-0.047* (0.026)
Alliances	0.077*** (0.025)
Defense Pacts	0.074** (0.031)
English Lang.	-0.052 (0.038)
Level Rep.	0.148*** (0.028)
UN Staff (Log)	0.337*** (0.056)
GDP (log)	-0.069*** (0.014)
Population (log)	-0.131*** (0.028)
Military Exp.	-0.092*** (0.017)
Year FE	Yes
Observations	9,654
R ²	0.271

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations.

Table A-9: Predicting Agenda-setting: Individual OLS Model Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Experienced (3 Yrs.)	0.059** (0.025)										
Male Amb.		0.026*** (0.007)									
Polity2			-0.038 (0.023)								
IO Memberships				-0.054 (0.035)							
Years UN Member					-0.010 (0.024)						
Vol. Budget Cont. (log)						0.331*** (0.096)					
Embassies Hosted							0.028 (0.028)				
Alliances								0.133*** (0.017)			
Defense Pacts									0.145*** (0.021)		
English Lang.										0.007 (0.041)	
Level Rep.											0.121*** (0.028)
UN Staff (Log)											0.130*** (0.036)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Power Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,931	10,167	10,167	10,167	10,167	10,167	10,167	10,167	10,167	9,885	10,167
R ²	0.212	0.211	0.211	0.212	0.210	0.219	0.210	0.229	0.229	0.206	0.215

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations.


Figure A-5: Predicting Agenda Setting: Individual OLS Model Results

Notes: Estimated coefficients from individual OLS models with 95% confidence intervals including the power controls and one key predictor at a time. Red/circle estimate shows key tenure measure; green/triangle estimates show general multilateralism controls; blue/circle estimates show material resource controls.

4 Robustness


4.1 Main Robustness Results

Figure A-6: Robustness to Alternate Model Specifications: Tenure




Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models (except for the “NegBin” model, which shows coefficients from a negative binomial model) with 95% confidence intervals. Baseline models include year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at country and year level.

Figure A-7: Robustness to Alternate Measures of Power: Tenure



Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models with 95% confidence intervals. Estimates from models with small power indicators shown in blue/filled circles; estimates turnovers by inexperienced (3 year or less) from models with major power indicators shown in orange/open triangles.

Figure A-8: Robustness to Alternate Model Specifications: Agenda-setting



Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models (except for the “NegBin” model, which shows coefficients from a negative binomial model) with 95% confidence intervals. Baseline models include year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at country and year level. ‘Main’ estimate is the model including only the key predictor and power controls, see Table A-9 and Figure A-5.

Table A-10: Add Country Fixed Effects

Model:	(1)	(2)
<i>Variables</i>		
Experienced (3 Yrs.)	0.070** (0.029)	0.099*** (0.029)
Male Amb.		-0.0009 (0.011)
Polity2		-0.020 (0.030)
IO Memberships		-0.222** (0.084)
Years UN Member		0.227* (0.131)
Vol. Budget Cont. (log)		0.756*** (0.127)
Embassies Hosted		-0.027 (0.036)
Alliances		0.004 (0.045)
Defense Pacts		0.031 (0.048)
Level Rep.		0.135*** (0.029)
UN Staff (Log)		0.359*** (0.068)
GDP (log)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.060** (0.029)
Population (log)	-0.276*** (0.088)	-0.378*** (0.083)
Military Exp.	-0.035** (0.017)	-0.126*** (0.024)
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,931	9,654
R ²	0.282	0.330

Clustered (Year & Country) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A-11: Alternate Measures of Experience

Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Variables</i>				
Experienced (Amb. Only)	0.006 (0.015)	0.013 (0.014)		
Experienced (Amb. or Dep.)			0.025 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Male Amb.		0.004 (0.007)		0.003 (0.008)
Polity2		-0.065*** (0.019)		-0.064*** (0.019)
IO Memberships		-0.215*** (0.042)		-0.217*** (0.042)
Years UN Member		-0.032 (0.022)		-0.034 (0.022)
Vol. Budget Cont. (log)		0.473*** (0.110)		0.475*** (0.110)
Embassies Hosted		-0.018 (0.026)		-0.019 (0.026)
Alliances		0.090*** (0.022)		0.091*** (0.023)
Defense Pacts		-0.015 (0.030)		-0.016 (0.030)
English Lang.		-0.055 (0.038)		-0.056 (0.038)
Level Rep.		0.160*** (0.033)		0.161*** (0.033)
UN Staff (Log)		0.323*** (0.055)		0.325*** (0.055)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Power Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	9,931	9,654	9,931	9,654
R ²	0.218	0.260	0.218	0.261

Clustered (Year) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*


4.2 Alternate Model Specifications

Table A-12: Predicting Agenda Setting: Continuous IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Tenure (Lenient)	0.004 (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	
Bin (3,6]			0.028 (0.020)
Bin (6,9]			0.042* (0.024)
Bin (9,Inf]			0.020 (0.031)
GDP (log)	0.011 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)
Population (log)	0.045*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.014)	0.045*** (0.014)
Military Exp.	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.011)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,931	9,247	9,931
R ²	0.210	0.222	0.210

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations. Model 1 includes all observations, Model 2 excludes observations above the 95th percentile of tenure. In Model 3, 0-3 years is omitted as the reference category.

