Other Research in Progress

Think Globally, Act Locally: The Determinants of Local Policymakers’ Support for Climate Policy (with Joshua A. Schwartz). Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Politics.

Although much progress to combat climate change has occurred subnationally, little research examines the policy preferences of local policymakers themselves and whether policymaker and public preferences are contradictory or compatible. To address these questions, we conduct identical conjoint experiments on over 500 local policymakers and the American public. Per our theoretical expectations, we demonstrate the probability of policy adoption can be increased by strategic design. Most notably, climate-related subsidies and regulations are preferred over taxes and penalties, suggesting efforts to put a price on carbon may not be the optimal approach. Partisan endorsements of climate plans also have a large effect—greater in some cases than substantive policy design—consistent with increasing polarization. While direct economic relief to the public is popular, it does not increase support for bolder climate policies. Finally, elite and public preferences are highly compatible, which is a positive signal about the representativeness of American democracy.

Engaged member state participation is a crucial resource that international organizations (IOs) need to survive and thrive. But IOs often award relatively high levels of formal and informal influence to their most powerful member states, which disincentives engaged participation by relatively weak member states. How do IOs encourage broad participation? We focus on one tool international institutions utilize to boost the influence of member states — institutional leadership positions. We argue that awarding such leadership roles, including to otherwise weak states, boosts their voice in IOs; their preferences are more likely to be reflected in policymaking processes. Such states thus have incentives to participate eagerly in IOs. We specifically examine the deliberations that take place in the IMF’s Executive Board, where Global South countries are structurally disadvantaged by the Fund’s proxy representation system; wealthy states represent themselves while other states belong to multi-member constituencies in which leadership rotates among members. We contend that the policymaking process at the Fund should be most influenced by states that represent themselves or are constituency leaders. Focusing on issues related to climate change, we deploy multiple measures to examine the extent to which countries’ preferences over climate issues are realized at IMF Board meetings. We find evidence to support our theoretical expectations; states more effectively advance their positions when they have more powerful institutional roles — this holds even for otherwise weak states.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans often require states to implement stringent policy conditions for funds to be disbursed. However, many recipients are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, which can limit their ability to implement such conditions. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many developing countries are especially climate vulnerable. We examine whether and how the IMF accounts for the burden posed by states’ climate vulnerabilities. We show that the Fund balances moral hazard and climate justice considerations by offering vulnerable countries loans with fewer and less stringent policy conditions. Mechanism tests suggest this effect is driven by bureaucrats learning about the vulnerability-inducing threat of climate rather than the initiative of management or member states. These findings highlight the subtle responsiveness of international financial institutions to countries’ climate vulnerabilities and illustrate how climate change influences international economic policymaking processes.

Has the adoption of digital diplomacy hurt consensus-building in multilateral negotiations? Building on elite interviews, I posit a theoretical framework to predict when digital diplomacy should pose a greater challenge. I argue that in institutions with strong consensus norms and diverse membership, digital diplomacy renders consensus-building more difficult. I test these expectations in the UN General Assembly, comparing consensus under the digital protocol adopted during COVID-19 to face-to-face negotiations. I also conduct an external validity probe in the EU Council. I find that, although consensus rates in aggregate did not decline, diplomats engaged in strategic selection, freezing negotiations on controversial and emerging issues to focus on easier issue areas. To separate the effects of digital diplomacy from the larger impacts of COVID-19, I propose two laboratory experiments. My findings suggest that digital diplomacy can be a useful tool for diplomatic `maintenance,’ but not for addressing many pressing issues.

As China assumes leadership in several key United Nations (UN) agencies, we assess the impact of this leadership on China’s global image, particularly in democratic states. We argue that a rising power uses IO leadership to portray itself as a responsible power. However, these efforts may have negative effects on the perceived legitimacy of IOs, which may be subsequently viewed as subject to major power capture. We test these expectations in pre-registered survey experiments in Brazil—a China-friendly case—and France—a China-skeptical case—finding that while China’s leadership of the UN enhances its image among skeptical publics, it negatively affects IO legitimacy in both populations. To a lesser extent, US leadership of IOs also reduces their legitimacy, suggesting publics are also concerned about great power control of IOs broadly. These findings advance our understanding of image management, soft power, and IO legitimacy, contributing to broader debates on China’s growing role in global governance.

Why are some small states effective in shaping the UN agenda, even in the face of powerful states’ opposition? I argue that states can influence the early stages of policymaking with diplomatic capital, a form of social power developed through skilled representation. By focusing on the late stages of policymaking, previous studies have overestimated the influence of powerful states. To test these claims, I assemble a dataset of proposed agenda items and the tenure of all states’ ambassadors from 1946-2019, and conduct interviews with diplomats from 49 states. I find that smaller states have higher diplomatic capital, states with greater diplomatic capital are more successful at agenda-setting even after accounting for material power, and random shocks to ambassadorial tenure—ambassador deaths—have negative effects on diplomatic capital. These insights challenge our understanding of the importance of power and diplomacy in IOs and the extent to which small states influence international politics.

