Diplomatic Giants: How Small States and Powerful Ambassadors Shape International Organization Policymaking
How do states seek to influence IOs policymaking, and which states succeed in these efforts? I challenge many prevailing theories about who influences IO policymaking—for example, the assumption that powerful states exert undue influence, or that individuals are unimportant relative to structural, state-level features. I examine why some small states—like Ireland, Costa Rica, and Liechtenstein—are effective at influencing IO policymaking by shaping the agendas of IOs, even in the face of powerful states’ opposition.
I argue that while material power is important in explaining some of IO politics, individual diplomats play a crucial role as well. States can influence the early stages of policymaking—when agendas are set and coalitions are built—with diplomatic capital, a form of social power developed through skilled representation. Diplomatic capital can be actively pursued, or can be an unintended consequence of resource constraints on diplomatic rotation. Just as individual effectiveness matters in domestic legislatures, diplomat effectiveness matters in IOs. By cultivating diplomatic capital, small states can be more influential than their size would suggest. I proposed three mechanisms by which diplomatic experience translates to capital: developing social networks, gaining substantive expertise over issues, and attaining mastery over institutional rules.
I contend that by focusing on the late stages of policymaking—particularly voting on final resolutions—previous studies have overestimated the influence of powerful states. Because it is easier to monitor state behavior in the later stages of the policymaking process, larger states can more readily use their economic or military power to influence these activities. However, in the early stages of policymaking where visibility tends to be lower, it is harder to leverage economic and military resources. These insights about the role of diplomacy, power, and agenda control challenge our understanding of the relative importance of power and diplomacy in IOs and the extent to which small states influence international politics. Per my theory, I expect that small states should have greater opportunity to influence the IO agenda in the early stages of policymaking because these contexts are lower-visibility, and thus it is more difficult for large states to deploy leverage economic and military resources to obtain their preferred outcomes. To test these expectations, I employ a multi-method approach.
In Chapter 1, I draw on insights from interviews with diplomats from nearly 50 different states’ missions to the United Nations (UN) to illustrate these different mechanisms by which diplomatic capital results in influence. I suggest that social networks are the principal means by which experience at the UN translates into a diplomat’s ability to be influential.
In Chapter 2, I create an original measure of diplomatic tenure for all UN member states from 1946-2018, constructing a database of 21,159 ambassador and deputy entries. I show that small states have longer average tenures than large states. I assemble an original dataset of 1,476 proposed General Assembly agenda items from 1946-2018 and illustrate that experienced diplomats are more effective at engaging in early-stage legislative activities. Consistent with my argument, I find that states with greater diplomatic capital—as measured by ambassador experience—are more engaged in proposing agenda items. When experienced ambassadors are replaced with novices, states become less engaged in agenda-setting. These findings hold even after random shocks to ambassadorial tenure: ambassador deaths.
In Chapter 3, I explore the biographical features of these individual ambassadors to develop a more fine-grained understanding of the features that translate experience into expertise. I collect biographical data on more than 1200 Permanent Representatives to the UN from 1995-2005, comprising the first cross-national dataset of diplomatic biographical information. Drawing on theories of leader effectiveness and diplomatic practice theory, I assess how key features—including education, employment history, and social networks—moderate the impact of diplomatic experience and contribute to diplomatic capital.
In Chapter 4, I theorize about the generalizability of these findings outside of the UN context, I arguing that the principles of diplomatic capital are likely to be influential across a wide variety of different types of IOs and developing a specific set of generalizability criteria, theorizing the role of preference heterogeneity among members, permanent representation, and formal rules. To test these expectations, I conduct an external validity probe in which I examine ambassadorial tenure and agenda-setting influence at the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO): another IO in which I expect diplomatic capital to play an important role in agenda-setting influence. I create the same measure of diplomat tenure for all GATT/WTO member states from 1983-2009, and assemble an original dataset of proposed agenda items from 1995-2009 to assess the influence of diplomatic capital on agenda-setting in the WTO/GATT.
In this book project, I demonstrate that early-stage legislative activities are an important channel for small-state policy influence in IOs, and that diplomatic capital allows small states to achieve influence in the early stages of IO policymaking. These insights shed light on the under-appreciated influence of small states in international politics, with implications for international policymaking as well as institutional legitimacy.