Figure A-9: GAM Results



Notes: Estimated results from nonparametric Generalized Additive Model (GAM) with a spline (5 knots) on the tenure predictor with 95% confidence intervals.

Table A-13: Interacting Tenure with Smallness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Experienced (3 Yrs.)	0.169*	0.058**	0.058**	0.058**
	(0.098)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Small State Ind.	0.028			
	(0.103)			
Experienced (3 Yrs.) $\times$ Small State Ind.	-0.123			
	(0.102)			
Experienced (3 Yrs.) $\times$ GDP (log)		0.016		
		(0.024)		
Experienced (3 Yrs.) $\times$ Population (log)			0.015	
			(0.025)	
Experienced (3 Yrs.) $\times$ Military Exp.				-0.010
				(0.034)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Power Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,931	9,931	9,931	9,931
R ²	0.214	0.213	0.213	0.213

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations. Small indicator shows countries not in the G20. Results in Model 1 are robust to three indicators of smallness (non-G20, FOSS, SSF). G20 results are shown; others available upon request.


Table A-14: Predicting Agenda Setting: Selection

	(1)
Long-Serving Career	0.098
	(0.062)
GDP (log)	0.034
	(0.026)
Population (log)	0.030
	(0.025)
Military Exp.	0.005
	(0.033)
Year FE	Yes
Observations	1,232
R ²	0.238

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS model estimates, clustered (Country & Year) standard errors in parentheses. Missing data imputed using Amelia, averaged over 5 imputations.


4.3 Elections Results

Figure A-10: Electorally Induced Turnovers



Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models with 95% confidence intervals. Variable suffixes of 1 show results for the incumbent being replaced, and suffixes of 2 show results for the incumbent's party losing, both constructed from the NELDA dataset.


Figure A-11: Electorally Induced Turnovers



Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models with 95% confidence intervals.


4.4 Death Analysis Robustness

Figure A-12: Turnovers at 5 Year Experience Threshold



Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models with 95% confidence intervals.


Figure A-13: Experienced vs. Inexperienced Turnovers



Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models with 95% confidence intervals. Estimates from models with turnovers by experienced (> 3 year tenure ambassadors) are shown in blue/filled circles; estimates from models with turnovers by inexperienced (3 year or less) are shown in orange/open triangles.

Table A-15: Death Balance Table

	Var.	T-Test P val.	Ctrl. Mean	Treatment Mean
1	Polity	0.59	2.13	1.20
2	IO Memberships	0.16	59.87	51.14
3	Duration UN	0.02	41.40	30.27
4	Vol. Budget	0.47	9.64	11.15
5	Embassies	0.83	33.56	35.18
6	Alliances	0.95	2.42	2.44
7	Defense Pacts	0.39	1.48	1.63
8	GDP	0.06	43886549048.28	129021406765.13
9	Pop. (Log)	0.37	15.18	15.66
10	Military Exp.	0.48	3.57	2.83
11	UN Staff (Log)	0.30	2.77	2.37
12	Gender	0.00	1.00	0.89
13	Level Rep.	0.00	1.59	2.17

Figure A-14: Deaths at 5 Year Experience Threshold

Notes: Estimated coefficients from OLS models with 95% confidence intervals.

5 Research Ethics

This research draws on expert interviews with diplomats, which were executed in compliance with standards and obligations described in the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research. The interview protocol went through an IRB review and approval process at the author's university in the U.S. to ensure that the activities were in line with regulations regarding the protection of human subjects. I did not engage with vulnerable populations, and the questions did not cover sensitive topics. The subjects of the interviews were public figures. I did not gather identifying information unless explicitly given permission by the respondent. All interview data are stored in a password-protected folder accessible only to the author. Respondents were asked whether they were comfortable with the author note-taking and recording during the interview, and if they were not, no notes or recordings were taken.

Before conducting the interviews, respondents were provided documentation of the risks and details of the interview to obtain their consent to participate. All respondents were also informed beforehand that they always had the option to opt-out during any point in the interview (none chose to do so). No compensation was provided to respondents. I assessed that the potential contributions of this research project were substantial while risks were minimal, and further that there were no conflicts of interest. Before, during, and after interviews, I ensured that participants understood that no identifying information was collected or would be revealed without the explicit consent of respondents. No deception was used in the study. Interviews to reduce any possible harm and not raise sensitive subjects.

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