Why do negotiators recycle previous texts in the drafting of legal documents in international organizations? I engage with theories of international lawmaking to understand how the unique context of IOs leads to different expectations of textual recycling compared to previously studied contexts, primarily treaty negotiations. I argue that textual recycling is an efficiency-enhancing strategy which negotiators are particularly likely to use when confronted by demanding policy agendas and when addressing low-salience issues. To assess this theory, I deploy a machine learning approach to measure textual recycling across all UN resolutions passed from 1946-2018. In line with my expectations, I find that rates of textual recycling are higher in the UNGA—which has an extensive agenda—than the UNSC—which has a narrower agenda. I further find that recycling is more likely to be used within chambers compared to across chambers, and on lower salience issues than on security matters. These findings suggest that negotiators weigh the benefits of efficiency against the importance of specificity when choosing to recycle texts.

Adopting climate mitigation policies is highly politicized in the US context. While prior work has shown a connection between the gender identity of individual members of the public and support for climate policy, to what extent does the gendered nature of the policy itself and the sex of the leader proposing it impact public opinion? We theorize that policies that are perceived as `masculine-threatening’ elicit more public opposition than gender-neutral climate policies. We further argue that women leaders face a higher penalty for pursuing climate mitigation, especially when they advocate for climate policies that threaten masculine-coded norms and behaviors. For example, if a woman leader proposes climate mitigation measures that disincentivize eating meat or driving larger, “manly” vehicles, then we expect public approval will be lower than if a man proposed an identical policy. To test our theoretical expectations, we deploy pre-registered survey experiments on representative samples of the US public. While we find that masculine-threatening policies face substantially more opposition, we do not find that women policymakers face a gender penalty for advocating either type of climate policy. These results have significant implications for academic theories about gender and climate policymaking, and suggest that sex alone does not inhibit women policymakers from advancing progressive climate action.

Multilateral diplomacy is a deeply social activity, in which interpersonal interactions allow diplomats to negotiate compromises across heterogeneous preferences. Deeper social ties enable diplomats to develop trust, exchange information, and reduce miscommunication, which are instrumental in successful negotiations. Can physical proximity between diplomats facilitate social relationships, thus fostering increased multilateral cooperation? We leverage the randomized seating arrangement of the UN General Assembly to investigate this question, probing whether spatially proximate diplomats are more likely to collaborate and vote similarly compared to spatially disparate diplomats. We find support for our expectation that diplomats seated next to each other are more likely to vote similarly, even after controlling for measures of state influence and affinity, and that the mechanism behind this effect is individual-level social relations between diplomats. Our results speak to the importance of face-to-face diplomacy conducted through international organizations (IOs), as well as the role of individual bureaucrats in shaping international political outcomes.

An array of international organizations (IOs) are working to address issues of environmental governance and human migration. Climate migration cross-cuts these unique issue areas, posing a set of distinct challenges for global governance and institutional coordination. We map and explore the international institutional arrangements established to manage climate migration. Some institutions serve clear roles as coordinators or leaders, while others do not play a significant role despite maintaining expertise in adjacent policy areas. To understand these patterns, we explore whether there exists a regime complex on climate migration, and if so, how did such an institutional arrangement come to be? %If not, why not, and what are the implications for climate migration policymaking at the state and interstate levels?
Employing a qualitative analysis of policy documents, conceptual frameworks, and institutional structures, we explore the intersections, duplications, and hierarchies among IOs working to address climate migration. Interviews with policymakers illuminate key points of tension and overlap, and opportunities for progress. Overall, we document a complex web of institutional arrangements, characterized by both cooperation and competition. The current framework is shaped to a significant degree by wrangling over funding, influence, and prestige. Understanding the dynamics of these institutional arrangements is crucial for fostering global governance mechanisms to manage the challenges posed by climate-induced migration.

Public diplomacy, traditionally led by government actors through initiatives like state visits, foreign aid, and official messaging, aims to communicate with and attract foreign publics. However, states are increasingly delegating these efforts to private and non-state actors, including celebrities and social media influencers. Is this `influencer diplomacy‘ effective at accomplishing the goals of traditional public diplomacy? We theorize that the credibility and positionality of non-traditional messengers significantly impact their effectiveness. We propose a series of survey experiments in the U.S. to evaluate whether influencers, due to their likability and perceived authenticity (positionality), are more effective than traditional diplomats, or if their potential lack of expertise and objectivity (credibility) undermines their impact. This research contributes to understanding the evolving landscape of public diplomacy and the strategic use of influencers in IR.